Some abstracts from the work on the topic Phenomenology and dynamics of stressful experiences in young children
INTRODUCTION

Stress and a child at first glance, the concepts are incompatible. Well, what kind of stress can a person have without the need to sit for hours in a traffic jam, swear with a saleswoman in a store, report for their own, and sometimes other people's mistakes to their superiors and fight like a fish on ice, in an attempt to reason with subordinates. And yet this little man also leads his public life, colliding with the interests and desires of other people, and therefore, getting into a stressful situation.
The essence of stress is that the body quickly adapts to a new situation, finds the only right solution. Overcoming stress in a person is manifested in a number of psychological and physiological properties: improving attention, increasing interest in achieving goals, positive emotional coloring of the work process. But it happens that the situation exceeds the adaptive capabilities of a person, and then comes the deterioration in well-being, which we colloquially call stress. In a baby who does not have proper immunity to stress, any, the most trifling situation at home, at school, in kindergarten can cause it.
Childhood is a period of unusually rapid development. During this time, the child learns many things, masters some abilities, acquires skills in many areas of activity. During this period, the quality of many neoplasms determines how successfully development occurs, how well the child learns to survive failures and stressful situations. Of course, in many ways, this does not depend on the child himself, but rather on those close adults who surround him, first of all, these are parents and educators in preschool institutions, teachers. Often, even noticing that a child is experiencing troubles, failures, not every adult will find an acceptable way to help him get out of an unfavorable situation.
Stress is a very difficult situation even for an adult, but for a fragile and still inexperienced child, this situation is doubly difficult.
For a very long time in Russia, issues of dealing with stress were hushed up, and stress in a child was not even mentioned. Currently, publications have begun to appear on stress in children, but in most cases they relate to stress disorders in school-age children. Causes, features of the course and assistance to younger children with stress is currently a little-studied issue.
Thus, the relevance of the thesis topic is due not only to the need for a clear understanding of the structure and course of the process of stressful experiences in children, but also to the need to develop methods for overcoming them.
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the phenomenology and dynamics of stressful experiences in young children.
To achieve this goal, the following tasks were solved in the work:
1. the features of the occurrence and course of stressful processes in young children are determined;
2. analyzed the main causes of stress in children;
3. the main methods of dealing with stress are characterized;
4. A study was conducted that characterizes the ability to deal with stress in young children.
The thesis is written on 40 pages and consists of an introduction, two chapters, divided into paragraphs, a conclusion and a list of references.

Phenomenology represents one of the directions in the philosophy of the 20th century, the task of which is to describe the phenomenon (phenomenon, event, experience) based on the primary experience of the cognizing consciousness (transcendental Self). Its founder is Husserl, although he had predecessors: Franz Bertano and Karl Stumpf.

Husserl's book "Logical Research" is the starting point for the emergence of this trend, which had a huge impact on the emergence and development of phenomenological psychology, phenomenological sociology, philosophy of religion, ontology, philosophy of mathematics and natural science, metaphysics, hermeneutics, existentialism and personalism.

The core of this trend is the concept of intentionality.- a property of human consciousness directed to a specific subject, that is, a person's interest in considering the philosophical aspect of a particular object.

Phenomenology aims to create a universal science that would serve as a justification for all other sciences and knowledge in general, had a rigorous justification. Phenomenology seeks to describe the intentionality of the life of consciousness, the existence of the individual, as well as the fundamental foundations of human existence.

A characteristic feature of this method is the rejection of any questionable premises. This direction affirms the simultaneous inseparability and at the same time the irreducibility of consciousness, human existence, personality, the psychophysical nature of man, spiritual culture and society.

Husserl put forward the slogan " Back to the things themselves!", which orients a person to the removal of functional and causal relationships between the objective world and our consciousness. That is, his call is the restoration of the connection between consciousness and objects, when the object does not turn into consciousness, but is perceived by consciousness as an object that has certain properties without studying its functions, structure, etc. He defended pure consciousness, free from dogma, imposed thought patterns.

IN 2 main methods were proposed as research methods:

• Evidence - direct contemplation,
• Phenomenological reduction is the liberation of consciousness from natural (naturalistic) attitudes.

Phenomenological reduction is not a naive immersion in the surrounding world, but focuses on what consciousness experiences in the world that is given to us. Then these experiences are used simply as certain concrete facts, but as ideal entities. This is then reduced to the pure consciousness of our transcendent Self.

"... The field of phenomenology is an analysis of what is revealed a priori in direct intuition, fixations of directly discernible entities and their interconnections and their descriptive cognition in a systemic union of all layers in a transcendentally pure consciousness," — Husserl, Ideas.

Using the method of phenomenological reduction, a person gradually comes to understand that being is preceded by pure ego or pure consciousness with the entities it experiences.

Phenomenology thus covers a vast field from simple contemplation of an object to philosophical reflection on the basis of its semantic cultures.

Husserl sought not only to understand the world, but also to construct, to the creation of a true world, in the center of which is the person himself. He wrote: "Philosophical knowledge creates not only special results, but also a human attitude, which immediately invades the rest of practical life ... It forms a new intimate community between people, we could say a community of purely ideal interests between people who live by philosophy, are connected by unforgettable ideas which are not only useful to everyone, but are identically mastered by everyone".

Currently, phenomenological research methods are used in psychiatry, sociology, literary criticism and aesthetics. The largest centers of phenomenology are located in Belgium and Germany. In the 90s of the 20th century, centers were established in Moscow and Prague. The International Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Education is located in the USA.

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David Woodruff Smith

Phenomenology

Phenomenology is the study of the structures of consciousness as they are experienced from a first-person perspective. The main structure of experience is its intentionality, focus on something, since it is an experience of some object or about it. The experience is directed towards the object in consequence of its content or meaning (representing the object), together with the corresponding conditions for the possibility of this.

Phenomenology as a discipline is distinct from, but related to, other major philosophical disciplines such as ontology, epistemology, logic, and ethics. Phenomenology has been practiced for centuries in a variety of guises, but it gained independence at the beginning of the 20th century in the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others. The phenomenological problems of intentionality, consciousness, qualia, and first-person perspective came to the fore in discussions modern philosophy of consciousness.

1. What is phenomenology?

Phenomenology is usually understood in one of two ways: as one of the philosophical disciplines, or as one of the movements in the history of philosophy.

Phenomenology as a discipline can initially be defined as the study of the structures of experience, or consciousness. In the literal sense, phenomenology is the study of "phenomena", the appearance of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways in which we experience things, and hence the meanings that things have in our experience. Phenomenology studies conscious experience experienced from a subjective point of view, or from a first-person perspective. This area of ​​philosophy, therefore, must be distinguished from its other main areas: ontology (the study of being, or what is), epistemology (the study of knowledge), logic (the study of formally correct reasoning), ethics (the study of right and wrong actions) etc., and correlated with them.

Phenomenology as a historical movement is a philosophical tradition begun in the first half of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre and others. This movement exalted phenomenology as a discipline as the true foundation of all philosophy - in contrast to for example, ethics, metaphysics or epistemology. The methods and characteristics of this discipline were widely discussed by Husserl and his followers; these discussions continue to this day. (The definition of phenomenology given above will thus be contested by, for example, Heideggerians, but it remains the starting point for describing this discipline.)

In the modern philosophy of consciousness, the term "phenomenology" is often used only to characterize the sensory qualities of seeing, hearing, etc. - what it is like to have different kinds of sensations. However, our experience is usually much richer in content and is not limited to just sensation. Accordingly, in the phenomenological tradition, phenomenology is interpreted much more broadly and deals with the meanings of things in our experience, in particular, the meaning of objects, events, tools, the flow of time, the self, etc. - to the extent that these things arise and are experienced in our "life the world."

Phenomenology as a discipline was central to the tradition of continental European philosophy throughout the 20th century, while philosophy of mind originated in the Austro-Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy that developed throughout the 20th century. But the essential character of our mental activity has been treated in these two traditions in such a way that their analyzes overlap. Accordingly, the perspective of phenomenology outlined in this article will take both traditions into account. The main task here will be to characterize phenomenology as a discipline within its modern boundaries, while noting the historical tradition that led to the independence of this discipline.

In essence, phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experience - from perception, thinking, memory, imagination, emotion, desire and volition to bodily consciousness, embodied action and social activity, including language activity. The structure of these forms of experience, as a rule, contains what Husserl called "intentionality", i.e., the orientation of experience to things in the world - that property of consciousness, due to which it is consciousness of something or about something. According to classical Husserlian phenomenology, our experience is directed towards things—represents or “intends” them—exclusively. across concrete concepts, thoughts, ideas, images, etc. They constitute the meaning or content of the corresponding present experience and are different from the things they represent or imply.

The essential intentional structure of consciousness, as we discover in reflection or analysis, presupposes other forms of experience that complement it. Thus, phenomenology develops a complex concept of awareness of time (within the stream of consciousness), awareness of space (primarily in perception), attention (distinguishing between focal and marginal, or “horizontal” consciousness), awareness of the appropriation of experience (self-consciousness - in one of the senses ), self-consciousness (consciousness of oneself), the self in its various roles (as thinking, acting, etc.), embodied action (including kinesthetic awareness of one's own movement), purpose and intention in action (more or less explicit) awareness of other persons (in empathy, intersubjectivity, collectively), language activities (including giving meaning, communication and understanding of others), social interaction (including collective action) and daily activity in the life world around us (in a particular culture ).

Further, in a different plane, we find various grounds or conditions for realization - conditions for possibility - intentionality, including embodiment, bodily skills, cultural context, language and other social practices, social background and contextual aspects of intentional activity. Thus, phenomenology leads us from conscious experience to the conditions that help it acquire intentionality. Traditional phenomenology has focused on the subjective, practical, and social conditions of experience. Contemporary philosophy of consciousness, however, has focused primarily on the neural substratum of experience, on how conscious experience and mental representations or intentionality are based on brain activity. It remains a difficult question to what extent these foundations of experience fall within the realm of phenomenology as a discipline. After all, cultural conditions seem to be more closely related to our experiences and habitual self-esteem than the electrochemical processes in the brain are related to them, not to mention the quantum mechanical states of physical systems with which we can relate. It is safe to say that phenomenology, at least in some way, leads us to some background conditions of our experiences.

2. Phenomenology as a discipline

Phenomenology as a discipline is defined by its field of study, methods and main results.

Phenomenology studies the structures of conscious experience as they are experienced from a first-person perspective, as well as the relevant conditions of experience. The central structure of experience is its intentionality, the way it is directed towards some object in the world - through its content or its inherent meaning.

We all experience different types of experience, including perception, imagination, thinking, emotions, desires, volitions, and actions. So the field of phenomenology is a set of experiences, including the types mentioned (along with others). Experiences are not only relatively passive, as with sight or hearing, but also active - when we walk, hammer a nail or kick a ball. (The scope of experience will be different for each kind of conscious being; we are interested in our own, human experience. Not all conscious beings will or will be able to practice phenomenology like we do.)

Conscious experiences have a unique feature: we we are going through them, we live or realize them. Other things in the world we can observe and deal with. But we do not experience them in the sense of living or realizing them. This experiential or subjective characteristic - experientiality - is an essential part of the nature or structure of conscious experience: as we put it, "I see/think/wish/do...". This trait is both a phenomenological and an ontological characteristic of every experience: it is an element of what it means to experience (phenomenological) and an element of what it means to be an experience (ontological).

How should we study conscious experience? We think about different types of experiences in the same way that we experience them. In other words, we start from a first-person point of view. Usually, however, we do not characterize the experience at the moment of its realization. In many cases, we are deprived of such an opportunity: states of intense anger or fear, for example, absorb all the mental attention of the subject. Having experienced a certain experience, we rather gain some background and familiarity with the corresponding type of experience: listening to a song, watching a sunset, thinking about love, intending to jump over a barrier. Phenomenological practice presupposes such familiarity with the types of experiences it characterizes. It is also important that phenomenology deals precisely with types of experiences, and not with specific fluid experiences, unless we are interested in their types.

Classical phenomenologists practiced three different methods. (1) We describe a certain type of experience as we find it in our own (past) experience. That is why Husserl and Merleau-Ponty said that one only needs to describe the experience. (2) We interpret a particular type of experience by relating it to relevant contextual characteristics. In this vein, Heidegger and his followers talked about hermeneutics, the art of interpreting in context, especially social and linguistic. (3) We analyze the form of the type of experience. Ultimately, all classical phenomenologists analyzed experiences, highlighting their important features for processing.

In recent decades, these traditional methods have branched out, expanding the range of methods available to phenomenology. So, in (4) of the logical-semantic model of phenomenology, we specify the conditions for the truth of a certain type of thoughts (when, for example, I think that dogs chase cats) or the conditions for the realization of a certain type of intentions (say, when I intend or want to jump over a barrier) . (5) In the experimental paradigm of cognitive neuroscience, we devise empirical experiments aimed at confirming or disproving the existence of some aspect of experience (when, for example, a brain scanner shows electrochemical activity in a particular region of the brain that is believed to serve a certain type of vision, emotion or motor control). This kind of "neurophenomenology" suggests that conscious experience is based on neural activity in embodied action in the appropriate environment - mixing pure phenomenology with biology and physics in a way that cannot be recognized as the fully congenial approaches of traditional phenomenologists.

What makes an experience conscious is the subject's awareness of the experience while experiencing or realizing it. This form of inner awareness has been the subject of many discussions that have spanned centuries since the question was posed in Locke's concept of self-consciousness, which develops Cartesian's idea of ​​consciousness ( conscience, consciousness). Does this awareness of the experience consist in a kind of internal observation of the experience, as if the subject were doing two things at once? (Brentano argued not.) Is this a high-level perception of the subject's mental activity, or a high-level thought of such activity? (Modern theorists have proposed both solutions.) Or is it another form of essential structure? (Sartre took this position, relying on the ideas of Brentano and Husserl.) These questions are beyond the scope of this article, but we note that the results of the phenomenological analysis mentioned above outline the field of study and the methodology appropriate to it. After all, awareness of experience is a defining feature of conscious experience, a feature that gives it a subjective, experienced character. It is the lived character of experience that makes it possible to study the object of study, namely experience, from the position of the first person, and such a perspective is a characteristic feature of the methodology of phenomenology.

Conscious experience is the starting point of phenomenology, but this experience graduates to less explicitly conscious phenomena. As Husserl and others have emphasized, we are only vaguely aware of things in the margins or periphery of our attention, and we are only implicitly aware of the wider horizon of things in the world around us. Moreover, as Heidegger emphasized, in practical matters, for example, when we are walking, hammering a nail, or speaking our native language, we are not explicitly aware of our habitual patterns of action. Moreover, as psychologists have noted, most of our intentional mental activity is not conscious at all, but can become so in the process of therapy or questioning, when we become aware of how we feel or think about something. We must therefore admit that the realm of phenomenology - our own experience - extends from conscious experience to semi-conscious and even unconscious mental activity, together with relevant background conditions implicitly involved in our experience. (These are debatable points; the point of these remarks is to be puzzled by the question of where to draw the boundary line separating the field of phenomenology from other fields.)

For an elementary exercise in phenomenology, consider a number of typical experiences that we can have in everyday life and taken from the perspective of the first person.

I see this fishing boat at the shore in the twilight coming over the Pacific Ocean.

I hear the sound of a helicopter approaching the hospital.

I think that phenomenology is different from psychology.

I want warm rains to come from the Gulf of Mexico, just like last week.

I imagine a terrible creature, like from my nightmare.

I'm going to finish the text by noon.

I carefully walk around the broken glass on the sidewalk.

I send a diagonal backhand with a characteristic twist.

I choose words to express my thoughts in a conversation.

These are rudimentary characteristics of certain habitual types of experience. Each sentence is a simple form of phenomenological description, articulating in everyday Russian the structure of the type of experience so described. The subjective term "I" serves as an indicator of the structuredness of experience from the position of the first person: intentionality stems from the subject. The verb indicates the type of intentional activity described: perception, thinking, imagination, etc. The way in which conscious objects are represented or intended in our experiences is important, especially the way we see, imagine, or think about objects. The direct object expression ("that fishing boat by the shore") articulates the way in which the object is represented in experience: the content or meaning of the experience, the essence of what Husserl called "noema". In fact, this objective phrase expresses the noema of the described act to the extent that the corresponding expressive possibilities of the language allow it. The general form of this sentence articulates the basic form of intentionality in experience: subject-act-content-object.

A rich phenomenological description or interpretation, such as we can find in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and others, will be very different from the simple phenomenological descriptions presented above. But such simple descriptions reveal the basic form of intentionality. By expanding the phenomenological description, we can assess the relevance of the context of the corresponding experience. And we can turn to the broader conditions for the possibility of this type of experience. Similarly, in the course of phenomenological practice, we classify, describe, interpret, and analyze the structures of experience according to our own experience.

In such interpretative-descriptive analyzes of experiences, we directly observe that we are analyzing the habitual forms of consciousness, the conscious experience of something. Intentionality, therefore, occupies a key place in the structure of our experience, and phenomenology is largely the study of various aspects of intentionality. Thus we explore the structures of the stream of consciousness, the enduring self, the embodied self, and bodily action. In addition, in thinking about how these phenomena work, we turn to the analysis of the relevant conditions that make possible our experiences as we have them and allow them to be represented and intended in their own way. Phenomenology thus leads to analyzes of the conditions for the possibility of intentionality, including motor skills and habits, background social practices, and often language, with its special place in human affairs.

3. From phenomena to phenomenology

The Oxford English Dictionary offers the following definition: Phenomenology. a. The science of phenomena other than being (ontology). b. A section of any science that deals with the description and classification of phenomena. From Greek phainomenon, phenomenon". In philosophy, the term is used in the first sense, while questions of theory and methodology are controversial. In physics and philosophy of science, it is used in the second sense, although it is used only sporadically in this area.

In its original meaning, therefore, phenomenology is the study phenomena, i.e. - literally - phenomena, not reality. Philosophy began with this ancient distinction when we emerged from Plato's cave. But phenomenology as a discipline did not develop until the 20th century, and is still poorly understood in some circles of modern philosophy. What is this discipline? And how did philosophy go from the original concept of phenomena to phenomenology as a discipline?

Initially, in the 18th century, "phenomenology" was understood as the theory of phenomena essential for empirical knowledge, primarily sensory phenomena. The Latin term "Phenomenologia" was introduced by Christoph Friedrich Oetinger in 1736. Subsequently, the German term "Phänomenologie" was used by Johann Heinrich Lambert, a follower of Christian Wolff. In a number of writings, this term was used by Immanuel Kant, as well as by Johann Gottlieb Fichte. In 1807, G. W. F. Hegel wrote a book entitled "Phänomenologie des Geistes" (the title of which is usually translated as "Phenomenology of the Spirit"). By 1889 Franz Brentano was using the term to characterize what he called "descriptive psychology". Hence Husserl took this term for his new science consciousness, the rest is known.

Suppose we say that phenomenology studies phenomena: what appears to us and its appearances. But how to understand phenomena? The term has had a rich history over the past centuries, in which we can find traces of the emerging discipline of phenomenology.

If we think in a strictly empiricist way, then sense data or qualia are sent to consciousness: either the patterns of the subject's own sensations (seeing red here and now, feeling tickled, hearing a booming bass), or sensory patterns of the objects around us in the world, for example, the sight and smell of flowers. (what John Locke called the secondary qualities of things). If we argue in a strictly rationalistic way, then the mind is the ideas, rationally formed "clear and distinct ideas" (in accordance with the ideal of Rene Descartes). In Immanuel Kant's theory of cognition, which combines rationalistic and empiricist goals, phenomena are defined to consciousness as things-as-they-are or things-as-they-represent (in the synthesis of sensory and conceptual forms of objects-as-they-are-cognized by us). In Auguste Comte's theory of science, phenomena ( phenomena) are facts ( faits, happening), which should be explained by one or another scientific discipline.

Epistemology of the 18th and 19th centuries Phenomena thus turn out to be the starting point for the construction of knowledge and, above all, of science. Accordingly, phenomena in the usual and still common sense are everything that we observe (perceive) and want to explain.

After the emergence of psychology as a discipline at the end of the 19th century, the phenomena, however, took on a somewhat different form. In Psychology from an Empirical Point of View (1874) by Franz Brentano, phenomena are what happens in the mind: mental phenomena are acts of consciousness (or their content moments), and physical phenomena are objects of external perception, starting with colors and shapes. From Brentano's point of view, physical phenomena exist "intentionally" in acts of consciousness. This view revives the medieval notion that Brentano called "intentional inner existence", but its ontology remains undeveloped (what does it mean to exist in the mind, and do physical objects exist only in the mind?). In a more general form, we could say that phenomena are everything that we are aware of: objects and events around us, other people, ourselves, and even (in reflection) our own conscious experiences as they are experienced. In a certain technical sense, phenomena are things insofar as they are given to our consciousness, whether in perception, imagination, thought or volition. This understanding of phenomena was destined to form a new discipline - phenomenology.

Brentano distinguished between descriptive And genetic psychology. Genetic psychology looks for the causes of various types of phenomena, and descriptive psychology defines and classifies such types, such as perception, judgment, emotion, etc. According to Brentano, every mental phenomenon, or act of consciousness, is directed towards some object, and so directed only mental phenomena. The intentionality thesis was a hallmark of Brentano's descriptive psychology. In 1889, Brentano used the term "phenomenology" for descriptive psychology, which paved the way for Husserl's creation of a new science - phenomenology.

Phenomenology as we know it was founded by Edmund Husserl in his Logical Investigations (1900–1901). This monumental work combined two essentially different theoretical lines: a psychological theory, continuing the ideas of Franz Brentano (and also William James, whose Principles of Psychology appeared in 1891 and made a great impression on Husserl), and a logical or semantic theory, continuing the ideas Bernard Bolzano and a number of Husserl's contemporaries who created modern logic, including Gottlob Frege. (It is curious that both lines of research go back to Aristotle, and that both produced important new fruits in Husserl's time.)

Husserl's "logical investigations" are inspired by Bolzan's ideal of logic using Brentano's concept of descriptive psychology. In his Teachings of Science (1835), Bolzano distinguished between subjective and objective ideas or representations ( Vorstellungen). In fact, Bolzano criticized Kant and the earlier classical empiricists and rationalists for their lack of such a distinction, which made phenomena only subjective. Logic is the study of objective ideas, including propositions, which in turn constitute the objective theories we find, for example, in the sciences. Psychology, on the other hand, would study subjective ideas, the specific content (episodes) of mental activity going on in specific minds at one time or another. Husserl sought to realize both goals within a single discipline. Phenomena, therefore, must be rethought as objective intentional contents (sometimes called "intentional objects") of subjective acts of consciousness. Phenomenology, therefore, studies this conglomeration of consciousness and phenomena correlated with it. In Ideas I (Book One, 1913) Husserl introduces two Greek words meant to convey his version of Bolzan's distinction: knowledge And noema, from the Greek verb no éō (νοεω), meaning "perceive", "think", "mean", hence the noun nous, or mind. The intentional process of consciousness is called knowledge, and its ideal content is noema. Husserl described the noema of an act of consciousness as both an ideal meaning and an "intentional object". Thus the phenomenon, or object-as-appearance, becomes a noema, or intentional object. Various interpretations of Husserl's theory of the noema have been put forward, associated with different ways of developing the fundamental theory of intentionality for Husserl. (Is it an aspect of the noema of the intentional object, or is it rather a medium for the intention?)

For Husserl, therefore, phenomenology combines a kind of psychology with a kind of logic. It develops a descriptive or analytical psychology by describing and analyzing types of subjective mental activity or experience, in a word, acts of consciousness. But it also develops a kind of logic - a theory of meaning (today we would say "logical semantics"), describing and analyzing the objective content of consciousness: ideas, concepts, images, propositions - in a word, all sorts of ideal meanings that serve as intentional content or noematic meanings of various types of experience. This content can be broadcast by various acts of consciousness and in this sense is an objective, ideal meaning. Following Bolzano (and, to a certain extent, the Platonic logician Hermann Lotze), Husserl opposed the reduction of logic, mathematics, or science to mere psychology, to how people actually think. In the same vein, he distinguished between phenomenology and mere psychology. From the point of view of Husserl, the subject of phenomenology is consciousness, and at the same time, the objective and translatable meanings of experiences are not reduced to purely subjective episodes. Ideal meaning is the engine of intentionality in acts of consciousness.

A clear understanding of phenomenology was waiting in the wings - Husserl's development of a clear model of intentionality. Indeed, both phenomenology and the modern notion of intentionality go back to Husserl's Logical Investigations (1900-1901). In the "Investigations" Husserl laid the theoretical foundations of phenomenology, and the very promotion of this radical new science took place in his "Ideas I" (1913). Alternative versions of phenomenology soon appeared.

4. History and varieties of phenomenology

Phenomenology acquired an independent status thanks to Husserl, just as epistemology gained such status thanks to Descartes, and ontology or metaphysics - thanks to Aristotle following Plato. Yet phenomenology has been practiced, named or not, for many centuries. When Hindu and Buddhist philosophers thought about the states of consciousness achieved through various kinds of meditation, they practiced phenomenology. When Descartes, Hume, and Kant characterized the states of perception, thought, and imagination, they were practicing phenomenology. When Brentano was classifying varieties of mental phenomena (defined in terms of the direction of consciousness), he was practicing phenomenology. When James was evaluating various kinds of mental activities in the stream of consciousness (speaking, among other things, of their embodiment and their dependence on habit), he also practiced phenomenology. Phenomenology has often been practiced by modern analytical philosophers of consciousness, dealing with the problems of consciousness and intentionality. And yet, despite centuries of roots, phenomenology flourished as a discipline only in Husserl.

Husserl's writings caused an avalanche of phenomenological texts in the first half of the 20th century. The diversity of traditional phenomenology is evident from the Encyclopedia of Phenomenology ( EncyclopediaofPhenomenology, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, Dordrecht and Boston), which contains various articles on seven types of phenomenology. (1) Transcendental constitutive phenomenology studies how objects are constituted in pure or transcendental consciousness, leaving aside questions about any relation to the natural world around us. (2) Naturalistic constitutive phenomenology studies how consciousness constitutes or perceives things in the natural world, assuming - together with the natural attitude - that consciousness is part of nature. (3) Existential phenomenology studies concrete human existence, including the experience of free choice or action in specific situations. (4) Generative historicist phenomenology studies the generation of the meaning of our experiences in the historical processes of collective experience. (5) Genetic phenomenology studies the genesis of the meanings of things in the subjective flow of experiences. (6) Hermeneutic phenomenology studies the interpretive structures of experience, how we understand and interact with the objects around us in the world of human existence, including ourselves and other people. (7) Realistic phenomenology studies the structure of consciousness and intentionality, assuming the existence of this structure in the real world, which for the most part occupies an external relation to consciousness and is in no way produced by consciousness.

The most famous of the classical phenomenologists were Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. These four thinkers understood phenomenology differently, practiced different methods, and got different results. Short review These differences will allow us to convey the characteristics of a key period in the history of phenomenology and, at the same time, a sense of the diversity characteristic of the entire field of phenomenology.

In Logical Investigations (1900-1901) Husserl gave an outline of the many-part system of philosophy in its progress from logic to the philosophy of language, then to ontology (the theory of universals and parts of the whole) and the phenomenological theory of intentionality, and finally to the phenomenological theory of knowledge. Then, in Ideas I, he focused directly on phenomenology. Husserl defined phenomenology as the "science of the essence" of consciousness, centered on the defining characteristic of intentionality, explicitly examined from a "first person" perspective (see Husserl, Eden I, paras. 33 et seq.). Arguing in this vein, we can say that phenomenology is the study of consciousness - that is, different types of conscious experience - as they are experienced from the point of view of the first person. In this discipline, we study various forms of experience, namely because they are experienced by us, from the perspective of the subject experiencing or fulfilling them. Thus, we characterize the experiences of seeing, hearing, imagining, thinking, feeling (i.e. emotions), dreams, desires, volitions, as well as actions, i.e. embodied volitional acts - walking, speaking, cooking, woodworking etc. But not every characteristic of experiences belongs here. The phenomenological analysis of this or that type of experience will contain an indication of how we ourselves would experience this form of conscious activity. And the main property of the types of experiences known to us is intentionality, that they are consciousness of something or about something, about something experienced in a certain way, represented or involved. How I see, conceptualize, or understand the object I am dealing with determines the meaning of that object in my current experience. Phenomenology thus contains the study of meaning, in a broad sense, including not only what is expressible in language.

In Ideas I, Husserl expounds phenomenology with a transcendental emphasis. In part this means that Husserl adopts the Kantian idiom of "transcendental idealism" in search of conditions for the possibility of knowledge or consciousness in general, and seems to turn his back on any reality beyond phenomena. But Husserl's transcendental turn also implied his discovery of the method epoché (from the notion of refraining from persuasion used by the Greek skeptics). We must practice phenomenology, said Husserl, "bracketing" the question of the existence of the natural world around us. In this way, we direct our attention in reflection to the structure of our own conscious experience. Our first significant result is the observation that every act of consciousness is consciousness about something, that is, intentional or directed towards something. Take my visual experience of looking at a tree on the other side of the square. In phenomenological reflection, we should not be interested in whether the tree exists: I have the experience of the tree whether or not the tree exists. However, we should be interested how the given object is comprehended or intended. I see eucalyptus, not yucca; I see this object as a eucalyptus of a certain shape, with peeling bark, etc. Thus, by bracketing the tree itself, we direct our attention to the experience of the tree, especially to its content or meaning. Husserl calls this tree-as-perceived the noema or the noematic sense of experience.

Husserl's followers argued about the proper characterization of phenomenology, as well as its results and methods. Adolf Reinach, one of Husserl's early students (who died in World War I), argued that phenomenology must retain its alliance with realist ontology, as in Husserl's Logical Investigations. Roman Ingarden, the next generation of Polish phenomenologist, continued to resist Husserl's turn towards transcendental idealism. Such philosophers believe that phenomenology should not bracket questions about being or ontology, which is assumed by the method epoché . And they were not alone. Husserl's early work was studied by Martin Heidegger. He was Husserl's assistant in 1916, and in 1928 succeeded him at the prestigious post at the University of Freiburg. He had his own ideas about phenomenology.

In Being and Time (1927) Heidegger laid out his version of phenomenology. From Heidegger's point of view, we and our activity are always "in the world", and our being is being-in-the-world, so that we study our activity not by isolating the world; rather, we interpret it and the meanings that things have for us by paying attention to our contextual relationship to things in the world. And phenomenology for Heidegger essentially boils down to what he called "fundamental ontology." We must distinguish beings from their being, and we begin our investigation of the meaning of being in our own case, by studying our own existence in the activity of "dazain" (such a being whose being is always my own being). Heidegger resisted Husserl's neo-Cartesian emphasis on consciousness and subjectivity, including the emphasis on being represented by the perception of things around us. He himself believed that the more fundamental way in which we relate to things is through practical activities like wielding a hammer, and phenomenology reveals the position in which we are in the context of the means at our disposal and our being-with-others.

In Being and Time, Heidegger approaches phenomenology with a quasi-poetic idiom referring to the original meanings of logos and phenomena, so that phenomenology is defined as the art or practice of "allowing things to show themselves." In Heidegger's inimitable linguistic game with Greek roots, ""phenomenology" means... allowing what shows itself to be seen by itself just as it shows itself to itself" (see Heidegger, Being and Time, 1927, §7c) . Here Heidegger unequivocally parodies Husserl's call "To the things themselves!", or "To the phenomena themselves!". Heidegger goes on to stress the importance of practical forms of reference or behavior ( Verhalten) like hammering a nail as opposed to representational forms of intentionality such as seeing or thinking about a hammer. Much of Being and Time is devoted to expounding the existential interpretation of our modes of being, including the famous discourse on our mode of being-to-death.

In a completely different style, clear analytic prose, in a lecture course called The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology (1927), Heidegger traces the question of the meaning of being from Aristotle and many other subsequent thinkers to phenomenological discussions. Our understanding of beings and their being comes ultimately through phenomenology. Here the connection with the classical questions of ontology is more obvious, and the echoes with Husserl's vision in the Logical Investigations (which inspired Heidegger at an early stage) are more noticeable. One of Heidegger's most innovative ideas was his concept of the "foundation" of existence, an appeal to modes of being more fundamental than the things around us (from trees to hammers). Heidegger called into question the modern fascination with technology, and his writings may suggest that our scientific theories are historical artifacts that we use in technological practice, and not systems of ideal truth (as Husserl believed). From the point of view of Heidegger, our deep understanding of being in our own case comes rather from the side of phenomenology.

In the 1930s, phenomenology migrated from Austrian and then German philosophy to French philosophy. The path was paved by Marcel Proust's In Search of Lost Time, in which the narrator details his vivid memories of past experiences, including his famous associations with the smell of Madeleine cookies. This sensitivity to experience goes back to the writings of Descartes, and French phenomenology was an attempt to retain the main thing in Descartes, while discarding his dualism of soul and body. The experience of one's own body or the living, living body of someone else has been an important motivation for many twentieth-century French philosophers.

In the novel Nausea (1936), Jean-Paul Sartre described the strange course of the protagonist's experiences, describing in the first person how everyday things lose their meaning - up to the moment when he encounters pure being at the foot of a chestnut tree, gaining at that moment a feeling own freedom. In Being and Nothing (1943, also written during his captivity during the war), Sartre developed the concept of phenomenological ontology. Consciousness is the consciousness of objects, as Husserl emphasized. In Sartre's model of intentionality, the main role in consciousness is played by the phenomenon, and the manifestation of the phenomenon is nothing but the consciousness of the object. The chestnut tree I see is, according to Sartre, just such a phenomenon of my consciousness. In fact, all things in the world, as they are usually given to us in experience, are phenomena, under which or behind which their "being-in-itself" lies. Consciousness, on the other hand, is endowed with “being-for-itself”, since any consciousness is not only the consciousness of an object, but also a pre-reflexive consciousness of itself ( consciencedesoi). True, unlike Husserl, Sartre believed that the “I” or selfhood is only a sequence of acts of consciousness (like a Humean bunch of perceptions), to which he, as you know, included acts of radically free choice.

Phenomenological practice, according to Sartre, involves a deliberate reflection on the structure of consciousness. Sartre's method actually turns out to be a literary style of interpretive description of various types of experiences in appropriate situations - a practice that is not really adequate to the methodological principles of Husserl or Heidegger, but allows Sartre to apply his rare literary skill. (Sartre wrote many plays and novels and was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature.)

Sartre's phenomenology, developed in Being and Nothingness, laid the philosophical foundation for his popular philosophy of existentialism, an outline of which is presented in the famous lecture "Existentialism is Humanism" (1945). In Being and Nothing, Sartre emphasized the experience of freedom of choice, especially in the context of choosing oneself, which determines the patterns of one's own actions. With vivid descriptions of the "look" of the Other, Sartre created the prerequisites for the modern political significance of the concept of the Other (in particular, in relation to other groups or ethnic groups). Moreover, Simone de Beauvoir, Sartre's companion in life, in The Second Sex (1949), outlined the concept of modern feminism with a detailed description of the perception of the role of women as Others.

In the 1940s in Paris, Maurice Merleau-Ponty joined the company of Sartre and de Beauvoir in the development of phenomenology. In The Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty presents a rich variety of phenomenology that emphasizes the role of the body in human experience. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre, Merleau-Ponty turned to experimental psychology, analyzing the stories of amputees who sensed these phantom body parts. He rejected both associationist psychology, focused on the correlations of sensations and stimuli, and intellectualist psychology, focused on the rational construction of the world in consciousness (cf. more modern behavioral and computational models of consciousness in empirical psychology). Merleau-Ponty himself was focused on the "image of the body", on our experience of our own body and its significance in our activity. By expanding Husserl's concept of the experienced body (as opposed to the physical body), Merleau-Ponty resisted the traditional Cartesian separation of mind and body. After all, the image of the body is neither in the mental nor in the mechanical-physical reality. Rather, my body is, so to speak, myself in my interaction with the objects I perceive, among which there are other people.

The scope of the Phenomenology of Perception characterizes the breadth of classical phenomenology, not least because Merleau-Ponty makes generous references to Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre, while creating his own innovative vision of phenomenology. His phenomenology considered: the role of attention in the phenomenal field, the experience of the body, the spatiality of the body, the mobility of the body, sexual and verbal corporality, other personalities, temporality, as well as the characteristics of freedom, so important for French existentialism. At the end of the chapter on cogito(Cartesian “I think, therefore I am”) Merleau-Ponty gives a brief formulation of his vision of phenomenology, emphasizing corporeality and existential moments:

If, reflecting on the essence of subjectivity, I find that it is connected with the essence of the body and the essence of the world, this means that my existence as subjectivity [= consciousness] is one with my existence as a body and with the existence of the world, and that, in after all, the subject, which I am, concretely speaking, is inseparable from this very body and this very world.

In a word, consciousness is embodied (in the world), and the body is merged with consciousness (with knowledge of the world).

In the years following the writings of Husserl, Heidegger, and the other authors mentioned above, phenomenologists delved into all of these classical themes, including discussions of intentionality, time consciousness, intersubjectivity, practical intentionality, and the social and linguistic contexts of human action. A significant place in this work was occupied by the interpretation of historically significant texts by Husserl and others - both because these texts are rich in content and complex, and because the historical dimension is itself part of the practice of continental European philosophy. After the 1960s philosophers trained in the methods of analytical philosophy also delved into the foundations of phenomenology, relying also on the works of the 20th century. on the philosophy of logic, language and consciousness.

Phenomenology has already been linked to logical and semantic theory in the Logical Investigations. Analytic phenomenology starts from this connection. In particular, Dagfil Vollesdal and J. N. Moanti explored the historical and conceptual relationship between Husserl's phenomenology and Frege's logical semantics (after his work On Meaning and Meaning, 1892). According to Frege, an expression refers to an object through meaning, so that two expressions (such as "Morning Star" and "Evening Star") can refer to the same object (Venus) but express different meanings in different ways of presenting it. Similarly, for Husserl, an experience (or an act of consciousness) intends or relates to an object through a noema or noematic sense: thus, two experiences can relate to the same object, while having different noematic senses with their different ways of presenting a given object (when , for example, the same object is observed from different sides). Moreover, Husserl's theory of intentionality is a generalization of the theory of linguistic reference: just as linguistic reference is mediated by meaning, so intentional reference is mediated by noematic meaning.

More recently, analytic philosophers of consciousness have rediscovered the phenomenological problems of mental representation, intentionality, consciousness, sensory experience, intentional and conceptual content. Some of these analytic philosophers of mind draw on William James and Franz Brentano, the pioneers of modern psychology, while others draw on empirical research in recent cognitive neuroscience. Some researchers are trying to interface phenomenological questions with problems in neuroscience, behavioral research, and mathematical modeling. Such studies extend the methods of phenomenology, following Zeitgeist. We'll talk more about the philosophy of mind below.

5. Phenomenology and ontology, epistemology, logic, ethics

Phenomenology as a discipline is one of the main areas of philosophy, but there are others. How does phenomenology differ from these other fields and how does it relate to them?

Traditionally, philosophy has included at least four key areas or disciplines: ontology, epistemology, ethics, and logic. Let us suppose that phenomenology is added to this list. Consider now the following elementary definitions:

• Ontology is the study of beings or their being - that which is.
• Epistemology is the study of knowledge - how we know.
• Logic is the study of formally correct reasoning - how to reason.
• Ethics is the study of right and wrong - how we should act.
• Phenomenology is the study of our experience - how we experience it.

The fields of study in these five areas are obviously different from each other, and they seem to require different methods of research.

Philosophers have sometimes argued that one of these areas is the "first philosophy", the most fundamental discipline on which all philosophy, knowledge or wisdom depends. Historically (it can be argued) Socrates and Plato put ethics first, then Aristotle metaphysics or ontology, Descartes epistemology, Russell logic, and then Husserl (in the late transcendental period) phenomenology.

Take epistemology. As we have seen, phenomenology, according to modern epistemology, helps to establish the phenomena on which claims to knowledge are based. At the same time, phenomenology itself claims knowledge about the nature of consciousness, a special kind of first-person knowledge through one of the forms of intuition.

Let's take logic. As we have seen, the logical theory of meaning led Husserl to the theory of intentionality, the heart of phenomenology. According to one interpretation, phenomenology explicates the intentional or semantic power of ideal meanings, and propositional meanings occupy a central place in logical theory. But the logical structure is expressed in a language - ordinary or in symbolic languages ​​like the language of predicate logic, mathematics or computer systems. An important controversial point remains the question of in what cases language forms specific types of experience (thinking, perception, emotions) and their content or meaning, and whether it does so at all. So between phenomenology and logico-linguistic theory, especially when talking about philosophical logic and philosophy (as opposed to mathematical logic as such), there is an important relationship (although it is not indisputable).

Let's take an ontology. Phenomenology studies (among other things) the nature of consciousness, which is the main question of metaphysics or ontology - a question leading to the traditional mind-body problem. Husserlian methodology would have taken out the question of the existence of the surrounding world, thereby separating phenomenology from the ontology of this world. At the same time, Husserl's phenomenology relies on the theory of species and individuals (universals and concrete things), as well as on the theory of relations between the part and the whole and ideal meanings, but all these theories are parts of ontology.

Well, let's take ethics. Phenomenology could play a role in ethics, providing an analysis of the structure of will, appreciation, happiness, concern for others (in empathy and sympathy). Historically, however, ethics has been on the horizon of phenomenology. Husserl for the most part avoided talking about ethics in his main works, although he noted the role of practical interests in the structure of the life-world or Geist(spirit, culture, as in Zeitgeist), and once gave a course of lectures in which he gave ethics (as well as logic) a fundamental place in philosophy, pointing out the importance of the phenomenology of sympathy in founding ethics itself. In Being and Time, discussing a variety of phenomena - from care, conscience and guilt to "fall" and "authenticity" (all of these phenomena have theological echoes), Heidegger declared that he did not deal with ethics. In Being and Nothing, Sartre did a subtle analysis of the logical problem of "bad faith", but developed an ontology of value produced by volition in good faith (looking like a revision of the Kantian foundation of morality). De Beauvoir produced an outline of an existentialist ethic, and Sartre himself left unpublished notes on ethics. A distinctly phenomenological approach to ethics is associated, however, with the work of Emmanuel Levinas, a Lithuanian phenomenologist who attended lectures by Husserl and Heidegger in Freiburg and then moved to Paris. In Totality and the Infinite (1961), transforming the themes of Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas focused on the significance of the “face” of the other, working out in detail the foundations of ethics in this area of ​​phenomenology and producing his texts in an impressionistic style with allusions to religious experience.

Ethics is closely related to political and social philosophy. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were involved in the political life of Paris in the 1940s, and their (phenomenologically based) existential philosophies implied a political theory based on individual freedom. Sartre subsequently made an unequivocal attempt to combine existentialism with Marxism. Yet political theory remained on the periphery of phenomenology. Social theory, however, was more closely connected with phenomenology as such. Husserl analyzed the phenomenological structure of the life world and Geist in general, including our role in social activities. Heidegger emphasized social practice, which he considered more fundamental than individual consciousness. Alfred Schutz developed the phenomenology of the social world. Sartre continued his phenomenological study of the meaning of the Other, fundamental social formation. Starting from phenomenological problems, Michel Foucault explored the genesis and significance of various social institutions, from prisons to insane asylums. And Jacques Derrida for a long time practiced a kind of phenomenology of language in search of the social meaning of "deconstruction" of various texts. A number of aspects of the French theory of "post-structuralism" are sometimes interpreted as broadly phenomenological, but these issues are beyond the scope of our review.

So, classical phenomenology is connected with some areas of epistemology, logic and ontology and leads to a number of areas of ethical, social and political theory.

6. Phenomenology and philosophy of consciousness

It should be obvious that phenomenology has a lot to say in the field called philosophy of mind. However, the traditions of phenomenology and analytic philosophy of mind, despite overlapping interests, were not closely related. So it is appropriate to conclude this review of phenomenology by turning to the philosophy of mind, one of the most actively debated areas of modern philosophy.

The tradition of analytic philosophy began in the early years of the 20th century with the analysis of language, most notably in the work of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Then, in The Concept of Consciousness (1949), Gilbert Ryle made a series of linguistic analyzes of various mental states, including sensations, beliefs, and will. Although Ryle is generally regarded as a philosopher of ordinary language, he himself said that The Concept of Consciousness could be called a phenomenology. Essentially, Ryle was analyzing our phenomenological understanding of mental states as they are reflected in everyday statements about consciousness. Based on this linguistic phenomenology, Ryle argued that the Cartesian dualism of mind and body contains a category error (the logic or grammar of mental verbs - "convinced", "see", etc. - does not mean that we attribute belief, sensation, etc. p. "ghost in the car"). Ryle's rejection of the mind-body dualism led to the resurrection of the mind-body problem: what exactly is the ontology of mind in the context of the body, and how are mind and body related?

René Descartes, in his landmark Meditations on the First Philosophy (1641), argued that the spirit and the body are two different kinds of being or substance with two different kinds of attributes or modes: bodies are characterized by spatio-temporal physical properties, while spirits characterized by mental properties (including vision, feeling, etc.). In a few centuries, phenomenology in the person of Brentano and Husserl will discover that mental acts are characterized by consciousness and intentionality, and natural science will find out that physical systems are characterized by mass and force, and ultimately by gravitational, electromagnetic and quantum fields. Where is consciousness and intentionality to be found in the quantum-electromagnetic-gravitational field that has been suggested to govern everything in the natural world in which we humans and our consciousnesses exist? This is what the mind-body problem looks like today. In a word, phenomenology - under whatever name it may appear - is at the very core of the modern mind-body problem.

After Ryle, philosophers began to search for a more detailed and generalized naturalistic ontology of the mental. In the 1950s, new materialistic arguments were put forward, convincing the truth that mental states are identical with states of the central nervous system. According to the classical theory of identity, each particular mental state (of a particular person at a particular time) is identical to a particular state of the brain (of that person at that very time). More radical materialism assumes that each type of mental state is identical to some type of brain state. But materialism does not fit well with phenomenology. It is not obvious how conscious mental states in their experienced quality - sensations, thoughts, emotions - can be just complex neural states that facilitate or implement them. If mental and neural states are simply identical, whether in their specific manifestations or in their types, where phenomenology appears in our scientific theory of consciousness - is it not simply replaced by neuroscience? But experiences are part of what neuroscience has to explain.

In the late 1960s and into the 1970s. a computer model of consciousness appeared, and functionalism became the dominant model of consciousness. According to this model, consciousness is not what the brain consists of (electromagnetic interactions in huge complexes of neurons). Consciousness is rather what brains do: their function is to mediate the information that enters the organism and the behavior of that organism. The mental state is thus the functional state of the brain or the human (animal) organism. More specifically, according to a favorite variation of functionalism, consciousness is a computing system: consciousness is to the brain in the same way that a program is to computer hardware; thoughts are nothing more than programs running on the "raw" apparatus of the brain. Since the 1970s the trend in the cognitive sciences - from experimental studies of cognition to neuroscience - has been to combine materialism and functionalism. Gradually, however, philosophers discovered that the phenomenological aspects of consciousness posed a number of problems for the functionalist paradigm as well.

In the early 1970s Thomas Nagel in the article "What is it like to be a bat?" argued that consciousness itself - especially the subjective nature of what it is like to have certain experiences - is outside the physical theory. Many philosophers have insisted that sensory qualities - what it is like to feel pain, see red, etc. - are not touched upon or analyzed in physical explanations of the structure and function of the brain. Consciousness has its own properties. Yet we know that it is intimately connected to the brain. And neural activity, at one of the levels of description, implements calculations.

In the 1980s John Searle argued - in Intentionality (1983) and later in Rediscovering Consciousness (1991) - that intentionality and consciousness are essential characteristics of mental states. From Searle's point of view, our brain generates mental states with their characteristic properties of consciousness and intentionality, all of which are part of our biology, despite the fact that consciousness and intentionality need a first-person ontology. Searle also argued that while computers simulate intentional mental states, they themselves lack them. According to his argument, a computer system has a syntax (processing symbols of a certain kind), but not a semantics (these symbols are meaningless: we interpret them). Accordingly, Searle rejected both materialism and functionalism, while insisting that consciousness is biological property organisms similar to us: our brains "allocate" consciousness.

The analysis of consciousness and intentionality is central to our interpretation of phenomenology, and Searle's theory of intentionality appears to be a modernized version of Husserl's theory. (Modern logical theory speaks of conditions for the truth of propositions, and Searle characterizes the intentionality of mental states by specifying "the conditions for their satisfaction.") But there is an important difference in their background theories. The fact is that Searle unequivocally uses the worldview settings of natural science, considering consciousness to be a part of nature. Husserl explicitly brackets this assumption, and subsequent phenomenologists, including Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, seek refuge for phenomenology outside of the natural sciences. Yet phenomenology itself must be largely neutral with regard to theories about the origin of experiences, in particular from brain activity.

In the period since the late 1980s. and especially since the late 1990s, a number of authors working in the field of philosophy of mind have focused on the question of the fundamental characteristics of consciousness, which ultimately belongs to phenomenology. Does consciousness always presuppose self-consciousness, or consciousness of consciousness, and is there an essential connection between the two, as Brentano, Husserl and Sartre (diverge in details) believed? If so, then every act of consciousness either includes the consciousness of this consciousness, or is accompanied by it. Does this self-consciousness have a kind of internal self-monitoring? If so, does this monitoring refer to a higher level, when each act of consciousness is accompanied by an additional mental act that monitors this basic act? Or is such monitoring on the same level as the basic act, being its own part, without which this act itself could not be conscious? Many models of this self-consciousness have been proposed, the authors of which sometimes explicitly relied on the ideas of Brentano, Husserl and Sartre or adapted them for their own purposes. These issues are addressed in two recent collections of papers: and.

In the philosophy of mind, the following disciplines or theoretical levels relevant to mind can be distinguished:

1. Phenomenology studies the lived conscious experience by analyzing the structure - types, intentional forms and meanings, the dynamics and conditions of possibility - perception, thinking, imagination, emotions, volition and action.

2. Neuroscience studies neural activity, which serves as a biological substrate for various kinds of mental activity, including conscious experience. The context of neuroscience will be set by evolutionary biology (explaining the evolution of neural phenomena), and ultimately by fundamental physics (explaining how biological phenomena are based on physical ones). This is a complex area of ​​natural sciences. They partly explain the structure of experience, the analysis of which gives phenomenology.

3. Cultural analysis studies social practices that help shape various types of mental activity, including conscious experience, usually manifested in embodied actions, or serve as their cultural substratum. Here we examine the contribution of language and other societal practices, including background attitudes and assumptions to which particular political systems can sometimes be attributed.

4. The ontology of consciousness studies the ontological types of mental activity in general, from perception (including the causal contribution to the experience of the environment) to voluntary action (including the causal effect of volition on bodily movement).

This division of labor in the theory of consciousness can be seen as a development of the ideas of Brentano, who originally proposed to distinguish between descriptive and genetic psychology. Phenomenology offers a descriptive analysis of mental phenomena, neuroscience (and, more broadly, biology, and ultimately physics) models for explaining what causes or causes mental phenomena. Cultural theory offers an analysis of social activity and its impact on experience, including how language shapes our thinking, emotions, and motives. Ontology places all these results in the fundamental scheme of the structure of our world, which also includes our own consciousnesses.

The ontological distinction between form, phenomenon and substratum of conscious activity is detailed in D. W. Smith's book "Mind World" (2004), in the essay "Three Sides of Consciousness".

Meanwhile, from an epistemological point of view, all these types of theories of consciousness begin with how we observe the phenomena that appear to us in the world, reflect on them and try to explain them. But this is where phenomenology comes in. Moreover, the question of how we understand each fragment of the theory, including the theory of consciousness, is central to the theory of intentionality - so to speak, the semantics of thought and experience in general. And this is the heart of phenomenology.

7. Phenomenology in modern theory consciousness

Phenomenological questions, under whatever name they may be, play a very important role in modern philosophy of mind. Continuing the theme of the previous section, we note two similar questions: about the form of inner awareness by which mental activity becomes apparently conscious, and about the phenomenal character of conscious cognitive mental activity in thinking, perceiving and acting.

Since Nagel's 1974 article "What's it like to be a bat?" the notion of what it is like to experience a mental state or activity has become a challenge to reductive materialism and functionalism in the theory of consciousness. This subjective phenomenal character of consciousness is said to constitute or define consciousness. What is the form of this phenomenal character found in consciousness?

One of the most significant lines of analysis is to recognize that the phenomenal character of mental activity lies in some kind of awareness of it - an awareness that, by definition, makes it conscious. Since the 1980s many models of this kind of awareness have been developed. As noted above, among them are models that define such awareness as monitoring more high level, in the form of internal perception of this activity (a kind of internal feeling, according to Kant), or internal consciousness (according to Brentano), or an internal thought about this activity. Another model presents such awareness as an integral part of the experience, as a form of self-representation within the experience itself (again, see about this).

Yet another, somewhat different model may be closer to the type of self-consciousness sought by Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre. According to this "modal" model, internal awareness of experience takes the form of an integral reflexive awareness of "this very experience". This form of awareness is recognized as a constitutive element of experience that makes it conscious. As Sartre expressed this thesis, self-consciousness constitutes consciousness, but this self-consciousness itself is “pre-reflexive”. This reflective awareness is then not part of a separate high-level monitoring, but rather built into consciousness itself. According to the modal model, this awareness partly determines the very nature of the experience: its subjectivity, phenomenality, consciousness. This model is developed in D. W. Smith's Mind World (2004), in the essay "Return to Consciousness" (and others).

But whatever the concrete nature of the phenomenal character may be, the question remains of the distribution of this character over the mental life. What is phenomenal in different types of mental activity? This raises questions related to cognitive phenomenology. Is phenomenality limited to the "feeling" of sensory experience? Or is phenomenality also present in the cognitive experience of thinking about something, in perception loaded not only with sensual but also with conceptual content, or in volitional or motivated bodily acts? These issues are discussed in the collection Cognitive Phenomenology.

The limiting view is that only sensory experiences have a truly phenomenal character, that it is only in relation to them that one can speak of what it is like to have them. Seeing a color, hearing a sound, smelling a smell, feeling pain - only these types of conscious experience, according to this concept, are endowed with a phenomenal character. Strict empiricism could limit phenomenal experience to pure sensations, although even Hume seems to have allowed for phenomenal "ideas" beyond pure sensory "impressions". A somewhat broader view of the problem would recognize that perceptual experience has a distinctly phenomenal character, even when sensations are framed by concepts. Looking at a yellow canary, clearly hearing middle C on a Steinway piano, smelling the pungent odor of anise, feeling the pain of a syringe prick from a medical injection—all these conscious experiences have a “what it’s like to be” character, shaped by conceptual content that, according to this concept is also "felt". The Kantian conception of conceptual-sense experience, or "contemplation", would also recognize the presence of a phenomenal character in these types of experience. Indeed, phenomena in the Kantian sense are precisely things as they appear in consciousness, so that their appearances, of course, have a phenomenal character.

An even broader view would allow for a distinctly phenomenal character in all conscious experience. The idea that 17 is a prime number, that the red color of a sunset is caused by the light waves of the Sun distorted by the air, that Kant was closer to the truth than Hume in speaking of the foundations of the knowledge that economic principles are at the same time political - even activity, having such a pronounced cognitive character, is not devoid, according to this broad view, of the nature of what it is like to think this and that.

There is no doubt that classical phenomenologists such as Husserl or Merleau-Ponty shared a broad view of phenomenal consciousness. As noted above, the "phenomena" that are the focus of phenomenology were recognized as bearers of rich experiences. Even Heidegger, despite his removal of the emphasis on consciousness (a Cartesian sin!), spoke of "phenomena" as something that appears or is shown to us ( Dasein) in our daily activities like hammering nails. Like Merleau-Ponty, Gurvich (1964) explores in detail the "phenomenal field" that encompasses everything that is given in our experience. It can be argued that for these thinkers, each type of conscious experience is endowed with its own special phenomenal character, its own "phenomenology" - and the task of phenomenology (as a discipline) is to analyze this character. Note that in modern discussions the phenomenal character of experience is often referred to as its "phenomenology" - whereas, according to standard usage, the term "phenomenology" designates the discipline that studies such "phenomenology".

Since, according to Brentano, Husserl, and others, intentionality is an essential property of consciousness, the very nature of intentionality will be phenomenal as part of what it is like to have a certain type of intentional experience. But it is not only intentional perception and thinking that have distinct phenomenal characters. An embodied action will have a similar character, including the experienced qualities of kinesthetic sensation and conceptual volitional content, when, for example, we feel how we kick a soccer ball. The “living body” is exactly the body as it is experienced in everyday embodied voluntary actions like running, kicking a ball, or even talking. Husserl wrote extensively about the "living body" (Leib) in Ideas II, and Merleau-Ponty continued this line with detailed analyzes of embodied perception and action in The Phenomenology of Perception. See Terence Horgan's entry on conative phenomenology in the collection, and the entries by Charles Sievert and Sean Kelly in the collection.

But there remains a problem. Intentionality is essentially connected with meaning, so that the question arises about its appearance in a phenomenal character. The content side of conscious experience, importantly, usually has a horizon of background meaning - meaning, for the most part implicitly, and not explicitly present in experience. But in this case, a significant amount of experiential content will be devoid of a consciously felt phenomenal character. So it can be argued. This line of phenomenological theory has yet to be developed.

Bibliography

• Brentano, F., 1995, psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Trans. Antos C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister, London and New York: Routledge. From the German original of 1874.

• Brentano's descriptive psychology, a forerunner of Husserl's phenomenology, with the concept of the intentionality of mental phenomena and an analysis of inner consciousness distinct from inner observation.

• Heidegger, M., 1962, Being and Time, Trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row. From the German original of 1927.

• The main work of Heidegger, which outlines his version of phenomenology and existential ontology, including the difference between being and its being; practical activities are also emphasized here.

• Heidegger, M., 1982, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Trans. by Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. From the German original of 1975. The text of a lecture course in 1927.

• The clearest exposition by Heidegger of his understanding of phenomenology as a fundamental ontology; discusses the history of the question of the meaning of being since Aristotle.

• Husserl, E., 2001, Logical Investments. Vols. One and Two Trans. J. N. Findlay. Ed. with translation corrections and with a new Introduction by Dermot Moran. With a new Preface by Michael Dummett A new and revised edition of the original English translation by J. N. Findlay. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. From the Second Edition of the German. First edition, 1900-01; second edition, 1913, 1920.

• Husserl's main work, which presents his system of philosophy, including the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language, ontology, phenomenology and epistemology. Here the foundations of Husserl's phenomenology and his theory of intentionality are laid.

• Husserl, E., 2001, The Shorter Logical Investigations. London and New York: Routledge.

• Abridged version of the previous edition.

• Husserl, E., 1963, Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson. New York: Collier Books. From the German original of 1913, originally titled Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book. Newly translated with the full title by Fred Kersten. Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1983. Known as ideas I.

• A mature version of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, including the notion of intentional content as a noema.

• Husserl, E., 1989, Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. From the German original unpublished manuscript of 1912, revised 1915, 1928. Known as ideas II.

• Detailed phenomenological analyzes envisioned in Ideas I, including analyzes of body consciousness (kinesthesis and motor skills) and social consciousness (empathy).

• Merleau-Ponty, M., 2012, Phenomenology of Perception, Trans. Donald A. Landes. London and New York: Routledge. Prior translation, 1996, Phenomenology of Perception, Trans. Colin Smith. London and New York: Routledge. From the French original of 1945. Quoted from the Russian edition: Merleau-Ponty M. The Phenomenology of Perception. St. Petersburg: Yuventa, Nauka, 1999.

• Merleau-Ponty's concept of phenomenology, rich in expressive descriptions of perception and other forms of experience, which emphasize the role of experienced corporeality in many forms of consciousness.

• Sartre, J.-P., 1956, Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press. From the French original of 1943.

• Sartre's main work, which presents in detail his concept of phenomenology and sets out his existential view of human freedom; here is an analysis of the consciousness of consciousness, the view of the Other, and many others.

• Sartre, J.-P., 1964, Nausea. Trans. Lloyd Alexander. New York: New Directions Publishing. From the French original of 1938).

• A novel in the first person with descriptions of the nature of experiences, thus illustrating Sartre's understanding of phenomenology (and existentialism) without technical terms and much theorizing.

Modern research

• Bayne, T., and Montague, M., (eds.), 2011, Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

• Articles discussing the limits of phenomenal consciousness.

• Block, N., Flanagan, O., and Güzeldere, G. (eds.), 1997, The Nature of Consciousness

• Large-scale studies of various aspects of consciousness in the analytical philosophy of consciousness, often affecting phenomenological problems, but with rare references to phenomenology as such.

• Chalmers, D. (ed.), 2002, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings

• Key texts on the philosophy of mind, mainly analytical, sometimes touching on phenomenological problems; there are references to classical phenomenology; among others, excerpts from the works of Descartes, Ryle, Brentano, Nagel, and Searle (discussed in this article) are included.

• Dreyfus, H., with Hall, H. (eds.), 1982, Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

• Research into problems of Husserlian phenomenology and the theory of intentionality in relation to early models of cognitive science, including Jerry Fodor's discussion of methodological solipsism (cf. Husserl's method of bracketing or era) and the article "Husserl's Notion of Noema" (1969) by Dagfin Vollesdal.

• Fricke, C., and Føllesdal, D. (eds.), 2012, Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl: A Collection of Essays. Frankfurt and Paris: Ontos Verlag.

• Phenomenological studies of intersubjectivity, empathy and sympathy in the writings of Smith and Husserl.

• Kriegel, U., and Williford, K. (eds.), 2006, Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

• Articles about the structure of self-consciousness or consciousness about consciousness, a number of which are unequivocally based on phenomenology.

• Mohanty, J.N., 1989, Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Accoun t. Oxford and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell.

• The study of the structures of consciousness and meaning in the modern reading of transcendental phenomenology, the structures of consciousness and meaning in the modern reading of transcendental phenomenology, associated with the problems of analytical philosophy and its history.

• Mohanty, J.N., 2008, The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

• A detailed study of the evolution of Husserl's philosophy and his concept of transcendental phenomenology.

• Mohanty, J.N., 2011, Edmund Husserl's Freiburg Years: 1916-1938. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

• A thorough study of Husserl's late philosophy and his concept of phenomenology, including the concept of the life-world.

• Moran, D., 2000, . London and New York: Routledge.

• Large-scale popular discussion of the main works of classical phenomenologists and a number of other thinkers close to phenomenology.

• Moran, D., 2005, Edmund Husserl : Founder of Phenomenology. Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press.

• A study of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.

• Parsons, Charles, 2012, From Kant to Husserl: Selected Essays, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

• A study of historical figures in the philosophy of mathematics, including Kant, Frege, Brentano and Husserl.

• Petitot, J., Varela, F. J., Pachoud, B., and Roy, J.-M., (eds.), 1999, Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenmenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press (in collaboration with Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York).

• Studies of phenomenological problems in connection with cognitive science; the idea of ​​the integration of disciplines and, accordingly, the combination of classical phenomenology and modern natural science is carried out.

• Searle, J., 1983, Intentionality. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

• Searle's analysis of intentionality, often close in detail to Husserl's theory of intentionality, but carried out in the tradition and style of the analytic philosophy of language and consciousness, without explicit application of phenomenological methodology.

• Smith, B., and Smith, D.W. (eds.), 1995, The Cambridge Companion to Husserl

• Detailed studies of Husserl's writings, including his phenomenology, with an introduction that provides an overview of his entire philosophy.

• Smith, D. W., 2013, Husserl, 2nd revised edition. London and New York: Routledge. (1st edition, 2007).

• A detailed study of Husserl's philosophical system, including logic, ontology, phenomenology, epistemology and ethics, of an introductory nature.

• Smith, D.W., and McIntyre, R., 1982, Husserl and Intentionality: a Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company (now Springer).

• A book that develops analytic phenomenology and contains an interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology, his theory of intentionality and historical roots, as well as connections with problems of logical theory and analytic philosophy of language and consciousness; introductory character.

• Smith, D. W., and Thomasson, Amie L. (eds.), 2005, Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

• Articles combining phenomenology and analytical philosophy of consciousness.

• Sokolowski, R., 2000, Introduction to Phenomenology. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

• A modern introduction to the practice of transcendental phenomenology, without historical interpretation, with an emphasis on the transcendental attitude in phenomenology.

• Tieszen, R., 2005, Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

• Articles about the connection between Husserl's phenomenology and problems of logic and mathematics.

• Tieszen, R., 2011, After Godel: Platonism and Rationalism in Mathematics and Logic. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

• A study of Gödel's works on the foundations of logic and mathematics in relation, among other things, to Husserlian phenomenology.

• Zahavi, D. (ed.), 2012, The Oxford Handbook on Contemporary Phenomenology. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

• Collection of contemporary articles on phenomenological topics (mainly not about historical figures).

Translation by V. V. Vasiliev

How to cite this article

Smith, David Woodruff. Phenomenology // Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Translations of Selected Articles / ed. D.B. Volkova, V.V. Vasilyeva, M.O. Cedar. url ==< >.

Original: Smith, David Woodruff, "Phenomenology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =<

In many definitions of the concept of “experience”, attention is most often focused on their connection with emotional processes. In addition, it is emphasized that experiences are aimed at overcoming or modifying problematic, conflict, stressful situations that cause difficult emotional states with a negative sign.

The concept of "experience" in modern psychology has become very widespread due to its extreme importance in the descriptions of psychotherapeutic practice. However, the place of experiences as an integral act in the structure of psychological realities has not yet been fully presented. Some authors believe that experiences are fully related only to the inner world of a person. For example, L.M. Wecker writes: experiences are "a direct reflection by the subject of his own states, and not a reflection of the properties and relationships of external emotional objects" .

In the works of K. K. Platonov, experience is an attribute of an act of consciousness that does not contain an image of the reflected and manifests itself in the form of pleasure or displeasure (suffering), tension or resolution, excitement or calm.

All authors unanimously recognize their exceptional role in the formation of the subjectivity of the personality and the development of its self-consciousness. For example, L.S. Vygotsky viewed experiences as special integral unit of consciousness. Many authors note that experiences perform a system-forming function in the development of the value-semantic sphere of personality. In the context of the discussion of the mechanisms of the psychology of destruction, the identification in experimental studies of connection of experience and reflection(B.S. Bratus, F.E. Vasilyuk, L.F. Shestopalova and others).

Considering experience as a process of meaning formation from the standpoint of a regulative approach, it is important to note that it is precisely the reflexive mechanisms (affective and cognitive) that determine the inner logic of experience. In the process of experiencing, due to reflexive mechanisms, the content of the experienced is realized, and thanks to this, the boundaries of the value-semantic sphere of a person are built.

Thus, in the process of experiencing, which is multidimensional, sense formation, sense generation, sense awareness, sense construction are carried out, which arise due to affective and cognitive reflexive mechanisms. All these personal constructs form the basis of self-regulation, phase dynamics and productive, constructive productivity of experience. In the absence of them, the positivity of the experience is lost. It turns into a mechanism that aggravates the destructive tendencies of the psyche of a person who finds himself in difficult life circumstances. A compelling example of this is provided by the results presented in Philip G. Zimbardo's "Lessons from the Stanford Prison Experiment" article. He wrote: “Prisons are places that humiliate human dignity, destroy the nobility of human nature, and expose the worst in social relations between people. They are just as bad for guards as they are for prisoners in terms of their destructive effect on self-esteem, sense of justice and human compassion.

An analysis of the phenomenology of experience allows us to say that they represent an internal “reworking” of significant events for a person (anxiety of expectation, a flash of rage or joy, tormented by doubts, suffering, for example, about the loss of a loved one or destruction, hopes). Experiences are inherent in each person, but their dynamic characteristics are individualized. There are people who are more and less prone to experiences.

One of the features of the manifestation of experiences is that the experience that has arisen already “lives its own life” and hardly obeys arbitrary regulation. That is, there is already an involuntary visual, auditory and kinesthetic “scrolling” of the same emotionally charged event several times, a multiple return to what has already happened. As a result of this, experience is an ongoing emotionally colored state. There are several stages in it: reflection, awareness, direct experience.

The experience can be diffuse emotional character(sensory tone of sensations) as a form of response to perceived or imaginary signs of an object. It is this feature of experience that is often used for advertising purposes in order to dull conscious self-regulation, for example, when making a decision on the choice of a product. The emergence of this type of experience is due to the activity of the subcortical parts of the brain and the autonomic nervous system (P.V. Simonov).

There may be special emotional experiences high subjective intensity, bringing a person to ecstasy. For example, it can be a person's experiences associated with his personal acceptance of religious beliefs. Such experiences destroy a person's previous ideas, and a person can perceive his behavior with destructive tendencies as a "turn to the truth." This form of experience is widely used in psychotechnologies for terrorist purposes, in the use of fanatical people to organize destructive disturbances during sports, concerts, etc. events. These forms of behavior can be clearly pathological in nature, most often manifested under the influence of the “crowd phenomenon”; at the same time, deindividualization of former personal positions and beliefs occurs.

The category of experience as a form of unity of the bodily and spiritual, inner and outer worlds of a person is a form of subjective being, which, through objective consciousness, merges with objective being into “some derivative unity”. Access to the innermost depths of being opens up knowledge-experience as a unity of life and knowledge. L.S. Vygotsky developed the idea of ​​experience as a unit of study of the unity of personality and environment.

The question of how the ability to experience arises in ontogenesis does not have an unambiguous answer. But most authors believe that it is formed in vivo, since "experience is social in origin and semiotically mediated, which makes it possible to attribute it to higher mental functions" .

The most complete theory of experience in Russian psychology is presented in the works of F.E. Vasilyuk. He defines experience as any emotionally colored state experienced by the subject and a phenomenon of reality, directly represented in his mind and acting for him as an event of his own life.

V.P. Zinchenko in the preface to his book "The Psychology of Experience (Analysis of Overcoming Critical Situations)" indicates that this work expresses a fundamentally new approach to the category of experience. “The problem of experiencing, as it is posed in the book, does not fit into the traditional problematics of emotional processes... As the object of his research, the author chose the processes by which a person overcomes critical life situations... What does a person do when nothing can be done when he finds himself in a situation of impossibility to realize his needs, attitudes, values, etc.” .

In the synergistic theory of the psychology of experiences F.E. Vasilyuk notes that the frustration of significant motives of the personality, the destruction of its former ideals, a sharp breakdown in life values ​​create the need for a significant change in semantic orientations. This function is performed by experience. Moreover, the positive effectiveness of the experience process can be achieved in various ways - from the use of various psychological defenses to creative, constructive, transformative psychotechnologies.

F.E. Vasilyuk considers experience not as a “reflection in the consciousness” of the subject of one or another of his states, not as a special form of contemplation, but as a special form of activity aimed at restoring mental balance, the lost meaningfulness of existence, at the “production” of a new meaning. Comparing the mechanisms of psychological defense and the mechanism of experience, he notes that experience is a much more complex, creative, multi-stage, emotionally rich process leading to the development and transformation of the inner world and human life. In the process of experiencing, the value structure, relations with the world and others change, personal harmonization and personal growth take place. Since experiencing is a multi-stage process, psychological defense can also be present at some of its stages in the form of a temporary auxiliary phenomenon. That is, in the theory of experience F.E. Vasilyuk moves from "the scheme of individual activity to the scheme of the life world".

The practical significance of the theoretical provisions of the psychology of experiences, developed on the basis of the analysis of the vast experience of observations and experimental studies by F.E. Vasilyuk, lies in the fact that, on their basis, technologies have been created to overcome many psychological disorders and pathologies. Particularly important are the proofs that a person “always himself, and only himself, can live through events, circumstances and changes in your life that gave rise to the crisis. It is the experiences that are aimed, under appropriate circumstances, at restoring the psychological ability to live a full life. “If we liken a critical situation to the fall of a running person, then the experience will correspond to the efforts spent by him to get back on his feet and thereby get the opportunity to continue running again.”

F.E. Vasilyuk, when developing the technology of understanding psychotherapy, takes the theory of experience as a methodological basis. “The psychotechnical system of understanding psychotherapy is based on the theory of experiencing and considers the process of experiencing as its main “hope”, i.e. as the main productive process that provides the effect of psychotherapy. Therefore, the units of analysis in understanding psychotherapy must include an element that describes this or that aspect of the process of experiencing ... ". “As a basic scheme that differentiates the process of experiencing, a scheme of levels, or modes of functioning of consciousness, was chosen, which distinguishes the levels of reflection, awareness, direct experience and the unconscious in the system of consciousness. Each of these levels corresponds to a psychotherapeutic method. The result of comparing the levels of experience and methods adequate to them is the allocation of four basic psychotechnical units: “reflection - maieutics”, “consciousness - classification”, “direct experience - empathy” and “unconscious - interpretation” ".

Of considerable interest for work in the field of the psychology of destruction in practice is the proven position on the possibilities of psychologists to be included in the process of experiencing people who find themselves in extreme situations. F.E. Vasilyuk writes: “The process of experiencing can be controlled to some extent - stimulate it, organize it, direct it, provide favorable conditions for it, striving to ensure that this process ideally leads to growth and improvement of the personality, or, at least, does not go in a pathological or socially unacceptable way (alcoholism, neuroticism, psychopathization, suicide, crime, etc.). Experience, thus, is the main subject of the application of the efforts of a practical psychologist who helps a person in a situation of a life crisis.

In conclusion of a brief review of the theoretical provisions on the essence of experiences in the context of identifying the mechanisms of the psychology of destruction, it should be noted that the subjective fabric of experiencing acts of the psychology of destruction is still an almost undeveloped area, and therefore hypothetical rather than generalizing-resultative conclusions are more appropriate in talking about it.