Andrey FEDOROVYKH - graduate student of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Scientific analysis of the events associated with the collapse of the Russian Empire and the USSR, which manifested themselves especially acutely in the Black Sea region, has important theoretical and practical significance. In particular, the problem of the status of the Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR and its main naval base - the city of Sevastopol, today is perhaps the least studied, despite the active discussion of these issues at the interstate and public levels and, as a consequence, the presence of a large amount of different literature about this theme.

In accordance with the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by the President of Russia V.V. Putin, the protection of the territory of the Russian Federation from maritime directions, its sovereignty over internal sea waters, the territorial sea, including the Black Sea region, “belongs to the category of the highest state priorities”1. At the same time, the document sets the task of maintaining the basing of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for the long term. Following the results of the Meeting on military-diplomatic issues of the Azov-Black Sea region on September 17, 2003, the President of the Russian Federation emphasized that this is a zone of strategic interests of Russia, which “provides direct access for Russia to the most important global transport routes, including energy ones.” At the same time, the real challenges to the security of the Russian Federation in the Azov-Black Sea region are the activity of terrorist structures, ethnic crime and illegal immigration. In order to strengthen the position of the Russian Federation in the region, a decision was made to create an additional base for the Black Sea Fleet in Novorossiysk. At the same time, it was emphasized that the decision to develop the Black Sea Fleet basing system on the Caucasian coast of Russia “does not mean that we will leave our main base in Sevastopol”2. The problem of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol became one of the most complex consequences of the collapse of the USSR. However, the possibility of its occurrence was hidden for about forty years in the decision of the top leadership of the USSR in 1954 to transfer the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. This decision meant “a break in the historical continuity of the state-territorial structure”3 of the Russian Federation, without taking into account the interests and opinions of its multinational people. The idea of ​​the inviolability of the USSR, the underestimation of the internal contradictions of the Soviet federation and the role of the national factor led to the oblivion of the historical experience of largely similar events during the collapse of the Russian Empire, accompanied by an intense struggle for the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol and Crimea. After the collapse of the USSR, the military-political problem of the Black Sea Fleet turned out to be inextricably linked with the territory of its Main Base - the city of Sevastopol - and the potentially conflicting ethnopolitical situation in Crimea, where the majority of the population was in favor of reunification with Russia. This circumstance led to the particular complexity of the situation and the search for political ways to solve it. Stability and interethnic harmony as a whole in the Black Sea region and the Caucasus largely depended on the choice of a political path to resolve the problem of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol. According to one of the authoritative experts in this field, V.A. Pechenev, the Black Sea Fleet has always been and remains “the most important component of a unified system for ensuring Russia’s strategic interests in the entire Black Sea-Caspian region”4. The problem of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol turned out to be so complex that at the highest state level at times it seemed almost insoluble. Ultimately achieving compromise political and legal solutions on the issue of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol becomes particularly relevant in the context of the Russian Federation’s interest in maintaining its naval presence in Sevastopol and Crimea after 2017 - the deadline for the presence of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and Crimea, according to what was achieved in 1997 agreements with the Ukrainian side.

Chronologically, the problem of the status of the Black Sea Fleet covers the period from the end of 1991 - beginning of 1992, when this issue first arose at the interstate level, which immediately led to confrontation and the subsequent protracted crisis in Russian-Ukrainian relations - to 2000, when the division process was largely completed inheritance of the former Red Banner Black Sea Fleet of the USSR and on its basis the Naval Forces of Ukraine and the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation were finally formed. By this time, the problem of the status of Sevastopol as the main naval base of two fleets on the Black Sea was also formally resolved. The intermediate date is May 28, 1997, when, in preparation for the signing of the “Grand Treaty” on friendship and cooperation between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, three intergovernmental Agreements on the Black Sea Fleet were signed. Thus, the “process of determining the fate” of the Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR was formally completed. Thus, in the history of the Black Sea Fleet problem, two large chronological periods can be distinguished - the first - from 1992 to 1997 - a period of difficult negotiations at the interstate and interdepartmental level in the context of constantly emerging conflict situations and crisis phenomena in relations between Russia and Ukraine. The next period (June 1997 - end of 2000) represents an equally complex process of filling the main provisions of the agreements reached at the interstate level with concrete content.

In the fate of the Armed Forces of the former USSR, the events of 1991 were of decisive importance, when, along with the “parade of sovereignties” of the former Soviet republics, the principle of “new independent states - their own armed formations” began to be strictly implemented. The most painful process of dividing and determining the status of the Soviet inheritance took place in Ukraine. The danger of this situation was largely due to the fact that after the collapse of the Union, most of the weapons and facilities of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, the largest, more than 100,000-strong strategic group of the former unified USSR Navy with an uncertain status, ended up on its territory.

With the collapse of the Union, the Black Sea Fleet found itself in an extremely difficult situation. The situation developed as follows. On August 24, 1991, Ukraine, in accordance with the Act of Declaration of Independence and the results of the all-Ukrainian referendum, began to build a sovereign independent state, the guarantor of the security and territorial integrity of which was to be its own armed forces5. In accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine “On military formations in Ukraine,” all military formations stationed on its territory were formally subordinated to the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine was created. On December 6, 1991, the Supreme Council of Ukraine adopted the law “On the Armed Forces” and “On Defense,” officially proclaiming the creation of its national armed forces on the basis of associations, formations and units of the USSR Armed Forces that were stationed on its territory. On December 8, in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed the Agreement on the Commonwealth of Independent States6. The USSR finally ceased to exist. This was preceded by a meeting in the Union Ministry, at which the defense ministers of the sovereign states that were still part of the USSR agreed on a shared participation in the formation of the country's military budget. Even then, Ukraine firmly declared its intention to create its own army. Other problems were also not resolved, which generally did not allow reaching a consensus on issues of defense and security. With the formation of the CIS, any attempts to prevent the division of the Armed Forces by Ukrainian leaders were considered a violation of the laws of Ukraine and interference in its internal affairs.

Clarity to the current situation was brought to a certain extent by the meeting of the heads of state of the Commonwealth, held on December 30, 1991 in Minsk, during which the CIS member countries signed a number of documents on military issues, according to which the Ministry of Defense of the former Union was subject to liquidation, and instead The Main Command of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States was created. The CIS states received the right to create their own armed forces on the basis of units and units of the USSR Armed Forces that were stationed on the territory of these states, with the exception of those that were recognized as “strategic forces” and were supposed to remain under the unified command of the CIS7. However, subsequent events showed that the leaders who signed the package of military documents did not have a common idea of ​​what is included in the understanding of “strategic forces”, nor what should be the status and conditions for the deployment of these forces on the territory of the new states.

The fleet had the status of an operational-strategic formation. However, it is precisely this status, the implementation of which is possible only if the unity of the fleet is preserved in the entire interconnection of its structure as an association, that was subject to revision by the political leadership of Ukraine and its Ministry of Defense. The basis of their position was a different interpretation of the agreements reached in Minsk. In fact, Ukraine initially set a course for dividing the Black Sea Fleet. Naturally, the leadership of Russia, in fact the legal successor of the Union, the personnel and command of the Black Sea Fleet and the largely pro-Russian population of Crimea and Sevastopol could not agree with this. A confrontation began that lasted a total of more than five years, during which the parties several times found themselves on the verge of open confrontation.

Events around the Black Sea Fleet after the collapse of the USSR developed as follows.

In October 1991, the Supreme Council of Ukraine decided to subordinate the Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine. On April 5, 1992, President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk signed the Decree “On the transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to administrative subordination to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.”

On April 7, 1992, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin issued a Decree “On the transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.”

The “War of Decrees” ended with the meeting of Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk on June 23, 1992 in Dagomys. An agreement was signed on the further development of interstate relations, which indicates the need to continue the negotiation process on the creation of the Russian Navy and the Ukrainian Navy on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet.

On August 3, 1992, high-level Russian-Ukrainian negotiations took place in Mukhalatka near Yalta. The Presidents of Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement on the principles of forming the Russian Navy and the Ukrainian Navy on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR, according to which the Black Sea Fleet becomes the Joint Fleet of Russia and Ukraine with a unified command. The parties agreed that within three years the issue of dividing the Black Sea Fleet would be resolved. Thus, the first protracted crisis in interstate relations was resolved.

On June 17, 1993, negotiations between Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk took place in the Moscow region. An agreement was signed on the formation of the fleets of the two states on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet.

On September 3, 1993, in Massandra (Crimea), at a working meeting of the presidents of Russia and Ukraine, a protocol was signed, according to which the Black Sea Fleet with all its infrastructure in Crimea will be used by Russia.

On April 15, 1994, in Moscow, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement on a phased settlement of the Black Sea Fleet problem, according to which the Ukrainian Navy and the Russian Black Sea Fleet are based separately. In accordance with the agreement, Ukraine should receive up to 20% of the Black Sea Fleet vessels.

On February 7–8, 1995, an agreement was reached in Kyiv on the basing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol.

On June 9, 1995, a meeting between Boris Yeltsin and the new President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma took place in Sochi. An agreement was signed according to which the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Naval Forces are based separately; the main base and headquarters of the fleet are located in the city of Sevastopol; property issues must be resolved taking into account the previously reached agreement on dividing property in half. 81.7% of the vessels are transferred to Russia, 18.3% of the vessels are transferred to Ukraine.

On May 28, 1997, final intergovernmental agreements were signed in Kyiv on the status and conditions of the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine, on the parameters of the division of the Black Sea Fleet, on mutual settlements related to the division of the fleet and the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory8. The Ukrainian parliament ratified these documents on March 24, 1999. The State Duma ratified it on June 18, 1999.

Graphically, the process of dividing the ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet can be depicted as follows: (see Appendix 1 on p. 104).

The situation of uncertainty of the legal status and future fate of the Black Sea Fleet that persisted for more than five years had an extremely unfavorable effect on its combat effectiveness. What happened to the Black Sea Fleet in the period from 1991 to 1997 was perceived by many as the process of its death. Indeed, if we approach it from a formal point of view, the Black Sea Fleet of 1991 is not comparable to the Black Sea Fleet of 1997. This conclusion can be reached by comparing the data at the time of the conclusion of the Russian-Ukrainian agreements:

In 1991, the Black Sea Fleet numbered about 100 thousand personnel and 60 thousand workers and employees, and included 835 ships and vessels of almost all existing classes. Including: 28 submarines, 2 anti-submarine cruisers, 6 missile cruisers and large anti-submarine ships of rank I, 20 BODs of rank II, destroyers and patrol ships of rank II, about 40 TFR, 30 small missile ships and boats, about 70 minesweepers, 50 landing ships ships and boats, more than 400 naval aviation units. The organizational structure of the fleet included 2 divisions of ships (anti-submarine and amphibious assault), 1 division of submarines, 2 aviation divisions (fighter and naval attack missile carriers), 1 coastal defense division, dozens of brigades, individual divisions, regiments, and units. The forces of the Mediterranean squadron were in constant combat readiness. Every year, up to a hundred warships and vessels entered the world's oceans through the Black Sea straits. The fleet had an extensive network of bases from Izmail to Batumi (Izmail, Odessa, Nikolaev, Ochakov, Kiev, Chernomorskoe, Donuzlav, Sevastopol, Feodosia, Kerch, Novorossiysk, Poti, etc.), its units were stationed in the territory of Ukraine, Crimea, Moldova, Russia , Georgia, North Caucasus autonomies. According to experts from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, by the beginning of 1992. the value of all Black Sea Fleet property, including warships, exceeded 80 billion US dollars.

The most complete data on the quantitative and qualitative composition of the Black Sea Fleet in 1992–1993. D. Clark, an expert on military issues in the analytical magazine RFE/RL Re¬search Report, cites in his publications. According to his assessment, “Despite the fact that the Black Sea Fleet, like the Baltic Fleet, is smaller than the Pacific and Northern fleets of the former USSR, it is still a formidable force, larger than most other fleets in the world, including NATO members other than the United States. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies9 (IISS), it has more than 400 ships, of which 45 are surface strike forces, of which the most significant are naval warships, including two guided-missile carrier cruisers "Moscow" and "Leningrad", three missile carriers with nuclear weapons, ten missile carriers and thirty missile frigates. The Navy's weakest part is its submarine component, which consists of 26 mostly obsolete diesel submarines... The strength of the Fleet's land-based aviation, however, more than compensates for this weakness. According to IISS estimates, this component includes 151 combat aircraft and 85 helicopters. Some Russian sources claim that there are even more of them, approximately 400 units, including 140 capable of carrying nuclear weapons and solving problems at long distances... The fleet also includes a marine brigade based in Sevastopol, and coastal defense units - a motorized rifle division in Simferopol". D. Clark determined the probable number of personnel as 75,000 officers and sailors.

In November 1996, the Black Sea Fleet included 383 surface combat ships, 56 combat boats, 49 special purpose ships, 272 boats and raid vessels, 190 support vessels, 5 submarines, a total of 655 units. The Ukrainian Navy included 80 ships and vessels of various classes.

According to the results of the Kyiv agreements of May 28, 1997, the Russian Black Sea Fleet consists of 338 ships and vessels. The number of personnel cannot exceed 25 thousand people, including 2 thousand in the Marine Corps and attack aviation. The fleet includes 106 aircraft, of which there cannot be more than 22 combat aircraft. Russia cannot have more than 24 artillery systems with a caliber of more than 100 mm; 132 armored vehicles. Of the 80 command posts of fleet associations and formations, 16 (20%) remain behind the Russian Black Sea Fleet, of 39 communication facilities - 11 (28%), of 40 radio-technical service facilities - 11 (27%), of 50 logistics facilities - 9 ( 18%), out of 16 facilities providing missile, artillery and mine-torpedo weapons - 5 (31%), out of 7 ship repair facilities - 3 (42%).

The Ukrainian Navy received 30 warships and boats, one submarine, 90 combat aircraft, 6 special purpose ships, as well as 28 support vessels.

Thus, after the division of the Black Sea Fleet, the ratio of warships in the Black Sea basin became 1:2.5 in favor of Turkey.

Russia has three naval bases left - Sevastopol, Feodosia and temporarily Nikolaev; one location for the deployment of coastal troops (Sevastopol). In Sevastopol, Russia can use three of the five main bays: Sevastopol, Yuzhnaya, Karantinnaya, and also Cossack for the deployment of the Black Sea Fleet marine brigade. Streletskaya Bay will be used jointly by the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Navy. Also, the Russian Black Sea Fleet can use two main airfields in Gvardeyskoye and in Kach (Sevastopol), two reserve airfields in Sevastopol (Khersones, Yuzhny), a military sanatorium in Yalta, a communications post and testing center in Feodosia and some other facilities outside of Sevastopol. Russia's rental of facilities and bases costs it $97.75 million a year, which is written off to pay off Ukraine's debt. Russia undertakes not to deploy nuclear weapons in Ukraine as part of the Russian Black Sea Fleet; in addition, the procedure for using most naval facilities is established by Kyiv. The routes for the movement of personnel and military equipment of the Black Sea Fleet are also determined by local authorities. According to Russian military doctrine, the Black Sea Fleet forces should consist of two operational-tactical groupings - Eastern with a base in Novorossiysk and Western with a base in Sevastopol, which retained the status of the main base of the Fleet10.

According to data published in early 2002, the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation includes more than 50 warships, over 120 auxiliary vessels, and about 430 units of military equipment and weapons. The Black Sea Fleet's aviation numbers about 90 aircraft and helicopters. In accordance with the agreements on the deployment of the Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine, a military group of at least 25,000 people, 24 artillery systems with a caliber of more than 100 mm, 132 armored vehicles, and 22 combat aircraft are located in Crimea. This number remains unchanged to this day. The Ukrainian Navy has about 40 warships and boats and about 80 auxiliary vessels. It should be noted that by this time the command of both fleets had generally managed to establish constructive cooperation after almost ten years of confrontation. This became possible largely because, despite all the difficulties, a political decision was made at the interstate level that put an end to the process of determining the fate of the Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR. Since 1999 The Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy conduct annual joint exercises within the framework of the Peace Fairway program and solve common problems in the Black Sea basin. Nevertheless, to this day there remain quite complex controversial issues related to the basing of both contingents, the military doctrines of the two countries, the status of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet - the city of Sevastopol, the attitude towards partnership with NATO, etc., which means the point in the negotiation the process on the Black Sea Fleet issue has not yet been addressed11.

Summing up the more than ten-year discussion on the Black Sea Fleet issue, it should be said that during many years of political battles over the Black Sea Fleet, none of the conflicting parties - neither Russia nor Ukraine - achieved their initially set goals. Initially (after the collapse of the USSR), the Russian political leadership apparently sought not to interfere in the course of the “objective process” of the transition of the Black Sea Fleet under the jurisdiction of the new independent Ukrainian state. However, the principled position taken by the command of the Black Sea Fleet and its personnel, despite the increasing pressure from the Ukrainian authorities and various political forces of Ukraine, aimed at forcing politicians of the two states to begin a negotiation process on the problem of the status of this part of the former USSR-CIS Navy with the goal of making a final political decision on this issue, forced the leadership of the two countries to enter into a dialogue at the interstate level, which lasted for many years and often brought both sides to the threshold of open confrontation. During the long-term negotiation process, the Russian side sought to retain the Black Sea Fleet as the successor of the USSR, and also to seriously strengthen itself on the shore, transferring under its jurisdiction most of the infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet, along with its main naval base - the city of Sevastopol. At the same time, during the negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet issue, Russia’s actions were extremely inconsistent, due to the difficult internal political and economic situation in the country and the obvious reluctance of the top political leadership to take serious steps that could worsen the already difficult relations with Ukraine and thereby push it into the orbit of influence Western countries, and above all the USA and NATO. This was expressed in the readiness of the Russian side to make serious concessions during the preparation and signing of fundamental interstate agreements, which, as a result, bore traces of haste and legal negligence, largely did not correspond to reality and, therefore, did not contribute to the speedy resolution of the situation that had developed around the Black Sea Fleet dangerous political and economic situation. This policy was wrong and did not justify itself. As a result of more than ten years of negotiations on the problem of the status of the Black Sea Fleet on the territory of another state and its division between the two countries, accompanied by its sharp quantitative reduction, the Russian Federation, while formally remaining the legal successor of the Soviet Union, received only a small part of the Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR. At the same time, the Russian side was unable to defend its vision of the status of Sevastopol as the main base of its Black Sea Fleet, the status of the Black Sea Fleet as a single operational-strategic formation of the CIS Navy, as well as the principle of separate basing of fleets, and as a result did not receive at its disposal all the Black Sea Fleet’s sailing personnel and about 5% of the base territory and Fleet infrastructure facilities on extremely unfavorable lease terms. As a result, Russia actually lost a colossal part of the property of the former USSR, which it had every right to claim, and also significantly weakened its influence in the Black Sea region and the Mediterranean.

The Ukrainian side, declaring its rights to the Black Sea Fleet, sought to transfer under its jurisdiction this naval formation, if not entirely, then its best part, as well as all the infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet located on its territory, often acting by illegal, violent methods , through the seizure and reassignment of military facilities of the Black Sea Fleet, and the creation of structures of the Ukrainian Naval Forces without permission, while violating the agreements reached at the interstate level on the division of the Fleet, which was greatly facilitated by the policy of concessions to Ukraine pursued by the political leadership of the Russian Federation, as well as the interest of Western countries in weakening the influence Russia in the Black Sea region. At the same time, the Ukrainian political and military leadership, receiving full financial and political support from the NATO bloc, interested in minimizing Russian influence in the strategically important Black Sea region, set a course for the actual destruction of the Black Sea Fleet, officially declaring its intention to create a small naval force to protect the borders of an independent state and, at the same time, trying to subordinate as many infrastructure facilities and ships of the Black Sea Fleet as possible to themselves, without being able at the same time to maintain them in proper combat readiness for economic, organizational and technical reasons. It was these actions of the Ukrainian side, coupled with the criminal indifference of the then Russian authorities, that caused sharp rejection among the command and personnel of the Black Sea Fleet, which made it impossible for Ukraine and its Western “allies” to realize their intentions regarding the Black Sea Fleet. During the fifteen years of its independence, Ukraine has failed to create full-fledged naval forces in the Black Sea capable of influencing the situation in the region. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian side managed to reassign most of the infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet, formally confirm its jurisdiction over Sevastopol, and also force the Russian side to sign a major interstate agreement on extremely favorable terms. However, Russia, in turn, managed to retain even a small, but most combat-ready part of the Black Sea Fleet, its basis, and also defend the so-called. a “package” approach to the agreements reached and future negotiations with Ukraine on the issue of prolonging agreements on the Black Sea Fleet, according to which the Russian side intends to conduct all negotiations without exception strictly on the basis of the principles of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership of May 31, 1997 year and in inextricable connection with the Basic Agreements on the fleet of May 28, 1997, not allowing their revision or free interpretation on the part of Ukraine, in particular, under the threat of otherwise making territorial claims, etc.

In general, speaking about the results of the peculiar confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, it should be noted that the Russian side won the battle for the ships, but Ukraine retained the “land,” that is, Sevastopol and most of the coastal infrastructure. However, these are only visible results, behind which there is undoubtedly a deeper problem: the entire ten-year conflict between the two states associated with the Black Sea Fleet problem boiled down to one fundamental question: will independent Ukraine remain in the orbit of Russia’s military-political influence or will it gain independence from it? will enter some other global military-political system. The dispute over the Black Sea Fleet was only one aspect of this problem and in many ways evidence of its discussion and solution. The results of this dispute can be determined as follows: Russia, of course, managed to some extent to maintain its presence in Crimea and a powerful lever of influence on the situation in the Black Sea region. The preservation of the Black Sea Fleet with its main base in Sevastopol indicates that Ukraine still remains in the orbit of Russian military-political strategy, however, Ukraine, having retained very serious positions, has turned from a simple object of Russian policy into a serious factor influencing this policy, without which it is quite difficult to imagine maintaining the “status quo” in the region in the future. Whether the current relationship between Russia and Ukraine will eventually transform into a genuine partnership, or whether after the twenty-year lease period expires, disputes over the future fate of the Fleet will flare up with renewed vigor (which seems very likely in light of recent events in Ukraine) - time will tell.

1 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the period until 2020. Approved by the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin on July 27, 2001 // Marine collection., 2001. No. 9. P. 5.

3 Abdulatipov R.G. The national question and the state structure of Russia., M., p. 12.

4 Pechenev V.A. Who benefits from returning Russia to pre-Petrine times? // Russian newspaper. 1996, September 24.

5 Russia-Ukraine (1990–2000) Documents and materials. T. 1. M., 2001. pp. 18–24.

6 Ibid. pp. 33–37.

7 Indestructible and legendary” in the fire of political battles of 1985–1993. M., 1994. S. 265–271; Shaposhnikov E.I. Choice. M., 1995. pp. 143–144.

8 See: Russia-Ukraine (1990–2000) Documents and materials. T.2. pp. 125–142.

10 Gorbachev S.P. Pessimistic tragedy... P. 26–27; Crimean Truth. 1992. No. 5. January 9; Myalo K.G. Decree. Op. P. 144; D.L. Clark. The Saga of Black Sea Fleet... p. 45; Mirror of the Week. 1997 May 31; Tragedy of the Black Sea Fleet (1990–1997).//Moscow-Crimea. Vol. No. 2. M., 2000; http://legion.wplus.net/guide/navy/flots/cher_l.shtml; http://www.janes.com; http://www.Sevastopol.org.

11 Crimea Island. 1999. No. 2; Malgin A. Decree. Op. P. 48; Kommersant-Vlast. 2002. No. 17–18.

Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy

Emblem of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy

Total information

Number of members

Technique (as of March 2014):

• Underwater equipment - 1;
• Surface equipment - 47;
• Personnel - 25,000 people.

Military conflicts

War in South Ossetia (2008),
Crimean crisis (2014)

Order of the Red Banner

The Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation is the operational-strategic association of the Navy of the Russian Federation on the Black Sea. Successor to the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR and the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Empire

History of the Russian Black Sea Fleet

After the collapse of the USSR, from August 1992, the Black Sea Fleet existed as a joint fleet of the Russian Federation and Ukraine. In 1995-97 The Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation and the Ukrainian Navy were created with separate basing on the territory of Ukraine. In 1997, Russia and Ukraine entered into a basic agreement. The lease terms for the base are $98 million. Duration of stay is until May 28, 2017.

On April 21, 2010, the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine Dmitry Medvedev and Viktor Yanukovych in Kharkov signed an Agreement on the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine (ratified by the State Duma of the Russian Federation and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on April 27, 2010). The stay of the Russian base in the Black Sea was extended by 25 years (until 2042) with the right to extend it for the next five-year period if neither side declares the need to terminate this agreement.

On April 2, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law terminating four Russian-Ukrainian agreements on the Black Sea Fleet from 1997 and 2010.

Organization

The Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy includes surface and submarine forces, coastal fleet forces and their constituent marine units, coastal defense troops and naval aviation.

In addition, the Black Sea Fleet includes ships and vessels, special purpose units, private units, logistics units and the Hydrographic Service of the Navy.

Base points

The main bases of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy are the Sevastopol and Novorossiysk naval bases.

The main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is the Sevastopol Naval Base, which is located on the administrative territory of the hero city of Sevastopol and is located in three bays of this city - Northern, Southern and Karantinnaya and has several berths.

The second base is Novorossiysk Naval Base. It is the youngest association of the Russian Navy and is located on the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea.

The main tasks of the NVMB are to assist the forces of the Southern Military District in the coastal direction, protect the state border of Russia in cooperation with the forces of the border troops, ensure the deployment of fleet forces, as well as ensure military maritime transport.

The Crimean naval base is a heterogeneous operational-territorial association of the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR Navy and the Russian Navy, which existed in 1976-1996 and was recreated in 2014.

Equipment and weapons

As of 2014, the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy includes the 11th brigade of anti-submarine ships, the 197th brigade of landing ships, the 68th brigade of water area security ships, the 41st brigade of missile boats, which are based in Sevastopol, and the 184th brigade Water District Protection, based in Novorossiysk.

Prefix of ships and vessels

Ships and vessels belonging to the Russian Navy currently do not have prefixes in their names.

Marks of Excellence

Small missile ships of Project 1234.1 are a further development of Project 1234. They received powerful weapons and more advanced electronic equipment. RTOs are designed to destroy surface ships and enemy fleet formations in far and near sea zones, cover convoy and landing operations of fleet forces, and patrol in specified areas.
"Mirage"(1986, tail number 617),
"Calm"(1978, tail number 620).

Small anti-submarine ships of Project 1124M are a further development of Project 1124. They received more powerful weapons, a new sonar and advanced electronic equipment. The ships of this project are designed to search and destroy enemy submarine forces in far and near sea zones, provide anti-aircraft defense and air defense to fleet formations, cover convoy and landing operations of fleet forces, and patrol in specified areas. They were built in several series, which differ slightly in performance characteristics. Project 1124M MPKs are the main escort ships of the Russian Navy.
As part of the Black Sea Fleet:
MPK-118 "Suzdalets"(1983, tail number 071),
MPK-134 "Muromets"(1982, tail number 064),
MPK-199 "Kasimov"(1986, tail number 055),
MPK-207 "Povorino"(1989, tail number 053),
MPK-217 "Eysk"(1989, tail number 054).

The small anti-submarine ship "Aleksandrovets" of Project 1124 is designed to search and destroy enemy submarine forces in far and near sea zones, provide anti-submarine warfare and air defense to fleet formations, cover convoy and landing operations of fleet forces, and patrol in specified areas. The ships of this project were the main escort ships of the USSR Navy. They were built in several series. The MPC received modern air defense and anti-aircraft weapons, two sonar systems, and new radio-electronic equipment. "Alexandrovets" is the last operational ship of the project.
In the fleet since 1982

The small anti-submarine ship "Vladimirets" of Project 1145.1 is a further development of Project 1141. It received new weapons, more advanced sonar and electronic equipment, and the design of the ship was improved. As a power plant, it received economical gas turbines, which allows it to provide a wide range of speeds and operating modes. Small anti-submarine ships are unique in their design - they are equipped with fixed-type hydrofoils with automatically controlled flaps. Project 1145.1 MPKs are designed to search and destroy enemy submarine forces in far and near sea zones, provide anti-aircraft defense and air defense to fleet formations, cover convoy and landing operations of fleet forces, and patrol in specified areas. IPCs on PC have no analogues in any fleet in the world. "Vladimirets" is the last active ship in the series.
In the fleet since 1991

The sea minesweeper "Zheleznyakov" of Project 12660 is a new generation mine-resistant ship, which has received modern weapons, electronic equipment, and means of searching and destroying mines. For the first time in the Russian fleet, it can search for mines directly along the ship's path. MTSH is designed to search and destroy mines in far and near sea zones, cover convoy and landing operations of naval forces, and patrol in specified areas. MTSH Project 12660 are the most advanced mine-resistant ships of the Russian Navy.
In the fleet since 1988

The sea minesweeper "Vice Admiral Zakharyin" of project 02668 is a further development of project 266M. The ship received new weapons, mine-anti-mine systems (for example, GAS Livadia) and radio-electronic equipment. The minesweeper can search for mines directly along the ship's path. It is designed to search and destroy mines in far and near sea zones, cover convoy and landing operations of naval forces, and patrol in specified areas.
In the fleet since 2009

The sea minesweeper "Valentin Pikul" of Project 266ME is a further development of Project 266M. The ship received new weapons, mine protection systems and electronic equipment. The minesweeper is designed to search and destroy mines in far and near sea zones, cover convoy and landing operations of naval forces, and patrol in specified areas.
In the fleet since 2001

Sea minesweepers of Project 266M are a further development of Project 266. They received new weapons and mine protection systems, and the design of the ship was improved. Minesweepers are designed to search and destroy mines in far and near sea zones, cover convoy and landing operations of naval forces, and patrol in specified areas. They were the main type of mine-resistant ship in the maritime zone of the USSR Navy.
As part of the Black Sea Fleet:
"Vice Admiral Zhukov"(1978, tail number 909),
"Ivan Golubets"(1973, tail number 911),
"Turbinist"(1972, tail number 912),
"Kovrovets"(1974, tail number 913).

Basic minesweepers of Project 1265 are designed to search and destroy mines in the near sea and base zones, cover convoy and landing operations of naval forces, and patrol in specified areas. They were produced in several series, which differed slightly in performance characteristics. This project was the main type of mine-resistant ship in the base zone of the USSR Navy.
As part of the Black Sea Fleet:
BT-40 "Lieutenant Ilyin"(1982, tail number 438),
BT-241 "Mineralnye Vody"(1990, tail number 426).

The Black Sea Fleet is an operational-strategic association of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea, which includes diesel submarines, surface ships for operations in the ocean and near sea zones, naval missile-carrying, anti-submarine and fighter aircraft, and units of coastal troops.

The history of the origin and formation of the Black Sea Fleet dates back to the second half of the 18th century, when Russia achieved major successes in the struggle for access to the seas and established itself on the shores of the Azov and Black Seas. Sailors of the Black Sea Fleet took an active part in the revolutionary events of 1917, and from the spring of 1918 they participated in the fight against the advancing forces of German troops. During the Great Patriotic War, the Black Sea Fleet defended bases and coasts, protected its communications, acted on enemy communications, and carried out air strikes on its coastal facilities. Subsequently, having restored the infrastructure destroyed by the war, the Black Sea Fleet carried out tasks to protect the southern borders of the country.

After the collapse of the USSR, from August 1992, the Black Sea Fleet existed as a united fleet (of the Russian Federation and Ukraine). According to the bilateral agreements on the Black Sea Fleet of 1995 and 1997, on its basis, the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy were created with separate basing, and the status of the Russian fleet on the territory of Ukraine was determined.

On June 12, 1997, the historical St. Andrew's flag was again raised on the ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, under which the Black Sea sailors resumed their participation in long-distance voyages not only in the Mediterranean Sea, but also in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans. In 2010, the Black Sea Fleet organizationally became part of the Southern Military District.

On April 2, 2014, in connection with the admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the formation of new subjects within the Russian Federation - the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol, the President of Russia signed the Federal Law "On the termination of agreements relating to the presence of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine" . After this, the renewal of the naval personnel, aviation and equipment of the coastal troops of the Black Sea Fleet began.

The Black Sea Fleet protects Russia's economic interests in the region, ensures the safety of navigation, and carries out foreign policy actions of the government in economically important areas of the World Ocean (visits, business calls, joint exercises, actions as part of peacekeeping forces, etc.). During the operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria, fleet forces from the permanent naval group in the Mediterranean provided maritime cover for aviation operations from the Khmeimim airbase.

GPS g. 44.614162,33.520412 (format used in online maps)
GPS g.m. 44°36.849", 33°31.224" (format used in navigators and geocaching)
GPS g.m.s. 44°36"50.98", 33°31"13.48"

The coordinate points to the place from where tourist boats depart - the Kornilov embankment in Artillery Bay.

Sevastopol is an unusual city. Often the embankment is the most beautiful thing in a village, the center of the city, the water calms us down and gives us peace, but here the embankments are everywhere - here and there, up and down, beauty! And numerous and varied boats float on the water.

From the water, Sevastopol is completely different, especially at sunset, when the colors of the sky shimmer on the waves, the world darkens, and the lanterns become brighter and more beautiful. Therefore, the water excursion is definitely worth taking.

The world is three-dimensional - this means that everything can be looked at from a different perspective. Beautiful.

Oleksandr Okhrimenko now has a home port of Odessa, that is, he managed to sail away during the whole mess with Crimea.

The large landing ship "Yamal" 156 has been in service since 1988.

The medium reconnaissance ship "Priazovye" SSV-201 was built in 1986 and is now based in the South Bay of the city of Sevastopol.

Medical ship 320 "Yenisei" has a rich history of a "floating hospital" and a huge list of rescued and cured people.

The warship "General Ryabikov" was built in 1978 and is still in use for its intended purpose.

The floating workshop "PM-56" has been operating since 1973, representing a mobile repair base for "treating" ships at long distances from home.

The patrol ship 808 "Inquisitive" was created in 1979 and originally belonged to the Baltic Fleet, but three years later it was transferred to the Black Sea Fleet.

The medium sea tanker Koida is a support ship.

Since 1959, the rescue vessel Epron has been carrying out search and rescue operations and carrying out diver descents. Participated in the operation to raise the Ochakov BOD. And besides, it was Epron that found the submarine Narwhal from the First World War near Sevastopol.

The patrol ship 810 Smetlivy and the large anti-submarine ship 713 Kerch have been in service since 1968 and 1969, respectively.

Small rocket ship "Mirage" with tail number 617.

Rocket hovercraft "Samum" with number 616.

"Samum" was laid down in 1991, one of the youngest ships on this page.

The small anti-submarine ship U 205 "Lutsk", launched in 1993, the Russian flag was raised over it in 2014.

All ships are equipped with the most complex and incomprehensible equipment for ordinary people, which, nevertheless, is impressive - so many pieces of hardware on one ship!

The small anti-submarine ship U209 Ternopil was launched in 2002 and joined the Russian Navy in 2014.

The large landing ship "Konstantin Olshansky" U402 is named after the commander of the detachment that liberated the city of Nikolaev from the Nazi invaders. Built in 1985, it began serving in the Russian Navy in 2014.

The patrol ship U130 "Hetman Sahaidachny" was launched in 1992, now the flagship of the Ukrainian Navy, and only because it was in the Mediterranean Sea during the mess.

Warships are beautiful even for those for whom they all look the same. But everyone has their own history, which the Sevastopol bays allow you to touch.