To defeat the enemy in engineering-equipped shelters, villages, and behind duvals, direct fire artillery fire was used

Regular monthly reports on military operations in Afghanistan (for May-June-July 1984) are offered to the attention of VKO readers. The materials fully preserve the style and spelling of the documents from the headquarters of the 40th Army.

May 1984

The army troops fully completed the combat plan for May, as well as the tasks of assisting local authorities in strengthening state power in controlled counties and volosts.

Two planned operations were performed in May. The operation in the provinces of BAGLAN, PARVAN, KAPISA under the leadership of the army commander, Lieutenant General GENERALOV L.V., carried out by units and subunits of the 108th, 201st Motorized Rifle Division, 103rd Airborne Division, 66th, 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 191th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 345th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 2nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, continues.

In addition, an operation was carried out in the provinces of HILMAND and KANDAHAR from May 3 to May 20 by units of the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 317th Infantry Division, 350th Infantry Division, 5th Motorized Rifle Division under the leadership of the head of the combat training department of the army headquarters, Major General A.Ya.

The purpose of the operation was:

• defeat newly identified rebel gangs in the green zones of the provinces;
• expand the zones of influence of government power and stabilize the situation in HELMAND province.

The total group of rebels in the combat areas in HELMAND province consisted of 69 groups with a total number of up to 1,900 people, armed with up to 28 mortars, up to 40 DShK, a large number of RPGs and automatic small arms.

Since May 1982, no operations have been carried out in HELMAND province, which allowed the rebels to equip powerful engineering strongholds, firing positions for heavy weapons and other defensive structures.

Features of this operation:

• with the start of the operation, the rebels did not leave their areas and put up stubborn resistance from their strongholds;
• highly rugged terrain with a wide network of canals, ditches, the presence of well-equipped bunkers, bunkers, trenches, dugouts, as well as excellent knowledge of the terrain allowed the rebels to escape attacks, hiding behind small groups;
• To defeat the enemy in engineering-equipped shelters, villages, and behind duvals, direct fire artillery fire was used;
• the wide green zone significantly complicated the actions of the troops, reduced the pace of the offensive to 1.5–2 km, especially for armored groups, and allowed the rebels to carry out an organized retreat and secretly exit the battle;
• weather conditions did not allow full use of aviation.

As a result of the operation, 658 rebels were destroyed, 60 people were filtered, 23 rebels were detained and transferred to KHAD, 2 rebels were captured.

Captured: small arms - 140 units, ammunition for CO - 12.85 thousand units, DShK - 1 unit, DShK ammunition - 11.4 thousand units, RPG - 10 units, RPG rounds - 15 units. , recoilless rifles – 1 unit, rounds for ammunition – 6, 68 hand grenades, 28 anti-tank weapons, cars – 6 units, motorcycles – 5 units, 1 tractor, 60 mines for a mortar, 2 landmines, 1 trailer for a mortar, 1 binoculars, 2 megaphones, documents 3 IR.

Destroyed: small arms - 6 units, PTM - 21 units, landmines - 17 units, strong points - 8, firing points - 72, 2 trouble-free guns, defensive structures - 42, dugouts - 18, DShK - 3 units, ammunition DShK - 2.0 thousand units, mortars - 5 units, mines for the mortar - 251 units, RPG - 5 units, RPG rounds - 66 units, ammunition depots - 4, fuel and lubricants depots - 10, food depots – 3, warehouses with medical equipment – ​​1, cars – 4, motorcycles – 4, machine guns – 2, documents 1 IC. Removed: PTM – 37, PPM – 10, landmines – 14.

Our losses: killed - 6 people, wounded - 34 people (including 7 officers).

In total, as a result of the operations carried out, 315 rebels were destroyed, 317 were filtered, 247 were detained, 76 were captured.

Captured: small arms - 646 units, ammunition for CO - 257.53 thousand units, DShK - 5 units, 13 barrels for DShK, DShK ammunition - 69.52 thousand units, RPG - 29 units, shots RPGs – 260 units, BO – 5 units, shots for BO – 163 units, mortars – 2 units, mines for a mortar – 1335 units, PGI – 2 units, mines and land mines – 1009 units, RG – 386 pcs., explosives - 660 kg, various warehouses - 86, documents 8 IR, cars - 6, motorcycles - 5, PGI ammunition - 740 pcs., machine guns - 3, radio stations - 3 pcs., AGS ammunition - 400 pcs.

Destroyed: CO - 37 units, ammunition for CO - 1.0 thousand units, DShK - 117 units, DShK ammunition - 8.88 thousand units, RPG - 117 units, RPG ammunition - 11 units, BO - 3 units, mortars - 33 units, mines for the mortar - 297 units, ZGU - 3 units, mines and land mines - 850 units, RG - 68 units, explosives - 40 kg, strong points - 57 units, firing points - 251, caves - 377, 49 fortresses, 53 various warehouses, 20 Islamic committees, 12 cars, machine guns - 11, pack animals - 90. Mines and landmines removed - 293 pcs.

Our losses: killed - 31 people (including 5 officers), wounded - 132 people (including 10 officers). Armored personnel carrier – 1 unit, Su-17 – 1 unit.

In addition to conducting operations, army troops were involved in the implementation of intelligence data in areas of responsibility received through Soviet representative offices and the DRA Armed Forces.

In total, during the reporting period, 17 implementations were carried out, of which 16 were effective, which is 96% of the effectiveness (73% in April of this year).

The units and subunits of the 103rd Airborne Division, as well as the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade, showed the greatest effectiveness.

As a result of the implementation, the following were destroyed: 179 rebels, 283 people filtered, 78 detained and transferred to KHAD, 3 captured.

Captured: small arms - 44 units, ammunition for CO - 16.56 thousand units, RPGs - 3 units, rounds for RPGs - 6 units, mines for a mortar - 8 units, hand grenades - 27 units, warehouse – 1, documents 1 IC.

Destroyed: CO - 29 units, RPGs - 6 units, mortar mines - 41 units, mines and landmines - 37 units, warehouses - 2, 1 Islamic committee, 1 vehicle. 3 PTMs were removed.

Our losses: killed - 2 people (including 1 officer), wounded - 8 people.

In accordance with the plan for organizing ambush operations, army units widely used ambushes on the likely routes of movement of caravans and bands of rebels and in the interests of communications.

In total, during the reporting period, 330 ambushes were set up and search and reconnaissance actions were carried out, of which 19 yielded results, which is 5.7% of the effectiveness (6.4% in April of this year).

The highest performance with high activity was shown by units and units of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division, 103th Motorized Rifle Division, 201st Motorized Rifle Division, whose effectiveness was 10, 6.9, 19%, respectively.

As a result of ambush and search and reconnaissance actions, the following were destroyed: 90 rebels, 1 cave, 1 car, 3 motorcycles. Captured: small arms - 34 units, ammunition for CO - 7 thousand units, RPG - 2 units, RPG rounds - 13 units, mines and landmines - 12 units, RG - 29 units, explosives - 2 kg ., documents of the 1st Islamic Committee. Detained - 38 rebels.

Our losses: killed - 3 people, wounded - 17 people (including 2 officers).

The sabotage actions of the rebels in May are not decreasing. Thus, during the reporting period, the rebels committed 54 acts of sabotage, as a result of which our losses amounted to: 30 people killed (including 7 officers), 91 people wounded, including 4 officers. By technology: MTLBU - 1, armored personnel carrier - 4, tank - 1, cars - 11, aircraft - 5, helicopters - 3.

In response, 97 rebels were killed and 15 were detained.

Captured: CO – 21 units, DShK ammunition – 400 units, RPG – 1, RPG rounds – 2 units, BO rounds – 5 units.

Thus, as a result of military operations in May, the following were destroyed: rebels - 4681, SO - 66 units, ammunition for SO - 1 thousand units, DShK - 117 units, ammunition for DShK - 8.88 thousand units, RPG – 123 units, rounds for RPG – 11, ammunition – 3 units, mortars – 33 units, mines for mortar – 338 units, PGI – 3 units, mines and landmines – 887 units, RG – 68 units ., explosives - 40 kg., strong points - 57, firing points - 251, caves - 378, 49 fortresses, various warehouses - 55, 21 Islamic committees, 14 cars, 3 motorcycles, 11 machine guns, 90 pack animals.

Captured: CO - 745 units, ammunition for CO - 281.1 thousand units, DShK - 5 units, 13 barrels for DShK, ammunition for DShK - 69.56 thousand units, RPG - 35 units, shots RPGs – 281 units, BO – 5 units, shots for BO – 168 units, mortars – 2 units, mines for a mortar – 1343 units, PGI – 2 units, mines and landmines – 1021 units, RG – 442 pcs., explosives - 662 kg., various warehouses - 87, documents of 10 Islamic committees, cars - 6, motorcycles - 5, ammunition for PGI - 740 pcs., machine guns - 3 pcs., radio stations - 3 pcs. Filtered - 1200 people, detained - 378 rebels, captured - 79. Mines and landmines removed - 293 pieces.

Our losses: killed - 66 people (of which 13 officers), wounded - 249 people (of which 16 officers).

By equipment: MTLBU - 1 unit, armored personnel carrier - 5 units, tank - 1 unit, cars - 11 units, aircraft - 6 units, helicopters - 3.

June 1984

The army troops completed the combat plan for June, as well as the tasks of assisting local authorities in strengthening state power in controlled counties and volosts.

In June, 7 operations were performed, of which: planned – 6, unplanned – 1.

Operations were carried out in the provinces: BAGLAN, PARWAN, KAPISA, KABUL, HERAT, BADAKHSHAN, KUNAR, NANGARHAR.

Planned operations continue: in the provinces of BAGLAN, PARVAN, KAPISA under the leadership of the army commander, Lieutenant General L. GENERALOV; in the province of BAGLAN under the leadership of the deputy commander of the 201st motorized rifle division, Colonel Tolokov.

The goals of the planned operation in the PANJSHER gorge remained the same:

• defeat and destruction of gangs, Islamic committees, bases and warehouses;
• elimination of the main channel for rebel groups to receive weapons and other material from abroad;
• creating favorable conditions for establishing and conducting political work of party and state bodies of the DRA with the population in the liberated zone.

• destruction of the enemy group in parts;
• finding base areas and warehouses, Islamic committees and destroying them;
• widespread use of tactical airborne assault to implement newly acquired intelligence data.

As a result of the fighting in the PANJSHER gorge in June, the following were destroyed: rebels - 1832, small arms - 79 units, ammunition for CO - 1.6 thousand units, DShK - 62 units, RPGs - 52 units, mortars - 4 units. , BO – 2 units, strong points – 16, firing points – 23, caves – 15, fortresses – 49, hand grenades – 26 units, PGI – 1 unit, various warehouses – 9, machine guns – 2 units, pack guns animals – 15.

Captured: small arms - 141 units, ammunition for CO - 60.4 thousand units, DShK - 12 units, 1 DShK barrel, ammunition for DShK - 87.6 thousand units, RPG - 4 units, shots for RPGs - 128 units, mortars - 5 units, mines for M - 271 units, BO - 3 units, shots for BO - 565 units, mines and landmines - 547 units, RPGs - 278 units, explosives – 27 kg, warehouses – 17, IR documents – 6, radio stations – 2 units, PGI – 1, fire cord 600 m, KPVT – 1 unit, RPO rounds – 12 pcs.

148 mines and land mines were removed, 56 rebels were captured, 70 rebels were detained and transferred to KHAD.

Our losses: killed - 40 people (including 2 officers), wounded - 101 people (including 8 officers).

In the period from June 1 to June 10, a planned operation was carried out in the green zone of HERAT under the leadership of the commander of the 5th Guards. Motorized Rifle Division, Major General G. A. ANOSHIN, forces: from 5th Motorized Rifle Division - 101 Motorized Rifle Regiment (without small and medium-sized infantry and combat units), 371 Motorized Rifle Regiment (without small and medium-sized infantry and combat units), 650 orb, 24 tp (without combat units), 1060 ap (without two adn) . From 70 OMSBR – 2 MSB.

From the DRA Air Force - 17 Infantry, 21 Infantry Brigade, 466 P "K", OB "Ts", KhAD units, Tsaranda.

The purpose of the operation was:

• defeat bandit groups, warehouses in the green zone and the old city of HERAT;
• prevent organized action by rebels and counter-revolutionary underground against the people's power;
• contribute to stabilizing the situation in the operation area.

Features of the operation:

• launching a massive air strike by 76 Su-17, Su-7, Su-25 aircraft against reconnoitred rebel areas in the initial period of the operation, followed by air support for military operations;
• widespread use of tactical airborne assault in several echelons to blockade the green zone and the city of HERAT;
• joint actions of Afghan and Soviet units when combing blocked areas;
• the enemy did not offer significant resistance, since the main forces of the rebels were withdrawn from the area of ​​upcoming hostilities in advance.

As a result of the operation, 3195 people were filtered, 140 rebels were detained and transferred to KHAD, 183 people were drafted into the army, 7 rebels were captured.

Destroyed: rebels – 193, IK – 8, small arms – 74 units, machine guns – 1 unit, RPG – 1 unit, motorcycles – 7, hospital – 1, cars – 2 units, PTM – 12 units.

Captured: small arms - 139 units, machine guns - 3 units, RPGs - 1 unit, RPG rounds - 30 units, ammunition for CO - 15.66 thousand units, printing house - 1, cars - 8 units. , motorcycle – 1, hospital – 1, radio station – 1, BTR-40 – 1 unit, various warehouses – 4, documents 4 IR, hand grenades – 37 pcs., PTM – 21 pcs., telephone – 1, sets of uniforms – 99, binoculars – 1.

Our losses: killed - 4 people, wounded - 6 people.

Equipment losses: BMP – 1 unit, GTMM – 1 unit.

In the province of Kabul, a planned operation was carried out from June 24 to July 2 by forces of 350 pdp (without pdb), 1 pdb (without pdr) 357 pdp, rr 356 pdp, 80 opr, 1179 ap, 3/181 motorized rifle regiment, adn 181 motorized rifle division jointly with two Tsaranda battalions. Head - acting commander of the 103rd Guards. Airborne Division Lieutenant Colonel E. BOCHAROV.

Objectives of the operation:

• identify and destroy bandit groups and warehouses in DEHSABZ county;
• prevent the enemy from breaking through into the Panjshir Gorge and south into the Nangarhar Valley;
• provide assistance to local authorities in stabilizing the situation and strengthening state power in the area of ​​the operation.

Main features of the operation:

• During the blockade, 3 infantry infantry regiments 181 infantry regiments and 350 infantry regiments acted in opposite directions: 350 infantry infantry regiments from the south, 181 infantry infantry regiments from the north, north-west, which did not allow the rebels to break out of the blocked area and escape from the attacks of troops and aircraft;
• blocking the areas where the rebels were located was carried out at night, and combing was carried out at dawn, thereby achieving secrecy and surprise of actions;
• the units operated on foot without an armored group, with the support of aviation and artillery;
• in the hot part of the day from 10.00 to 16.00, the troops remained on their occupied lines and did not conduct active combat operations in order to preserve strength and activity for operations at night.

As a result of the operation, the following were destroyed: rebels - 307, DShK - 19 units, mortars - 3 units, OP - 22, OT - 20, warehouses - 2, BO - 1 unit, Islamic committees - 2, ammunition for DShK and SO - 16 thousand pieces, rounds for ammunition - 9, mines for a mortar - 48 pieces, explosives - 400 kg.

Captured: small arms - 25 units, ammunition for SO - 15 thousand units, DShK - 3 units, ammunition for DShK - 11 thousand units, 4 barrels for DShK, ZGU - 1 unit, barrels for ZGU - 3 pcs., MANPADS "S-2M" - 1 pc., BO rounds - 22 pcs., mines and land mines - 116 pcs., warehouses - 8, explosives - 204 kg, RPG rounds - 27 pcs., RPG - 1 units, mines for mortar - 76 pcs., RG - 35 pcs., mortars - 2 units, radio stations - 1, lapis lazuli - 120 kg, gas masks - 11 pcs.

Our losses: killed - 7 people (including 1 officer), wounded - 30 people, BTR-70 - 1 unit.

In the period from June 25 to July 3, a planned operation was carried out in the provinces of KUNAR, NANGARKHAR by forces of the 2nd, 3rd MSB, DSB, TTB (without 2 companies), adn (without battalion troops), RR 66 OMSBR, 1 OMSB together with units 9, 11 Infantry Division , 405 pgb under the leadership of the first deputy army commander, Major General P. S. SEMENOV.

The plan of the operation included:

• the use of front-line and army aviation, artillery fire on identified rebel groups and warehouses to defeat them and active military operations to block certain areas, gorges and check them in order to identify gangs for 9 days in the direction ASADABAD - JALALABAD, along the KUNAR River with the use of theater of operations defeat rebel groups in the KUNAR river valley, expand the zone of influence of state power and assist local party bodies in establishing and strengthening people's power in the KUNAR river valley.

Features of the operation:

• launching air and artillery strikes on areas where rebels are concentrated, bases and warehouses before the offensive of troops;
• the use of TAC for blocking areas and the location of gangs with subsequent combing of these areas by Afghan units;
• sequential blocking of gorges by occupying dominant heights and combing them in the opposite direction;
• the rebels, using the well-known inaccessible terrain, withdrew the main forces into the depths of the mountains, resisting with well-trained small groups;
• severe weather conditions and heat reduced the activity of the units and slowed down the pace of the offensive.

As a result of the operation, the following were destroyed: rebels - 316, DShK - 9 units, BO - 1 unit, mortars - 2 units, OP - 11, OT - 12, fortresses - 3, CO - 20 units, PPM - 12 units. , PTM – 11 pcs., food warehouses – 3.

Captured: small arms – 7 units, ammunition for CO – 1.5 thousand units, anti-tank missiles – 30 units. PTM removed – 128 pcs.

27 rebels were detained and transferred to KHAD.

Our losses: killed - 8 people (including 2 officers), wounded - 9 people (including 3 officers), died from heatstroke - 9 people.

The concept of the operation carried out from June 23 to June 29 in the province of KANDAGAR by forces of 2, 3 MRB (without MRB), TB, ADN (without 2 battalions), RR 70 OMSBR, 9 MSB 371 MRR, ADN (without artillery battalion) 1060 AP, 3rd Separate Motorized Infantry together with 20th, 34th Regimental Infantry, 7th Tank Brigade, 201st Orb, AB Tsaranda under the leadership of Deputy Chief of Army Staff, Major General LUCHINSKY A.A., provided for:

• inflicting massive air and artillery strikes, with active military operations using TakVD to defeat identified gangs and rebel groups in the vicinity of KANDAGAR;
• expand the zones of influence of state power and stabilize the situation in the combat area.

Features of the operation:

• with the start of the operation, the enemy did not leave his areas and offered stubborn resistance to the troops;
• delivering massive air and artillery strikes against the largest rebel groups, bases and warehouses before the offensive and during the offensive, which reduced the number of losses and contributed to the successful completion of tasks by units;
• access to combat areas was illuminated at night by artillery, which hampered the enemy’s maneuver;
• the enemy relied heavily on prepared defensive lines, skillfully maneuvering on terrain familiar to him;
• high vegetation, the presence of garden plots and vineyards made it difficult for our troops to operate and created favorable conditions for the enemy’s defense, allowing the rebels and their snipers to operate in small groups from ambushes.

As a result of the operation, the following were destroyed: rebels - 261, small arms - 15 units, DShK - 2 units, mortars - 3 units, PTM - 12 units, PPM - 2 units, RPGs - 3 units, firing points - 29 units, defensive structure – 1, motorcycle –

1 unit, ammunition warehouses – 3, 1 food warehouse, pack animals – 10, clothing warehouses – 1.

Captured: small arms – 56 units, ammunition for SD – 7.95 thousand units, ammunition for DShK – 0.65 thousand units, RPG – 4 units, rounds for RPG – 35 units, rounds for BO – 8 pcs., hand grenades – 30 pcs., PTM – 18 pcs., PPM – 2 pcs., explosives – 180 kg, fuses for mines – 30 pcs., bicycles – 10 pcs., 1 radio station, 1 sniper sight rifle, med. warehouse - 1, min for M - 25 pcs., documents 2 IC, magazines for AK - 11 pcs. Removed: PTM – 6 pcs., PPM – 7 pcs., 1 landmine. 5 people were detained and transferred to KHAD.

Our losses: killed - 2 people, wounded - 10 people.

The concept of a private operation carried out in the province of BADAKHSHAN in the period from June 8 to 28 by the forces of 1 MSB (without MSR), 2, 3 MSB (without 2 companies), RR, ADN, ISSR 860 OMSP together with units of 24 pp, AB Tsaranda, KHAD , under the leadership of the commander of the 860th separate infantry fighting unit, Lieutenant Colonel SIDOROV, provided for:

• using air and artillery strikes and active military actions to defeat rebel groups in the ARGUND valley and the KHAZARA gorge;
• stabilize the situation in the combat area;
• check the capabilities and passability of the old Kishim road and the exit to ARTYNGELAU.

Features of the operation:

• for the first time, the 860th special forces acted in full force on equipment;
• the use of aviation and artillery strikes against reconnaissance targets and on call;
• consistent blocking of areas where rebel groups are deployed by occupying heights and ensuring the advance of the main forces along the bottom of the gorge;
• the armored group and other equipment advanced off the roads due to its extensive destruction.

As a result of the operation, the following were destroyed: rebels - 154, DShK - 2 units, RPG - 1 unit, CO - 7 units, PTM - 3 units, 2 warehouses, 83 rebels were detained and transferred to KHAD, captured - 4 .

Captured: small arms - 35 units, ammunition for CO - 1.75 thousand units, machine guns 2 units, warehouses - 18, explosives - 95 kg, RG - 17 units, mines and land mines - 17, documents 1 IR , mines and land mines were removed - 19 pieces.

Our losses: killed - 2 people, including 1 officer, wounded - 9 people.

In addition to conducting operations, army troops were involved in the implementation of intelligence data in areas of responsibility received by intelligence agencies through Soviet missions and the DRA Armed Forces.

In total, 35 implementations were carried out in June (25 in May of this year), of which 26 were effective, which is 75.5% of the effectiveness (96% in May of this year).

The units and units of the 5th Guards showed the greatest effectiveness with high activity. MSD, 201 MSD.

As a result of the implementation, the following were destroyed: rebels - 467, SO - 39 units, DShK - 12 units, BO - 1 unit, mortars - 9 units, mines and land mines - 12 units, OP - 7, OT - 14, warehouses – 5, IR – 1, 1 car.

90 people were detained, 3 rebels were captured.

Captured: CO - 91 units, ammunition for CO - 14.4 thousand units, DShK - 1 unit, RPG - 1 unit, rounds for RPG - 2 units, mines and land mines - 38 units, RG - 6 pcs., documents 2 IR, machine gun - 1 pc.

Our losses: killed - 5 people, including 3 officers, wounded - 8 people, including 3 officers, BRM - 1 unit, Mi-8T - 1 unit.

In accordance with the plan for organizing ambush and reconnaissance and search operations, army units widely used them on the likely routes of movement of caravans and bands of rebels and in the interests of communications.

In total, in June, 343 ambushes were set up and reconnaissance and search operations were carried out (330 in May of this year), of which 33 showed results, which is 9.5% of the effectiveness (5.7% in May). The units and units of the 5th Guards showed the greatest effectiveness. MSD, 201 MSD, 1, 3 OMSB.

As a result of ambush and reconnaissance and search operations, the following were destroyed: rebels - 491, SO - 47 units, SO ammunition - 80 thousand units, DShK - 7 units, RPG - 1 unit, mortars - 5 units, OP - 7 , fortress – 1, warehouses – 3, IR – 1, cars – 8, motorcycles – 3.

Captured: CO - 122 units, ammunition for CO - 44.17 thousand units, DShK - 3 units, ammunition for DShK - 2.18 thousand units, RPG - 4 units, RPG rounds - 27 units. , BO – 1 unit, BO rounds – 20 units, mortar – 1 unit, mines and land mines – 48 units, RG – 45 units, explosives – 3 kg, warehouses – 2, documents 3 IR, vehicles – 2 units

35 people were detained and transferred to KHAD.

Our losses: 12 people were killed, including 4 officers, 8 people were wounded.

The rebels' sabotage activities decreased slightly during the reporting period. Thus, in June, the rebels committed 44 acts of sabotage (68 in May), as a result of which our losses amounted to: 29 people killed, including 5 officers, 72 people wounded, including 4 officers.

Equipment losses: tank - 1 unit, infantry fighting vehicle - 1 unit, armored personnel carrier (BRDM) - 4 units, cars - 8 units, aircraft - 1, helicopter - 1.

In response, the following were destroyed: 62 rebels, 20 pack animals, 14 rebels detained.

Captured: RPG – 3 units, CO – 1 unit.

Removed: PTM – 32 pcs., landmines – 8 pcs.

Thus, as a result of the military operations of the troops in June, 3249 people were filtered, 479 rebels were detained and transferred to KHAD, and 70 rebels were captured.

Destroyed: rebels - 3094, CO - 271 units, CO ammunition - about 96 thousand units, DShK - 117 units, RPG - 58 units, BO - 5 units, mortars - 27 units, mines to M - 448 pcs., PGI - 2 units, mines and landmines - 184 pcs., RG - 26 pcs., explosives - 50 kg, OP - 63, OT - 95, caves - 55, fortresses - 53, warehouses - 27, cars – 11 units, motorcycles – 11 units, machine guns – 7 units, defensive structure – 1, pack animals – 30, hospital – 1.

Captured: CO - 621 units, ammunition for CO - 180 thousand units, DShK - 20 units, 4 barrels for DShK, ammunition for DShK - 97 thousand units, RPG - 16 units, rounds for RPG - 369 pcs., BO - 4 units, shots for BO - 615 pcs., mortars - 8 units, mines for M - 367 pcs., PGI - 2 units, mines and landmines - 917 pcs., RG - 448 pcs. , explosives – 612 kg., warehouses – 55, documents 19 IC, cars – 10 units, motorcycles – 7 units, machine guns – 6 units, radio stations – 5 units, printing house – 1, hospital – 1, BTR-40 – 1 unit, MANPADS “S-2M” – 1 unit, DShK machine – 1, RST battery – 7 units, ZGU barrel – 3 units, machines for detonating land mines – 3 units, fire cord – 200 m.

Mines and landmines removed - 468 pieces.

Our losses: killed - 170 people, of which 24 officers, wounded - 351 people, of which 48 officers.

July 1984

The army troops completed the combat action plan for July, as well as the tasks of assisting local authorities in strengthening state power in controlled counties and volosts.

In July, 4 operations were carried out, of which: planned - 2, unscheduled - 2. The operations were carried out in the provinces of BAGLAN, PARWAN, KAPISA, KABUL, FARAH.

In addition, planned operations in the provinces of KABUL, LOGAR, carried out by the forces of the 103rd Airborne Division, 181th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 56th Airborne Brigade, and GHAZNI by the forces of the 191st Motorized Infantry Regiment continue; unscheduled - in the provinces of TOKHAR, BADAKHSHAN by forces of 860 special forces.

In the province of BAGLAN, from June 26 to July 6, 1984, a planned operation was carried out by the forces of 149 motorized rifle regiments, 122 motorized rifle regiments, 783 orb, 998 ap, 990 zap together with units of the 20th infantry division, the operational battalion Tsaranda, KhAD bodies under the leadership of the deputy commander of the 201st motorized rifle division, Lieutenant Colonel TOLYUKOV I .

By the beginning of hostilities, the total group of rebels was about 40 gangs with a total number of up to 1,400 people. A large number of bases and warehouses with weapons, ammunition, food and medicine are concentrated in the mountains.

Objectives of the operation:

• defeat of gangs, bases and warehouses in the areas of KHUNUMASHI-DAKHANAI-GORI, NAHRIN, BAGLAN;
• contribute to stabilization of the situation and strengthening of state power in the area of ​​​​combat operations.

Features of combat operations:

• the use of tactical airborne assault to blockade rebel areas with the simultaneous deployment of armored groups to support TakVD operations;
• sequential blocking of villages followed by combing them by Afghan units;
• massive use of air strikes and artillery fire to destroy concentrations of rebels, bases and warehouses, as well as to remove combined arms commanders;
• illumination of the area and harassing artillery fire along possible rebel advance routes at night in order to prevent counterattacks and the enemy’s breakthrough from the blocked area.

As a result of the operation, the following were destroyed: rebels - 107, mortars - 1 unit, DShK - 7 units, mines and land mines - 42 units, caves - 50 units, various warehouses - 4 units, workshops for the production of land mines - 1 unit.

Captured: small arms - 23 units, ammunition for CO - 11.36 thousand units, ammunition for DShK - 0.5 thousand units, rounds for RPGs - 6 units, hand grenades - 10 units, machine for DShK - 1 unit, various warehouses - 6, documents 1 IC, cars - 4 units.

62 rebels were detained, 291 people were filtered.

Our losses: killed - 2 people, wounded - 6 people (including 2 officers).

Equipment losses: infantry fighting vehicles - 2 units, vehicles - 1 unit.

In the period from July 15 to July 23, a planned operation was carried out in the province of KABUL under the leadership of the chief of staff of the 103rd Guards. Airborne Division of Colonel KHIMICH with forces of 350 pdb (without pdb), 357 pdb (without 2 pdb), 1/181 motorized rifle regiment, 80 orr, 1179 ap together with units of the 37 brigade “K”, 23 battalion “SN”.

Objectives of the operation:

• the defeat of gangs, base areas and warehouses in the area northwest and west of KABUL;
• stabilize the situation in the green zone adjacent to the section of the KABUL-CHARIKAR route and clear it of rebel forces.

Features of the operation:

• the enemy did not offer strong resistance to the troops, but occupied the dominant heights in small, well-armed groups (20–25 people), stubbornly holding them, covering the withdrawal of the main forces into the mountains and ensuring the removal of weapons and ammunition from dangerous areas;
• massive use of air and artillery strikes against separated targets, as well as support for the actions of troops on call;
• consistent blocking of rebel areas and villages, followed by combing of these areas by Afghan units;
• combat operations were carried out in high altitude conditions, so the use of the firepower of armored groups was limited and the fire impact on the enemy was provided through air strikes and artillery fire support.

As a result of the operation, the following were destroyed: rebels - 151, ammunition for SO - 3.74 thousand units, DShK - 3 units, ammunition for DShK - 11, 45 thousand units, rounds for RPGs - 23 units, rounds for BO – 43 units, ZGU – 1 unit, mines for mortar – 19 units, mines and land mines – 20 units, RG – 13 units, explosives – 450 kg., 1 strong point, 6 firing points, caves – 12 units, Islamic committee - 1, various warehouses - 12, fire cord - 170 m.

Captured: small arms - 30 units, ammunition for CO - 8.6 thousand units, DShK - 10 units, barrels for DShK - 3 units, ammunition for DShK - 57.88 thousand units, RPG - 3 units, rounds for RPGs – 158 units, mortars – 2 units, mines for a mortar – 111 units, BO – 2 units, rounds for BO – 439 units, ZGU – 2 units, KPVT – 1 unit. , barrel for KPVT - 1 pc., mines and land mines - 128 pcs., warehouses - 3 pcs., RG - 16 pcs., sights for DShK - 5 pcs., mines and land mines removed - 21 pcs.

Our losses: killed - 6 people, including 2 officers, wounded - 22 people, including 1 officer.

A private operation continued in the provinces of PARVAN, KAPISA under the leadership of the head of the operational department of the army headquarters, Colonel A. V. ZINENICH, with the forces of units and units of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division, 345th Regiment Regiment, DShB, RR 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade together with units of the 8th Motorized Rifle Division, 444th Infantry Division "K".

Objectives of the operation:

• using air and artillery strikes and active military actions to defeat newly identified rebel gangs in the PANJSHER and ANDARAB gorges;
• prevent the entry of new gangs into these areas and the replenishment of rebel forces with weapons and ammunition;
• provide assistance to local and party bodies in managing state power and expanding its influence in areas of combat operations.

Features of the operation:

• the enemy avoids clashes with troops and tries to impose partisan methods of struggle;
• searching for rebel bases and warehouses through tactical airborne landings and destroying them with the support of aviation and artillery;
• consistent destruction of newly identified bandit groups and increased efforts to prepare deployment points for units and units remaining to assist the people's power.

As a result of the operation, in the period from 1.07 to 25.07, the following were destroyed: rebels - 631, small arms - 21 units, DShK - 22 units, RPGs - 6 units, mortars - 2 units, caves - 3, fortresses - 52, mines and landmines – 9, pack animals – 83.

Captured: small arms – 82 units, ammunition for CO – 10 thousand units, ammunition for DShK – 3.24 thousand units, RPG – 4 units, rounds for RPG – 16 units, mines for mortar – 8 pcs., shots for combat weapons - 39 pcs., mines and land mines - 255 pcs., RG - 92 pcs., explosives - 20 kg, various warehouses - 10, documents 2 IR, machine gun - 1, mines and land mines removed - 42 pcs. ., 18 rebels were detained and transferred to KHAD, 2 were captured.

Our losses: killed - 22 people, of which 1 officer, wounded - 64 people, of which 9 officers.

Equipment losses: infantry fighting vehicles - 4 units, infantry fighting vehicles - 1 unit, vehicles - 1 unit, Mi-8 - 2 units.

The plan of a private operation carried out from July 5 to July 8 in the green zone of SHINDAND by units and units of the 5th Guards. MSD together with the 7th pgbr pgb, OB Tsaranda under the leadership of the chief of staff of the 5th Guards. MSD Colonel MALAKHOV E.N., provided:

• concentrate the main efforts on destroying the rebels in the villages of MAKALLAKHI-KUNDUZ, NASRABAD, KHOJANU, BARTEKHT, PARMAKAN;
• blocking rebel areas, combing them with forces of the 7th Brigade and the Tsaranda battalion to identify and destroy rebel groups and warehouses.

Features of the operation:

• the rebels still shy away from open battle; if it is impossible to leave, they try to enter the battle in the evening with the goal of breaking out of the blocked area, using the dark time;
• control of units and subunits during movement and blocking was carried out from the VzPU, which made it possible to reduce the time it took for units to blockade and eliminated gaps at the junctions of subunits and units;
• The blockade at night was carried out in a tight ring (up to 25 m between vehicles), and the dismounted personnel of the units occupied a perimeter defense and dug in between the vehicles, which excluded the possibility of the rebels breaking through from the blocked area.

As a result of the operation, the following were destroyed: rebels - 84, mines and landmines - 7, fuel and lubricants warehouse - 1, Islamic Committee - 1, cars - 6, explosives - 7 kg, points - 8.

Captured: small arms - 21 units, ammunition for CO - 1.035 thousand units, mines and land mines - 4 units.

We have no losses.

In addition to conducting operations, army troops were involved in the implementation of intelligence data in areas of responsibility received by intelligence agencies through Soviet missions.

In total, during the reporting period, 60 implementations were carried out, of which 51 were successful, which is 86% of the effectiveness. The units and subunits of the 5th Guards carry out the implementation of intelligence data most effectively and with high activity. Motorized Rifle Division, 201st Motorized Rifle Division, 103rd Airborne Division.

As a result of the implementation of intelligence data, the following were destroyed: rebels - 332, SO - 5 units, DShK - 2 units, RPG - 5 units, mortar - 1, mines and land mines - 20 units, strong points - 10, Islamic committees - 2 , machine guns – 3 units, car – 1 unit, pack animals – 12.

Captured: CO - 97 units, ammunition for CO - 43.78 thousand units, DShK - 4 units, barrel for DShK - 1, ammunition for DShK - 2.97 thousand units, RPG - 2 units, rounds for RPGs – 86 pcs., mortar – 1 unit, mines for mortar – 72 pcs., BO – 1 unit, shots for BO – 74 pcs., mines and land mines – 36 pcs., documents 2 IR, various warehouses - 4, RG - 212 pcs., explosives - 230 kg, fire cord - 86 m, machine guns - 3 units, pack animals - 19, mines and landmines - 80 pcs. removed, 2 rebels captured, detained and transferred to KHAD 150 rebels, filtered - 1722 people.

Our losses: 1 officer killed, 9 people wounded, 3 of them officers.

In accordance with the plan, the army troops carried out ambush and reconnaissance and search operations both on the routes of movement of caravans and bands of rebels, and in the interests of communications.

Thus, during the reporting period of July, 514 ambushes were set up and reconnaissance and search operations were carried out, of which 60 yielded results, which is about 12% of the effectiveness.

The units and units of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division, 201st Motorized Rifle Division, 1st, 2nd, 3rd Motorized Infantry Infantry are the most active and most effective in carrying out ambush and reconnaissance and search operations.

As a result of ambush and reconnaissance and search operations, the following were destroyed: rebels - 393, SO - 2 units, ammunition for SO - 40 thousand units, DShK - 6 units, RPG - 2 units, BO - 1 unit, rounds for BO - 20 pcs., PGU - 1 pc., mortars - 2 pcs., mines and landmines - 200 pcs., RG - 4 pcs., explosives - 2000 kg, cars - 14 pcs., motorcycles - 4 pcs., tractors – 2 units, pack animals – 39.

Captured: CO - 2 units, ammunition for CO - 98.11 thousand units, DShK - 2 units, ammunition for DShK - 2.64 thousand units, RPG - 4 units, rounds for RPG - 31 units ., mines for mortar - 6 pcs., mines and land mines - 172 pcs., documents 9 IR, warehouses - 2, RG - 89 pcs., cars - 4 units, machine guns - 2 units, mines and land mines removed - 6 pcs., captured - 16 rebels.

80 rebels were detained, 81 people were filtered.

Our losses: killed - 6 people, wounded - 16, of which 1 officer, infantry fighting vehicle - 1 unit.

The sabotage activities of the rebels do not decrease during the summer months. Thus, over the 25 days of July, the rebels committed 45 acts of sabotage, of which: shelling of columns – 12, shelling of posts and security forces – 17, explosions of mines and landmines – 12.

As a result of sabotage, our losses were: killed - 60 people, of which 17 officers, wounded - 89 people, of which 6 officers. Losses in equipment: infantry fighting vehicles - 3 units, armored personnel carriers - 3 units, tanks - 1 unit. , cars – 10 units, helicopters – 4 units.

In response, the following were destroyed: 46 rebels, RG - 2 units, captured: CO - 3 units, ammunition for CO - 6 thousand units, mines and land mines - 14 units, captured - 1 rebel, detained and transferred in KHAD – 1 rebel.

Thus, as a result of military operations in July (excluding aviation), the following were destroyed: rebels - 1744, small arms - 46 units, ammunition for CO - 43.74 units, DShK - 40 units, ammunition for DShK - 11, 45 thousand units, RPGs - 13 units, rounds for RPGs - 23 units, ammunition - 1 unit, rounds for ammunition - 63 units, ZGU - 2 units, mortars - 6 units, mines for a mortar - 19 pieces, mines and land mines - 298 pieces, RG - 19 pieces, VZ - 2457 kg, strong points - 2, firing points - 14, caves - 65, fortresses - 52, IR - 4, machine guns - 10 units, various warehouses - 20 units, cars - 21 units, motorcycles - 4 units, fire cord - 172 m, tractors - 2 units.

Captured: CO - 374 units, ammunition for CO - 179 thousand units, DShK - 16 units, 4 barrels for DShK, ammunition for DShK - 67.23 thousand units, RPG - 13 units, rounds for RPG – 297 pcs., mortars – 3 pcs., mines for the mortar – 197 pcs., BO – 3 pcs., rounds for BO – 552 pcs., ZGU – 2 pcs., KPVT – 1 pcs., barrel for KPVT – 1 pcs., mines and land mines - 598 pcs., documents 14 IC, various warehouses - 25 pcs., RG - 419 pcs., explosives - 250 kg., cars - 8 pcs., fire cord - 8.6 m, DShK machine – 1 unit, sight for DShK – 5 units, machine guns – 6 units, pack animals – 19. Mines and landmines removed – 163 units.

22 rebels were captured, 360 rebels were detained, 5263 people were filtered.

Our losses: killed - 96 people, of which 20 officers, wounded - 335 people, of which 30 officers.

"Shitholes"

After the battle, we stopped in Bagram, spent the night, and from there returned to Kabul. In Bagram I met a friend from my studies. I look - near the “buldyr” (in Afghanistan that’s what they called the regimental cafe, in Gaizhunai it was usually called “buldyr”) there’s a guy who looks like a homeless person sitting and eating a loaf of bread from the end. He pulls out the crumb, breaks it and slowly eats it. I went into a cafe and grabbed something. I went out and passed by - it seemed like a familiar face. When he came up, he jumped up: “Hello, Vitek!” Me: “Is that you?.. Why are you sitting here like a “schmoozer”?” - “Yes, I wanted to eat.” - “Why are you eating here? At least sit down on the step, otherwise he’s hiding in the corner.” He: “Everything is fine!” This was the same guy from Minsk, whose mother was the director of a confectionery factory.

And only then the guys from our training class, who ended up in the 345th Regiment in Bagram, told me that he was really a “schmoozer” (in army jargon - an unkempt person who doesn’t take care of himself, who doesn’t know how to stand up for himself. Short for “a person who is morally retarded.” – Ed.). I didn’t think it would end up in Afghanistan, but it did. And he was so spoiled there! I even felt sorry for him. Although I didn’t like him in training: after all, I had to literally carry him on myself all the time during cross-country races and forced marches, he completely tortured me.

And the story with this guy ended in tears. The deputy commander of their regiment, my fellow countryman, later told me about this. In the 345th regiment there was a “stay”: a PKT machine gun was stolen from a BMP-2 (a Kalashnikov tank machine gun. - Ed.). It looks like he was sold to dushmans. But who needs it? This is not an ordinary machine gun with a butt. Of course, you can also shoot the PKT manually. But this is a tank machine gun; it fires normally through an electric trigger.

They searched, found out inside the regiment, so that the matter would not go further - they would give it to the neck! But they never found it. Then they rode out to the village in armored vehicles and announced over the loudspeaker: “The machine gun is missing. Whoever returns will receive a great reward.” A boy came and said: “They sent me to say that there is a machine gun. We bought it." - “How much money do you want?” - “So much.” - “When will you bring it?” - "Tomorrow. Money up front". - “No, now - only half. The rest is tomorrow. If you leave with the money and don’t return the machine gun, we’ll raze the village to the ground.”

The next day the boy returned the machine gun. Ours: “We’ll give you more money, just show us who sold it.” Two hours later, everyone who was in the park was lined up. The Afghan boy showed me - this one, the blond one. It turned out that the machine gun was sold by the son of the director of a confectionery factory. He received five years for this.

At that time, he only had about a month left to serve... He had no money, everything was taken away from him. And he wanted to return home as a normal demobilizer. After all, “schmozniks” were sent to demobilization as “schmozniks”: they were given a dirty beret and the same vest. People fell into the “shitholes” for various reasons. In our platoon, for example, there was a guy who shot himself. Our people were surrounded. They shot back. The wounded appeared. And then a helicopter came to them, but only for the wounded. The wounded were loaded. And then the guy ran to the side, wrapped his leg in something and shot him. And I saw this demobilization!

The crossbow was from our call, but we didn’t even communicate with him. After all, paratroopers are paratroopers, no one likes injustice. If I plow and do everything right, and the other one shirks and doesn’t want to do anything, then little by little he becomes a “schmoozer.” Usually these people were sent to some bakery or to carry coal. They didn’t even show up in the company. In our company we had one from Yaroslavl, the other from Moscow. The first was a bread cutter, cutting bread for the entire regiment, and the other heated the boiler room. They didn’t even come to the company to spend the night - they were afraid that they would demobilize them. Both lived like this: one in the stoker, the other in the bread slicer.

A tragedy occurred with the one who was heating the boiler room. He once went to the grain cutter, who gave him bread. And this was seen by the ensign, who was the senior messenger. The ensign was very boring; he gave bread to almost no one. The ensign took the bread from the fireman, put it on the table and gave it to the guy as a “melon”! He ran to his stoker's room. After some time he felt bad, he went to the doctor. The doctor saw another soldier and said, sit down. The guy felt really bad... Suddenly he lost his sight. The doctor took him in and began asking him: “So what happened, tell me?” He managed to tell that his ensign hit him in the dining room... And he died... He had a cerebral hemorrhage.

The ensign was immediately pecked at: “Who are you? You don’t go to combat.” At least he wasn’t imprisoned, but he was transferred somewhere. This was a specific “flight”. How to hide such a case? And they awarded the deceased guy the Order of the Red Star posthumously. Of course, I felt sorry for the guy himself. His mother, the school director, then wrote letters to us: “Guys, write what a feat my son accomplished! They want to name the school after him.” We think to ourselves like soldiers: wow! Such a “schmoozer”, and the school is named after him! This is how it happened: many of us could have been killed a hundred times in combat, but we survived. But he avoided difficulties, and so everything ended tragically for him.

There was also one “schmuck”. His name was Andrey. He wrote poetry. Once after Afghanistan, my friends and I met at VDNKh on Airborne Forces Day. I’m standing, waiting for my people. I see some guy standing, paratroopers who did not serve in Afghanistan are huddled around. And he talks so pompously: we are there doing this, that, that!.. I listened and listened - well, I don’t like the way he talks. And then I recognized him! "Andrey! It's you?!.". He saw me and ran away like a bullet. They ask me: “Who is he?” - "Doesn't matter".

He was morally weak and couldn’t stand it in combat. That’s why they left him in the company and didn’t take him anywhere. And on top of that, he didn’t take care of himself: he had to file it every day, but he didn’t do it. And he didn’t wash at all, he walked around dirty.

We constantly kept ourselves in order, washed our clothes. On the street, under the regimental washbasin (these are pipes about twenty-five meters long with holes), there is a concrete hollow through which water flows. You put your clothes there, lather them and brush them - shirk-shirk, shirk-shirk. Turned it over - the same thing. Then you wash the brush and use it to remove the soap from your clothes. I washed it, called someone, the two of them unscrewed it, ironed it with their hands, and put it on themselves. In the summer, in the sun, everything dries out in about ten minutes.

And Andrey didn’t wash his clothes at all. They forced it - it was useless. But he wrote good poetry. They come back from combat and demobilize him: “My girlfriend’s birthday is coming soon. Let’s come up with something Afghan: war, airplanes, helicopters, mountains, love-carrots, wait for me, I’ll be back soon...” Andrey: “I can’t do that!” - "Why can not you?". - “I need a special condition...” - “Ah, imagination! Now I’ll give you your imagination!” And he takes the boot. Andrey: “Everything, everything, everything... It will happen now!” And then he composes the necessary poems.

He was a terrible lazy person, he fell asleep everywhere. Already being demobilized, I was in company order, he was with me. It’s clear that company orderlies don’t deserve demobilization; there are young people for that. I come and it’s not on the nightstand. And this bedside table is the first in the battalion. The battalion commander comes: “Where is the orderly?!”. I run out, sleepy: “Me!” - “Who is on duty?” - "I". - “Who is the orderly then?” - “He ran to the toilet.” - “Why didn’t they appoint anyone?” - “Because I’m an idiot, probably...” Something had to be said. - “Get up yourself!” Here everything started to boil for me: there is a huge difference between those who go to the mountains to fight and those who don’t. It seems that all this is the Airborne Forces, but it is different, like the infantry and the pilots. Some in the mountains are constantly at risk, but on armor there is much less risk. And I should be on the nightstand!..

I found him: “Are you sleeping?!”. He: “No, I’m resting...” And zero emotions, he’s asleep... (I probably slept the same way when I fell asleep while running at the post after Kandahar.) I hit him with some kind of boot: “Come on, quickly, on the nightstand!..”. And he literally kicked him into the corridor.

to be continued…

14.09.2014

From 1982 to 1984 served as a conscript in Afghanistan in the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division in various positions. From October 1982 to June 1984 - squad leader, submachine gunner and machine gunner in the 5th parachute company of the 2nd parachute battalion (with a break of 4 months - from May to August 1983). In 1983 he was twice demoted to the ranks.

He took part in the combat operations of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. He was wounded in battle - in the shoulder and multiple shrapnel wounds in the head.

In 1988-1989 participated in special peacekeeping operations in the Caucasus.

For military service and wounds in Afghanistan, he was awarded two medals “For Courage”. In 1988 and later he was awarded other state and departmental orders and medals.

Currently a poet, writer, artist, entrepreneur. He was officially nominated for the Nobel Prize in Literature, twice nominated for the National Literary Poet of the Year Award, and once for the Heritage Literary Award. He has literary prizes, diplomas and awards.

"Nobody except us". This is the motto of the Airborne Forces.
No one but us could carry out many military tasks.
No one but us can tell the whole truth.

As before, in war, I am ready to take the entire blow upon myself. For all the soldiers and officers who were called cannon fodder in Afghanistan. For all those undeservedly forgotten, for all those crippled morally and physically. For the real truth about the Afghan war.

But there are and will be blows, including from former “friends” and even from those at whose protection and rehabilitation this story is aimed. They have already begun and are coming in an endless wave, but for now I am holding this front, practically alone.

This is still our Afghan war. Unfortunately, it continues. They are very afraid of the truth, they hate the truth, the truth puts everything in its place, that’s why it is the truth.

Everything that is written below is also a very bitter truth.

There are no right or wrong in this story, there is my and other people’s personal lives, time and realities that force us to be exactly like that then.

It’s time for veterans, society, and the state to reconsider their attitude towards the Afghan war, repent to each other, forgive each other, pay off debts and start living in a new way for front-line soldiers, the state, and society, and not repeat similar mistakes with... .th cruelty towards each other.

Each of us, even those who want truth and justice, including me, wants to look the purest and best, believing that he is the very truth-teller who can seal anyone with his accusatory word.

But the truth is that out of all the many hundreds of thousands of soldiers, officers, generals and officials who went through the Afghan War of the Soviet Union and were in one way or another involved in it, only a few did not get dirty in one or another disgusting and vile mud of this terrible, deceitful, vile and shameless still ongoing slaughter.

A war that, first of all, was and is being waged by us against each other and against any normal and moral principles of love, sympathy, equality, humanity, conscience and morality.

We not only died there, we continue to die to this day. To die not from old age, to die from indifference and sometimes even hatred towards each other.

We are locked in a hellish circle of lies, callousness and window dressing.

This war not only claimed tens of thousands of the best boys’ lives (and indeed, it was almost always the purest and best who perished), it inflicted disproportionate moral trauma on all survivors, all those ascended, all glorified and favored, all known, all forgotten, all survivors, to all the fallen, to all the wounded and maimed. To the entire Russian people, for many generations to come.

This double war not only devoured us, it continues to devore our children, grandchildren and will devore our great-grandchildren with false heroism and deceitful patriotism if we do not restore the whole truth and justice about it and do not try to teach future soldiers, officers, generals and officials not to repeat our direct and indirect crimes against each other, both in the war and now.

25 years ago they trumpeted the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

As a memory of this country, I have 2 wounds, one in the arm and 14 shrapnel in the head, 3 hernias on the spine, 2 medals “For Courage”, a blue Airborne Forces beret with a vest in the closet, several photographs and sergeant’s shoulder straps in a box under the bed.

I remember some things well, some I have already forgotten. Time has passed. I managed to graduate from a special higher educational institution, go to another war in the former Caucasian Soviet republic, and again embrace a machine gun.

These are the memories of an individual soldier from a separate unit of the Airborne Forces, and I write exactly as I saw everything with my eyes and heard it with my ears. Don't take this as the ultimate truth.

“Fairy tales” about the Afghan war of the Soviet Union have become very ingrained in us, Afghan veterans, and in society as a whole. So much so that the veterans themselves and society already sincerely believe in it and don’t want any other legends and probably never will.

We embellished everything that seemed unsightly to us, created legendary idols of commanders, almost painted virtual icons from them, lied to ourselves and led society by the nose with heroic stories, covering up any inconsistencies and dirt.

Then we forgave everyone and everything, quickly forgot the bad, and multiplied the good a hundredfold. We, hungry for honesty in the communist deception and false pioneer-Komsomol space of our childhood and youth, the then Soviet Union, having watched enough patriotic films about the Great Patriotic War, wanted us to have our own piece of the great justice of life and “heroic everyday life.”

Naive in our military youth, we carried precisely this childish and youthful and naive perception of real combat reality until our gray hairs throughout our lives, passing on this popular print to all subsequent generations.

Our platoon and company commanders were not far from us either. They are close in age, in consciousness, and in perception.

I can say honestly and sincerely: the KURKA paratroopers during my service never retreated without an order, even under the fear of total destruction, this unspoken rule was observed sacredly, without grumbling or threats.

Also, the paratroopers tried not to throw dead, wounded and weapons to the enemy for profit. The whole company could die because of one wounded or killed person. Although shameful exceptions did occur, they did not abandon their soldiers only on the orders of higher commanders.

Leaving a killed or wounded colleague to the enemy, leaving part of the weapons to the enemy, seeing the enemy and not killing him at any cost - this was considered an indelible shame during my service in the DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan).

It was even impossible to imagine that a company or platoon commander would negotiate with the Mujahideen about the possibility of unhindered passage or about not attacking each other. It was a disgrace and amounted to betrayal. If you see the enemy, you know where the enemy is - destroy him, that’s why you’re a paratrooper. No deals with the enemy. This is how we were raised in the 350th Airborne Regiment. They were not raised by political officers. The demobilized soldiers were also trained by platoon commanders.

Those who deviated from these rules faced universal contempt both in Afghanistan and in civilian life in the Union. There would be no life for such a moral monster until his death.

But these are only 2 postulates, which are steadily carried out precisely in the 350th Airborne Regiment, by the so-called “triggers” (from the word automatic trigger), conscript soldiers and the junior officers commanding them (platoon and company commanders), directly involved in combat operations and continuously, all a year and a half of service, climbing mountains in search of gangs of Mujahideen, lice, explosions, wounds, illnesses and terrible fatigue.

Then, after my service, from the middle of the war until the end it was often different. Soviet officers and unit commanders often conducted peace negotiations with the Mujahideen, agreed with them on non-aggression, and asked not to touch our soldiers when they passed certain territories.

When the officers and soldiers from the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) who returned from Afghanistan, who served after us, told us this, we were shocked. For us it was tantamount to shame. We met our fighting guys, patted them on the shoulder, drank vodka to meet them, helped them adapt to society, but a sediment was left in our souls. They did not do as we did, they already had a different vision of battle and war, which we, who served earlier, unconsciously condemned internally as weakness and even a manifestation of cowardice.

Even now, two conflicting feelings are fighting inside me. On the one hand, of course, I want as many guys as possible to remain alive. On the other hand, we took the oath: “...and until the last breath be devoted to your People, your Soviet Motherland and the Soviet Government.”

“I am always ready, by order of the Soviet Government, to defend my Motherland - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, as a warrior of the Armed Forces, I swear to defend it courageously, skillfully, with dignity and honor, not sparing my blood and life itself in order to achieve complete victory over enemies.

If I violate this solemn oath of mine, then let me suffer the severe punishment of Soviet law, the general hatred and contempt of the Soviet people..."

Exactly:

But when they believed the oath, they took it with all their hearts and with a pure soul.

In reality it was like this: a person was born in the USSR, without asking he was identified as a resident of a communist country, his nationality was put on his passport (sometimes such that not everyone wanted to show his passport), they were driven into October, pioneers and Komsomol members, without asking, they were taken into Army, and without asking, they shoved the text of the oath into my hands and hung a machine gun around my neck.

Only later, after taking the oath, the person was thrown onto the Afghan front and was not given a choice.

If you don’t want to be a citizen of the USSR, you will be a dissident and placed in a mental hospital or prison.

If you don’t want to be an October boy, a pioneer or a Komsomol member, you will be an outcast from society.

If you don’t want to join the Red Army, take the oath and stomp to the front, the kid goes to prison.

Not everyone was brave enough against such a background to sacrifice their lives for the “cruel” Motherland.

By the age of 18, not everyone had enough brains to understand the intricacies of the Soviet government.

So they went, either from under the stick, or from watching enough patriotic films, or with a boyish delight to run into a real war game, or with a yard fighting spirit of the ability to get out of any trouble in life, or with the worker-peasant doom of a farm laborer - a citizen of the USSR.

The Afghan greeted everyone with food gruel, domestic and moral dirt, indifference of commanders, corpses of colleagues and a fist in the face. So they broke in tens of thousands, ran away, adapted, dodged, shot, exploded, fought, pissed, injected themselves, took drugs, stole.

There remained those who did not know how to get rid of them and those who considered themselves strong. They formed the front-line backbone of the fighting wolves, which in the 350th Airborne Regiment were called by the capacious word “trigger”.

The rest mostly poured into servants and clerks. Although there were unique exceptions to the rules, more on that below...

Now many historians are arguing how weakly and hastily trained in Soviet military training, eighteen-year-old boys in the Airborne Forces successfully resisted the seasoned and well-trained Mujahideen, often several times superior to adult men, and elite special forces, special forces, mercenaries, the USA, France, and other countries. They resisted with worse weapons, food, and worse generals...

As in the old fairy tale about Malchish Kibalchish, foreign historians are still looking for the terrible secret of the strength of the Soviet snotty soldiers.

There was no particular secret. The Airborne Forces for the most part consisted of courtyard kings, hooligans and strong street boys, capable of fighting for their principles and territories until complete victory, without retreating even half a step.

School, State Technical University, Army. This was our main biography.

These were not flimsy nerds and babbles pampered with intelligent quirks. This was in many ways the elite of courtyards, gateways and streets, the elite of schools and state vocational technical schools. And this street elite put on blue berets and vests and received a machine gun in their hands. Everyone who was close to this elite broke under it, and under it, with the crunch of facial bones, the grinding of exposed flesh, the crack of knocked out teeth and the smell of real personal blood.

If these boys were given a combat mission, they carried it out, no matter what. From the cradle they knew how to solve formidable cases and at the same time stay alive. And they knew how to give themselves to real boyish honor completely, without whining, begging, bargaining or pleading. Honor was and is always more valuable to them than their own life.

Airborne trigger - this title could only be achieved by honor.

During my service, the paratroopers also did not like to crawl around in front of the Mujahideen on their bellies, and where possible they tried to walk at full height. Perhaps it was not everywhere, but a couple of times we proudly went to attack the spirits directly, to the envy of the other branches of the army (usually motorized rifles) holed up behind the stones, rolling up our sleeves and sticking out our sternum in our vests. This is probably how the legends were formed about paratroopers who never bowed to the enemy, or in spiritual terms - “STRIPPED”.

The last time we demonstrated such courage was in Panjshir. They squeezed the guys there tightly. They were not cowards, but a psychological breakthrough was needed. But we had to run and bend over and move, and we were very tired. Well, a thirty-second speech from the commander on the radio that hope is only with us. They walked in vests, taking off their driver's jackets and lowering their overalls to the waist, without a taxiway, with machine guns at their advantage. They looked at us with hope and delight. The landing party is coming. The Mujahideen scampered like hares, except that they did not squeal. And how we reveled in ourselves. Airborne in a word. The Airborne Forces are not afraid of death. Let's go to full height and shoot. Well, they helped the motorized riflemen, and they scratched a piece of Panjshir. It’s hot, the sun is, the mountain river is seething, the greenery is climbing, and we, the handsome ones, are soaking in the storm.

When they drew a line in front of my face,
In the distant sky, like a boot,
Which blinded the shadow of horror,
From souls bent on a vain dream.
I saw the wind, I looked through the silence.
And I so wanted to see you above her.
I've drunk my fill of the damned war.
I learned to wait and hate.

A newborn crow, a child of war.
Half the foreman fell to the bottom, gritting his teeth.
And the snow flowed red from the meat,
Some by shrapnel, some by high explosive, half a company is gone.

And I kept rushing over the boots, and I was flying.
And bursting into tears throughout the entire neighborhood, he sang Hurray to them.
We still have so much to do in this World.
I wanted to howl, but in pain I dreamed of singing to you.

Heavens, you will open up to me,
To me through the cracks, teeth - clouds.
Today you will whelp me there,
For countless centuries.

In general, I have my own ideas about the “bravest” troops of Ahmad Shah Massoud, who controlled the Panjshir Gorge.

On Paghman, in the early summer of 1984, two incomplete platoons of the 5th company of the second battalion of the 350th parachute regiment, our 103rd Airborne Division, covering the withdrawal of the main troops, stood to the death for 24 hours against several thousand Masud troops knocked out by Soviet troops from Panjshir. They occupied a hill that, like a cork in a bottle, kept the Mujahideen in a small gorge. Well, the meat grinder started. They called themselves for artillery fire and bombing. The Masudites have large-caliber DShKs, thousands of bayonets, and mortars. The boys only have machine guns, three grenade launcher shots and one company machine gun. The guys carried out the order in full, they pinned the Masud forces on themselves for almost a day, they did not surrender the mountain, they did not abandon their weapons, the wounded and the dead, and then, after fulfilling the order, they walked another good fifteen kilometers themselves, carrying the dead and wounded, with the Masud troops on their tail. walked towards the nearest armor.

We walked, the company did not take away the helicopters, the helicopter pilots refused to fly in, they said it was due to the high density of shelling. The main troops were able to retreat without losses, Masud's troops were immobilized by the daily battle. Not really anyone was awarded. The fight was a noble one, a rare fight, even for Afghanistan. Victorious. But somehow forgotten, and never really discussed. I know the guys who fought on that hill. Ordinary Russian boys. There was an order, there was a task. Death, not death, the Motherland said.

At that time, the soldiers knew one task: they must constantly comb the mountains in search of gangs and, having found them, destroy them at any cost ( “...without sparing your blood and life itself to achieve complete victory over your enemies...”).

We knew and believed that this is precisely why we, the paratroopers of the 350th Airborne Regiment, 103rd Airborne Division, are in Afghanistan.

Some must find enemies and destroy enemies, others must provide for those who found and destroyed.

The bulk of the paratroopers did this. Whether it was good or bad depended on our personal preparation. And I bow with great respect to everyone who did it (no matter how he did it, he did what he had the strength to do) and I despise those who were supposed to fight and provide for those who fought, but fled from the war and from helping the triggers, like the devil from incense ( “...without sparing your blood and life itself to achieve complete victory over your enemies...”).

That is why almost all the old-timers went to our last combat operation, without trying to sneak home from it on the first sides ( “...without sparing your blood and life itself to achieve complete victory over your enemies...”). Almost all.

But there was an opportunity to fade away, which some old-timers took advantage of.

Let’s not judge harshly those who have already had enough of the war, and are simply tired of it, and cunningly took advantage of the opportunity to finish their personal Afghanistan before their company brothers. They will be judged by their dead and living comrades in war.

Cowardice and betrayal of his fighting friends and fellow soldiers overtakes the weak-spirited soldier anywhere and at any time of service. Even on demobilization.

Some people broke down when they were young and rose up later, others broke down at the end and thereby erased all their previous achievements. They broke down when they were young, thanks to the bullying of their colleagues and the indifference of their commanders. The old-timers were cowardly precisely and only because of personal cowardice.

But let's return to the Fifth Company.

There is some kind of mystery or mystery, as you wish, in this great and heroic battle.

Why was the 5th company sent so far from the armor on the very last day of combat?

Why didn’t anyone come to the aid of the company, which had been fighting such an armada of Mujahideen for almost a day?

Why didn’t a single helicopter fly in for fire support?

REFERENCE No. 1 (from the book “The Dangerous Skies of Afghanistan. Experience of the combat use of Soviet aviation in a local war. 1979-1989” by M.A. Zhirokhov):
June 5, 1984, combat loss of the Mi-24 helicopter. While attacking a target near the village of Pishgor, Captain E. Sukhov’s helicopter was fired upon by the enemy and the pilot-operator was wounded. While evading the target of attack, he came under air defense fire again and was shot down. The crew died.

Maybe this played a role, and they decided not to risk the turntables anymore? Or was this helicopter flying towards the fifth company?

Why did the company itself drag the dead and wounded after a day's battle to the armor?

Why did the helicopters refuse to fly in to pick up at least the killed and wounded of the 5th company after the battle?

REFERENCE No. 2 (from the book “The Dangerous Skies of Afghanistan. Experience of the combat use of Soviet aviation in a local war. 1979-1989” by M.A. Zhirokhov):
June 6, 1984, combat loss of the Mi-24 helicopter 50 smallpox (Kabul). Captain V.Skoblikov's helicopter carried out a guided attack from the ground as a wingman. At the exit from the attack, the ammunition on board detonated, probably due to fire from the ground. When an explosion occurred in the cockpit, pilot-operator Sr. Lt. V.Put, realizing that nothing could be done, dropped the canopy and jumped from a height of 150m. The parachute opened near the ground. Neither the commander nor the flight engineer, Sr. Lt. A. Chumak, had time to escape.

And again did you feel sorry for the helicopters? Already spared for the dead and wounded? Are these 2 factors of the death of the helicopters really influencing the fatal refusal to support the fifth company? Or maybe these guys, helicopter pilots, died flying to the fifth company to help?

REFERENCE No. 3 (from the memoirs of Major General Evgeny Grigorievich NIKITENKO):
“...passivity on the roads led to impunity for the actions of the rebels, especially when insufficient forces were allocated to escort the columns. So, on June 5, 1984, a convoy of 150 vehicles was attacked in the Shindand area and suffered heavy losses, since only two BRDMs and two anti-aircraft mountain installations were allocated to guard this convoy...”

Another fact of sloppiness?

All these “mad” losses of the Soviet troops in the short period from May to early June 1984 could easily have led to elementary career panic among senior officers and generals, as a result of which companies and battalions were thrown anywhere and anyhow. Perhaps the fifth company could have been thrown out so irresponsibly.

Why was the fifth company denied fire support for the first few hours of the battle, when the company stubbornly called fire on itself via radio?

Calling artillery fire on oneself at that hard time was not something out of the ordinary. Paratroopers in Afghanistan, squeezed by the Mujahideen, often resorted to this type of help, and senior commanders never refused such “help” to anyone.

In this battle, such fire support should have been provided upon request, but it was not provided for several hours, as if someone wanted the company to simply be destroyed.

Only after many hours of requests was a small artillery strike and air bombing carried out.

Incoming help from other units was also mandatory in such battles. In this case, no one came to the aid of the 5th company.

Whenever I asked questions about this battle, I was met with either muted silence, or hanging up on the phone during a conversation, or a reluctance to talk about this topic.

On my own behalf, I can give the following soldier facts:

1. The fifth company was already sitting on the armor to go to the regiment when the soldiers were told that the Mujahideen had pinned down the first battalion and they urgently needed to go to their aid.

2. When the 5th company passed by the positions of the first battalion, the soldiers of the first battalion said that no one was pressing them, and they absolutely did not need any help for cover. Moreover, some soldiers of the 1st battalion said that it was simply their battalion commander who made it so that the 1st battalion left for the regiment before the second battalion.
Did the soldiers of the 1st battalion have other information? There was no point in lying and making things up for them. The soldiers of the fifth company saw with their own eyes that no one was pinning the first battalion and the companies of the first battalion were resting freely.

3. Before this battle, the battalion commander of the first battalion flew to Kabul from Bagram airport. The combat operation is not over yet, the battalion commander leaves the battalion and flies to Kabul. Why? Who was left with the first battalion? Who released the battalion commander of the first battalion from combat until the end of the operation and the arrival of his battalion in the regiment?

4. The soldiers of the 5th company heard their officers and the company commander arguing that the company commander had made a mistake on the map and had led the company several kilometers further than it should have been, right in the rear of the Mujahideen. Was there really an error on the map or not?
As the company walked, it passed numerous fires, near which the Mujahideen were sitting.
Why didn’t the company officers and the company commander contact the regiment commander by radio and tell him that the 5th company was moving in the rear of a large bandit formation? Or they got in touch, but received an order to still move forward.
And indeed, they moved out at 19:00 on June 4, 1984 to “help” the first battalion and arrived in position only at 4:00 in the morning on June 5, 1984. The transition is too large to simply cover the retreat of the regiment and division to their permanent locations.
The fifth company passed by the positions of the first battalion at 20:00 on June 4. Why didn’t they simply change the first battalion’s positions? Why else did we walk 8 hours and a bunch of kilometers further? Where really, by whom and why was the 5th company sent?

5. Why didn’t intelligence know that such a large army of Mujahideen was essentially close to the location of the division and regiment? Why didn’t intelligence know that such forces of Ahmad Shah were not destroyed in Panjshir, but simply secretly left and quietly waited until the main Russian forces left Panjshir?
Or they knew, but kept silent. Or maybe they weren’t silent, they talked, but none of the generals wanted to listen.

6. No one helped the fifth company, which fought for 24 hours with superior enemy forces. There was no artillery help for several hours, despite numerous, hours-long begging requests under heavy fire. The Mujahideen simply shot the company from numerous DShKs at point-blank range (for your information, the DShK is a very large-caliber machine gun, capable of tearing down the turret of a light tank with three bullets). The company was not just shot from the DShK, they were beaten with explosive bullets for many hours without ceasing.
There were no helicopters. Before the armor, after the battle the triggers stomped on their own. They fought on their own. Nobody sent any support or help. No tanks, no helicopters, no troops.
The help of artillery and bombers was almost symbolic and looked more like a planned bombardment of a square of terrain in the mountains rather than support for a fighting unit. Such attacks were carried out quite often when, according to intelligence data, another gang of Mujahideen was “listed” in a certain square. They kind of made a little noise, maybe it would catch someone. How to spray water from a plastic cup onto a crowd of fighters.
So it is here. They made a little noise and that was all. And the company is fighting, the company is asking for heavy fire on itself. There is no fire. Fight the company yourself, die.

7. Almost no one was awarded for this battle except those killed. Well, those killed, of course, are always rewarded. The living were not fully rewarded, even the wounded.
The battalion commander of the second battalion, to which the fifth company was assigned, personally promised all the officer commanders and one of the best sergeants (a platoon commander from Chelyabinsk, in reality the guy held half a mountain himself and commanded the battle in his sector himself, he did not let any of the spirits near) to introduce them to the stars Heroes of the Soviet Union, all those killed should be presented with the Order of the Red Banner, all wounded with the Order of Soldier's Glory, 3rd degree, all those alive with the Order of the Red Star, and personally copied the names, and personally ordered the clerks to document all this. There are witnesses to this.

8. When the wounded came to the armor, they were only then transported by helicopter to the tent of the deployed army medical battalion. There were no regimental or divisional doctors anymore; they left for Kabul (that’s what the wounded were told). And again there is no medical help for 2 hours. Then, after bandaging and providing first emergency aid, in the army “pills” tent, again by helicopter, the wounded were taken to Kabul airport.
There they were unloaded at the takeoff and left. The helicopter pilots contact by radio and ask to send a car to pick up the wounded, and they are told that the 350th regiment is in position, the 5th company is dead, there are no survivors, and these are not their wounded, but most likely from another unit.
From Kabul airport, the wounded on their own walked almost two kilometers to the medical battalion. There was not a single doctor or surgeon in the medical battalion. They also knew nothing about the incoming wounded. They knew nothing about the battle.
This couldn't happen. The doctors were always ready to wait for days for incoming wounded people, they never let us down. When asked where the doctors and nurses were, they replied that the regiment had been in position for a long time, everyone was resting and celebrating the victorious Panjshir operation.
The soldiers of the fifth company are sitting, blood is flowing from under them, the orderly is running around and rubbing it on the floor with rags and setting up basins. They simply didn’t remember about the struggling 5th company; they didn’t even prepare for surgery. Maybe they hoped that there would be no one to operate on? Or even then they brazenly decided to erase the battle from the history of the Afghan war.

From the meager soldiers' facts, only one very terrible version emerges so far: the Company was doomed to death, in the hope that it would be completely destroyed by the Mujahideen, either in battle, or when the company would walk with the dead and wounded for long kilometers to the armor.

Who and why sent the 5th company so far from the main forces on the very last day of the operation?

All major battles in this operation are described in detail on the Internet. Nothing about this battle of the 5th company. Vacuum emptiness of information. Still.

The full picture of the situation so far is as follows:

In April-May 1984, our and Afghan troops carried out one of the largest operations in the entire Afghan ten-year war in the Panjshir Gorge. The operation was personally led by the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal Sergei Sokolov.

When the main forces of Ahmad Shah were allegedly “pushed out” from the Panjshir Gorge, the Soviet Army began to comb the surrounding areas.

By the time the huge two-month military operation to liberate the Panjshir gorge from the gangs of Ahmad Shah Massoud was completed, the battalion commander of the first battalion was already a “legendary” battalion commander, who became famous for having the lowest percentage of casualties among personnel during his command of the battalion. Although he could not protect his soldiers from murders based on hazing.

Let's not blame the battalion commander for this. In order to get away from hazing and come to a caring attitude towards soldiers, it was necessary to change the entire army system of work and thinking of the then officers of the entire Soviet Army.

Margelov was no longer there, there was no one to respect the soldier, to “love” him.

At 30 years old, a brave commander, battalion commander first, having the Order of the Red Star and the Red Banner, having been wounded in battle, enjoying the love and respect of his soldiers and superior commanders, a paratrooper officer - a legend, had served by this time in Afghanistan for almost two and a half years now. Six months longer than expected. This is two and a half years of the heaviest psychological burden of real front-line life. By this time, the first battalion commander was nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and was preparing to receive this title soon.

Without waiting for the battalion to arrive at the regiment, the first battalion commander, leaving his battalion (with the permission of the regiment? division commander?), leaves the Panjshir operation for Bagram, and from there, by An-12 plane, flies to the regiment's location.

It's time to fly home. Flights to the USSR were extremely irregular, you’ll miss “your” plane, and you’ll sit and cook for several months until flights open again. Yes, and it is necessary to prepare a farewell party with military friends, officers.

Ahmad Shah and his gang, in fact, were not in the Panjshir mountains. The entire operation to liberate the gorge was against almost no one. Thanks to betrayal, the Shah was warned in advance about the offensive of the Soviet and Afghan troops, led the main forces to a safe place and drove away himself. In the gorge there were small and scattered units of gangs that lagged behind the main Mujahideen army.

Additional information on this on the sites:
1) In pursuit of the “Lion of Panjshir”
2) The third military operation of formations and units of the 40th Army and Afghan troops in Panjshir against the formations of Ahmad Shah Massoud

The Panjshir operation of 1984 consisted of two parts: before the May holidays and after. Between these two halves, Soviet units, including the 350th Airborne Regiment, arrived at their permanent locations for a two-day rest, resupply, and to take with them any remaining manpower.

They raked both turners and bakers, if only there was more strength on the armor.

To temporarily replace the 350th regiment, at the place of its permanent deployment, the airborne regiment stationed there flew in from Fergana. The poor soldiers of the Fergana regiment were not even told that they were being taken to Kabul in Afghanistan. The soldiers only learned that they were in Afghanistan from us, who came to visit them. For a long time they didn’t believe it, they thought they were being played. I don’t know whether they were later sent back to the Union.

The appearance of a large and serious military mess was created. The more noise, the more stars on the chest and shoulder straps of all types of staff colonels and generals who have at least something to do with this noise, from Kabul to Moscow. "Much ado about nothing". Big "heroic" deception.

Before the first half of the Panjshir operation, the betrayal of the intelligence chief of the 149th motorized rifle regiment, stationed in Kunduz, occurred. An officer in the conflict shot and killed the mayor of Kunduz, took two soldiers with him, and went to join the Mujahideen. The 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion, which was supposed to, among other things, provide high-quality reconnaissance of Panjshir, was sent to apprehend the traitor. The search was unsuccessful and the traitor was not caught. It is possible that an officer of this rank also had information about the impending operation, which he passed on to the dushmans. And on April 19, 1984, the “great”, final Panjshir operation against Ahmad Shah Massoud began.

On April 30, almost at the end of the first half of the operation, the 1st battalion of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment died in the Khazar gorge: the losses of Soviet troops amounted to about 60 people killed. It's just that one of the generals gave the wrong order. The commander of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment was transferred to Belarus and demoted. The major general commander of the 108th motorized rifle division was also removed from his post as division commander. The trial took place in Tashkent, in the Military Court of the Turkestan Military District. There were heroic commanders, but there were dejected accused in court. Their careers were ruined forever.

There is a ton of information about this particular fight on the Internet.

So there was something to fear for both our regiment commander and our new division commander. The judicial authorities did not pat them on the head for the losses and hours of carnage. If they found out about these losses and massacres. And if they didn’t recognize it, then “there’s no trial.”

Before the second half of the operation, on May 3, 1984, the 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion itself was ambushed and lost 13 people - 3 officers and 10 soldiers. And again there is no full-fledged reconnaissance of Panjshir.

The Internet is simply full of information about this fight.

Only there is nothing about the battle of the 5th company.

Moreover, in the first half of the Panjshir operation of 1984 there are now enormous losses, but there is not a huge number of captured and killed spirits, so necessary for victorious reports. But there are also a large number of wounded Soviet soldiers. There are a large number of disabled people who were blown up by mines, both Mujahideen and their own, unexploded “petals” (mines dropped from Soviet aircraft and self-destructing after a few days). Such mines did not always self-destruct. There is information on the Internet that about 1,000,000 of these mines were dropped on Panjshir in 1984 and several hundred of our soldiers were blown up by them.

A short note: 1,000,000 (think about it!!! A million!!!) min frogs only. Each cost is not 5 or 100 rubles. The dollar then went for 1 ruble for 1 green one (even hucksters exchanged one for three for easy money). And the rest of the investments are only in this operation!? Equipment, planes, helicopters, fuel, ammunition, food, clothing, wages and so on...

The Soviet authorities pumped 5 billion rubles a year into Afghanistan. Wouldn’t it have been easier to just buy all the Mujahideen with their giblets for that money? Approximately 100,000 rubles a year for any most seedy Mujahideen. The CIA spent much less. We could buy up all the gangs of Afghanistan and direct them in the direction the USSR needed.

So no. The Union needed to shake its weapons at the whole world and have a huge training ground where human meat was as consumable as ammunition. Only the cartridges were treated much more carefully.

Commanders of all types are nervous and afraid of losing gold stars, orders and extraordinary titles that were already close to them.

For some commanders, the question is simply about preserving their existing ranks, orders and freedom; some had no time for a new “fall of stars”.

Nobody needs another big loss. And if you hide the death of the fifth company without helping it out, then you can put a brake on its death. The company itself, they say, is to blame. It climbed up somewhere and then they destroyed it. But the company, they say, didn’t have time to give a signal, so apparently their radio flew off right away, or it was broken by bullets. The company might have been written off retroactively or later and accused of unprofessionalism and arbitrariness in advancing further than necessary.

It turns out that either there really was a mistake by the company commanders on the map and half the blame for the battle lies with them, or the company was actually driven to where “Makar didn’t drive the calves to graze” (why?), or the company was specially sent very far away (maybe all the way to Paradise in heaven and for what?). A riddle within a riddle.

And if the company is helped with artillery and instantly with helicopters, and large army forces are sent to its aid, then he knows how things will go.

What if the number of killed soldiers and officers reaches hundreds and even thousands? There were several thousand Mujahideen, and the fifth company completely squeezed them. Masud's men tried to get out of the gorge bottle at any cost. At first they were definitely afraid that the full might of the Soviet Army would now fall on them.

Here you can’t write off that the spirits have left; here there will be a battle between thousands of Soviet soldiers and thousands of Afghan dushmans. And it is unclear how the card will fall. What if the spirits win? Or they won’t win, but they will kill several hundred or even thousands of our soldiers and commanders.

For large losses and incorrect orders, generals and officers could face more than just reprimand, they could face a military trial and real prison terms. There were examples. Career in the trash, stars and orders in the trash, glory in the bucket.

In short, general and officer ranks, careers and orders with the stars of Heroes went to hell.

It was necessary to fight for real. Maybe for the first time in Afghanistan, it was possible to fight for real, with a huge army of Mujahideen, and not with individual gangs.

Staff officers and generals gathered together. Personal well-being has become closer to them. H..n with her, with the fifth company, they said.

This is exactly the version. There was not and was not a victorious Panjshir operation. It was bullshit.

According to the original plan of the operation, the withdrawal of the regiment and division was to be ensured by the first battalion. The plan was approved at the very top and long before the start of the operation. But the first battalion commander is missing. The regiment or division commander may change his decision on the fly. Instead of the first battalion, the second battalion moves forward to provide cover. And to make it look believable, they tell us that the first battalion is supposedly pinned down and needs help.

Why? The first battalion commander and the regiment commander are good friends. By that time, both, as smart and competent officers, they understand that the Panjshir operation is a fake dummy, the Mujahideen left there in advance. And all of Anava, even before the start of the operation, knew that the spirits had left on Panjshir. Anava probably shared her suspicions with our regimental and divisional officers.

The 2nd Battalion of the 345th Separate Guards Parachute Regiment was located in the village of Anava. The battalion headquarters was located in the fortress.

The Panjshir Gorge blocked 20 outposts of the battalion. And the rest of the 345th Airborne Regiment generally stood in Bagram, from where the battalion commander of the first battalion flew out. Information spread quickly among the officers, so it was no secret to the battalion commander of the first battalion of the 350th regiment, and the commander of the 350th regiment, that the forces of Ahmad Shah were walking freely, between Kabul and Panjshir in huge numbers.

The battalion commander is the first to understand that his battalion, God forbid, may encounter gangs that have left Panjshir. And formally it is he who commands the battalion. The first battalion commander, sensitive to personal glory, could ask the regiment commander (or maybe the division commander) to change his first battalion to the second battalion. Just in case. After all, nothing bad is expected. They replaced and urgently brought the first battalion to the location. Out of harm's way.

And then the 5th company stumbles upon the spirits. She should send the first battalion to help, but it is not nearby. She would have her own battalion to help her, but who would cover the division’s withdrawal? If you stop the division, you stop the Army.

The 5th company would have received helicopters and artillery to the rescue, and then the arbitrariness of the regiment (or division?) commander and the first battalion commander would come to light. And goodbye to careers, goodbye to the stars of the Heroes of the Soviet Union, goodbye to the legend of the invincible first battalion commander, goodbye to the general rank of the new division commander of the 103rd Airborne Division.

Farewell to all well-deserved officer honor and glory, hello to the military court, which will fully answer for every violation of officer military discipline that led to combat losses of personnel. And the personnel are State property. Marshals were broken off, not only officers.

And the terrible thing begins. The company is fighting, but they are silent about the battle. They probably don’t report the battle to the top. And they don't give help. Only light shelling and weak bombardment of the battle square is all that the regimental commander can do for the company. This is all.

The death of the 5th company suited everyone. It suited the first battalion commander and the regiment commander; they did not need an investigation into what happened. It suited the division commander and the army commander, because the linden of the Panjshir operation and the failure of this operation did not come up. There is no need to accept a multi-thousand-strong and unpredictable battle with Mujahideen who appeared out of nowhere, after an operation has already been carried out.

And the captured Mujahideen and their leaders will definitely testify that the Panjshir operation of May 1984 was a complete mess. And the victorious reports had already gone to Moscow and the ceremonial jackets under the victorious orders and stars were already showing holes. For the division commander, a colonel, who by that time had served in Afghanistan for only three months, this was the first major operation; the rank of general and a good order, and maybe even the title of Hero, loomed ahead.

The company was probably expected to die. We were really looking forward to it. It couldn't be otherwise. The practice of war showed that in battles even with an enemy twenty times smaller, companies were simply wiped out. Yes, the company had to die. Then it was possible to say that the company had gone in the wrong direction, its radio was immediately jammed, and the company did not have time to transmit anything. All the blame could be placed on the company itself.

Therefore, even after the battle, the company was not pulled out, but was forced to go to the armor itself, in the hope that the Mujahideen would finish it off.

But the company survived. A total of seven killed. True, there are many wounded, but these are lightly wounded, and there are also few seriously wounded. The company is combat-ready and can move on its own. With difficulty, but it can. And he can fight. And the radio is intact. And the perfume didn’t do it. 5th Company won.

But the big commanders still pretended that there was no battle. It was not profitable to show this fight. If we don't wash, we'll just ride. There is not even a mention of this fight anywhere on the Internet. None. There are details about all the others, with maps, lists of the dead, testimonies and memoirs of witnesses, but there is no information about this battle of the fifth company.

I am an old operative with a higher education, and although all this is my speculation, but according to the scanty facts I have and knowledge of human society...... and Soviet society, everything looks exactly as written above. Although we will not rush, and for now we will consider all this a version.

We tried to contact the battalion commander of the first battalion, the man simply did not talk about this topic, remained silent on the phone, did not hang up for a very long time, then did not pick up for repeated calls and completely disconnected.

But he managed to say that he flew from Bagram to Kabul, leaving the battalion immediately after the Panjshir operation. But this is a violation of the combat regulations. The commander leaves the battalion until it arrives at the unit's location. By whose order and to whom does he leave it?

Another fact: when the triggers of the 5th company flew home from Afghanistan at the end of June 1984, a sergeant from the first battalion was flying with them, wounded in the leg. The wound was fresh, during the flight his stitches opened and blood flowed, he poured it out of his boot.
He also received his wound somewhere during the end of the Panjshir operation.

Maybe the fifth company was really promoted to replace the positions of the first battalion because some part of it encountered spirits? But which one, and why did the rest of the first battalion, past whose positions the 5th company was marching, know nothing about it?

One of the commanders of the 5th company, whose man his soldier found after Afghanistan, who was also in that battle, who became for the soldier who found him a friend and a person whose opinion he valued very much (the soldier for many years, on his way to another treatment, stopped by commander home in Moscow for a visit, lived in his apartment), for a long time did not want to raise this topic, left it by any means (for the soldier at that time this was not quite the main thing and he did not insist, and the commander referred to the lack of facts and left everything finding out about the battle in which he was also himself, for later).

Moreover, at the same time, the commander of this soldier sincerely wanted the soldier to write the history of the 5th company and find out the truth about this battle. At least he sincerely told the soldier about this desire.

When the soldier specifically and directly pestered the commander by phone (and they live in different cities) with the fact that he urgently needed some clarifying facts about this battle, which were known to this particular commander, as a participant in the battle and a junior officer, the commander of this soldier suddenly referred to suddenly busy and asked to call back the next day.

The soldier called back, the commander said hello, again referred to being busy and said that he would call back himself. The soldier could no longer reach him, and the commander does not call back or pick up the phone.

This has never happened to this officer before. He is a serious and committed person; he has done a lot of good for the soldier. Maybe he is trying to protect his former soldier from big troubles in this way? Maybe for some people the truth about the battle of the 5th company is still scary?

It’s scary, even despite the fact that absolutely all crimes of the Afghan war have been amnestied and forgiven by law. Who is afraid not even of the law, but of what? Just afraid of the truth? Afraid of condemnation from veterans and fellow soldiers in Afghanistan? Afraid of shame?

I don't want to throw mud at anyone. I don't blame anyone. This is simply a version put together by me, a fairly experienced specialist with a special higher education, from very meager and not fully illuminated facts conveyed to me (my friends in Afghanistan, former soldiers of the 350th regiment, among them there are also specialists with higher education in such matters, they say that they also see no other explanation for the events).

More than anything, I want this terrible version to turn out to be just complete nonsense of my brain and not confirmed at any point. But I need some facts and answers to simple questions to cover the whole history of the battle of the 5th company.

I’m ready to declare all my versions simply ridiculous and stupid versions, but I want the real and honest officer’s truth. I don’t want to publish anyone’s names until all the circumstances are fully clarified. And then I won’t print the name.

The paratroopers were not the only ones who fought bravely in that bloody year of 1984. The losses of the 40th Army in 1984 were the heaviest for the entire period of hostilities in Afghanistan and amounted to 2,343 people killed and 7,739 wounded and injured.

Soldiers of the 350th Airborne Regiment will continue this complex investigation in the name of our killed and wounded fellow soldiers.

Two months after writing the above, the following information was found on the Internet:
“...06.5.84. The 1st battalion of the 350th RPD moved closer to the mountains. At the very beginning, 3 pdr. were ambushed. The company commander in the 3rd PDR was Novozhilov, and the platoon commander Tokarev and two soldiers Fedulov and Bogolyubov died ... "

This means that there was still a battle of the 1st battalion, and there were dead and wounded. Why was this fight silenced? Why did only one fifth company advance to replace the entire battalion, since the first battalion had three companies of its own? And after all, the fifth company was told that the first battalion was pinned down on June 4, 1984. And here is information about the fight on June 5th. Maybe the dates on the Internet are shifting?

To figure it out and figure it out...

But still, where was the battalion commander of the first battalion when its soldiers and officers died on June 5, 1984?

I have no desire to pin down the first battalion commander with this incident. And I have no desire to blame him. He is a heroic man, there are no words, but no more heroic than any normal trigger man of our regiment. I know the boys of the 350th Airborne Regiment are no less brave. And the soldiers personally saved entire platoons and companies, and with severe wounds received in battle while saving their colleagues, they went home, and did not have a single medal. And for me, with my two Braves for Afghanistan, their exploits are far and away. No, I honestly earned mine, but still... It’s a shame that the guys are Heroes without awards. It's somehow unfair.

And in the first battalion there was the same hazing as in any other. And the soldiers there slaughtered each other and killed young soldiers for not bringing a ration of butter to an old soldier.

There were bullying and beatings, lice, accidents, dystrophy. There was heroism, self-sacrifice and exploits.

Only the battalion commander became a Hero of the Soviet Union. And the majority of ordinary front-line soldiers went home without a single military award, despite all their many exploits. But the same picture was in the second battalion.

Any ordinary combat soldier of the 350th regiment, if he were in the place of any battalion commander or any company or platoon officer, would command no worse. Of course, school education and some experience in leading people would be helpful, but courage and courage would be no less. It’s just that everyone got their own Afghan, precisely at a certain moment in their biography.

Then many soldiers who went through Afghanistan became officers and generals, commanded companies, regiments and platoons in another war, in Chechnya, and did their job no worse than the battalion commander of the first battalion and no less heroically.

So, by Afghan standards, the battalion commander was a normal officer, and there were many such officers. And they accomplished feats and saved lives, and made mistakes more than once.

By the way, he did good things to me personally twice (although he probably doesn’t remember) and I remembered him as a very humane officer, and not a soulless jackal.

But personally, I want to know if it was his action that I owe for the fourteen pieces in my head and the loss of my two best friends.

All veterans, soldiers and officers who went through Afghanistan have their own dark spots in their biographies and it is impossible to divide front-line soldiers into white and black, but everyone must ask their fellow soldiers who suffered because of them and God for sincere forgiveness for their sins that led to death and injuries and disabilities of fellow soldiers.

Ask personally and try with all your might to make amends if you still don’t forgive.

And you need to forgive. You'll have to forgive. It's hard to blame, it's even harder to forgive. Living without forgiving those who have repented is a sin.

February 15 is the twenty-ninth anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

MMG PV KGB USSR 68th Red Banner Takhta-Bazar border detachment

This war has already been forgotten, but many Sovietologists believe that the introduction of troops into Afghanistan was a fatal mistake of the Soviet leadership, which led to the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, as the President of Russia called it Vladimir Putin.

Since then, the world has changed beyond recognition: the Soviet Union has disappeared; some of the former Soviet republics became members of NATO - a military alliance created during the Cold War for armed confrontation with the USSR and the countries of the Eastern bloc; the “soft” displacement of Russian speakers continues from the former southern republics of the Union; the confrontation over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh continues between Armenia and Azerbaijan; Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan became eastern despotisms and in their development rolled back into the Middle Ages; The political leadership of Belarus and Ukraine are cultivating nationalism, which has already led to a deterioration in relations between the once fraternal republics and has served to establish a sanctions regime against a number of Russian enterprises and citizens by the European Union and the United States.

What goals stood before the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, who served there, how the everyday life of our soldiers went and how the further fate of the participants in the hostilities unfolded, we recall with a participant in the hostilities, an Afghan veteran, Sergei Trubin.

Sergey Trubin. 1984 Afghanistan.

Sergei Afanasyevich Trubin, was born on April 20, 1966 in the city of Kamyshlov, Sverdlovsk region, in a large family. Childhood was not easy; Sergei was left without a father early on. The mother, Trubina Nina Nikolaevna, was raising three sons. He studied at secondary school No. 1, graduated from SGPTU No. 16 with a specialty: assistant driver of a diesel locomotive - electric locomotive.

In 1984, he was called up for military service in the Border Troops of the KGB of the USSR. Thanks to his character and sports activities in his youth, he ended up in the garrison sports company. Twice became the champion of the Far Eastern Military District in sambo. Received the title of Master of Sports in Sambo and Judo. As part of the motorized maneuver group (MMG), the USSR KGB PV was sent for further service to the Herat province of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Participated in more than 30 combat missions to escort transport convoys from the USSR. Was wounded twice. Awarded DRA medals and insignia. After demobilization, he returned to his native Kamyshlov, headed a sports school where he studied sambo, judo, and athletic gymnastics with the youth of Kamyshlov. Champion of the Sverdlovsk and Tyumen regions in all-around strength. Entrepreneur, currently the founder of Kamyshlovsky Bread LLC.

Married. Father of four daughters.

Reference.

The USSR sent a military contingent to Afghanistan on December 25, 1979. The reason for this decision was the intense confrontation within the political leadership of Afghanistan and about 20 requests from the DRA government for the introduction of Soviet troops. In March 1979, an armed rebellion began in Herat. On July 3, 1979, US President Jimmy Carter (US President 1977-1981) signed a directive on assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. Under the supervision of the CIA, the supply of weapons to anti-government armed groups began. On the territory of Pakistan, in Afghan refugee camps, training centers for armed forces were established. The country began to see protests by the Islamic opposition, mutinies in the army, and within the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the internal party struggle intensified, especially after the events of September 1979, when the leader of the PDPA, Nur Mohammad Taraki, was arrested and then killed on the orders of Hafizullah, who removed him from power. Amina.

Under Amin, terror unfolded in the country not only against Islamists, but also against members of the PDPA - supporters of Taraki. The repression also affected the army, the main support of the PDPA, which caused mass desertion and rebellion. The KGB received information about Amin's connections with the CIA in the 1960s and about secret contacts of his emissaries with American officials after the assassination of Taraki. The Soviet leadership feared that a further aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan would lead to the fall of the PDPA regime and the rise to power of forces hostile to the USSR. As a result, it was decided to prepare for the overthrow of Amin and his replacement with a leader more loyal to the USSR, Babrak Karmal.

The number of Soviet advisers (including military) in Afghanistan was sharply increased: from 409 people in January to 4,500 by the end of June 1979. From December 10, on the personal order of the USSR Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov, the deployment and mobilization of units and formations of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts was carried out. The 103rd Vitebsk Guards Airborne Division was raised at the signal “Gathering”. On December 12, 1979, at a meeting of the Politburo, a decision was made to send troops. On the evening of December 27, units of the 103rd Airborne Division and the 345th Guards Parachute Regiment blocked and took control of the military units of the Kabul garrison, the television and radio center, the ministries of security and internal affairs, Soviet special forces stormed Amin's palace, during the assault Amin was killed.

During the period from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989, about 620 thousand military personnel served in the troops in Afghanistan. In addition, during this period there were 21 thousand civilians in the Soviet troops, in the positions of workers and employees. According to official statistics, during the fighting in Afghanistan, 417 military personnel were captured and went missing. Some sources estimate irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died from wounds, diseases and accidents, missing) at 15,031 people.

They formed columns in Kalai-Nau and escorted them to Herat, sometimes they went further to the outskirts of Shindand.

RR: - Sergey, before serving, what did you know about Afghanistan, about the events that were happening there, what did you have to face?

S.T: - My brothers and I grew up as ordinary Soviet boys, we went to school and sports clubs. Since we didn’t have a father, we always relied only on ourselves, our own strengths. My mother, Trubina Nina Nikolaevna, worked as a cook in a kindergarten, so she left home very early in the morning, worked a lot, held three jobs at the same time, and was tired. My brothers and I always tried to help, we did everything around the house ourselves. Before serving, I knew practically nothing about Afghanistan; there was little information, only in the “Serving the Soviet Union” program, which we boys watched regularly. But they only showed how our soldiers build schools, plant trees, only good things. In 1982, Oleg, my older brother, was drafted into the Soviet army. Immediately after training, he was sent to serve in Afghanistan, in Kunduz, a settlement not far from the Soviet-Afghan border. He wrote that everything was fine, he served as a sapper, and had awards from the DRA government. We didn’t even have time to meet and talk with him; I was called up in 1984, and Oleg had just been demobilized and came home.

I didn’t think that I would end up in Afghanistan, since families where someone had already participated in hostilities were no longer sent to hot spots. Moreover, I ended up in the KGB Border Troops and served in the Far East. But apparently not in my case. Since childhood, I have been involved in sambo, judo, and boxing. Immediately after being drafted, he took part in garrison competitions and won. I was enrolled in the sports company. At that time, each garrison had such units, the soldiers from which defended the sporting honor of their military unit. He twice became the champion of the Far Eastern Military District in sambo and judo, and received the title of master of sports in these sports. The district command encouraged me and granted me leave. I left the district for my border detachment to process documents, and there, instead of vacation, I was sent to the Turkmen SSR, to Kushka. Now there is no city with that name. In Kushka they were already preparing for a business trip to Afghanistan. The participation of border troops in the contingent was not advertised at that time, so we replaced the border guards’ uniform with a combined arms one, received an AKM instead of an AK-74, formed a motorized maneuver group and, under our own power, departed to the deployment point near Kalai-Nau, Badghis province, and in 1986 redeployed to Karezi-Ilyaz , Herat province. So he served as a foreman in the Motorized Maneuverable Group of the KGB USSR PV of the 68th Red Banner Takhta-Bazar border detachment from 1984 to 1986.

My mother was very worried about me. At first I wrote in letters home that I was serving in Mongolia.

Afghanistan is a completely different culture, a different religion. We were Soviet boys then, religion for us was something distant in the past, pre-revolutionary, we knew nothing about Christianity then, but here there is radical Islam, their order remained medieval, especially in the villages. Of course it was a shock for us. Women in burqas, illiterate people, dirty and ragged children. A desert with knee-deep dust untouched for centuries - a car will pass, the dust hangs in the air for several days, mountains, stones, water shortage, daytime heat, night cold. Of course, we were not ready for all this.

RR: - What kind of combat units were facing your unit?

S.T.: - We are border guards, and the main task was to protect the border of the Soviet Union, but on the other side of the border. They served at posts located on the tops of mountains and hills in the vicinity of Kaloyi-Nau, carried out military raids, set up barriers and ambushes. We worked proactively. Thanks to this, there was peace on the southern borders of the Union. By the way, in the first year after the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, there were 250 attempts by gangs of various sizes to enter the territory of the USSR by force. The most sensational one was the attack on the Moscow border post. Many guys died then and almost all were wounded and shell-shocked. Caravans of drugs arrived from Afghanistan. Before the withdrawal, we intercepted and destroyed them. In the USSR, no one knew about drugs.

Our mine detection dog - sometimes only she could find Italian plastic mines.

In addition to border posts, the tasks of our MMG included guarding the Kalaya-Nau - Herat road. They constantly accompanied convoys with cargo and water from the Union. “The road of life” we called it. They formed columns in Kalai-Nau and escorted them to Herat, sometimes they went further to the outskirts of Shindand. Sappers and cover are moving forward, one armored personnel carrier in front, one in the middle, one bringing up the rear of the column. They walked like this from several hours to several days. Then they returned to the point, rested for a day or two and were escorted again. Our mine-detecting dog was very helpful - sometimes only she could find Italian plastic mines. Mine detectors didn’t hear them, you can’t always reach them with a probe, the spirits bury them deep, 50 - 70 cm. The mine is in a plastic case, it contains two and a half or six kilograms of explosives. They are difficult to detect. The action of the “Italian” is unpredictable. She is “inflatable”. A dozen cars can drive over it until it “inflates” and explodes. Unpredictable. The road had to be cleared again before each column left. The spirits were constantly mining. And not just at night. They observe - the detachment has passed, new ones are immediately posted.

"Italian". The mine is in a plastic case, it contains two and a half or six kilograms of explosives. They are difficult to detect.

They often fired from green paint. The spirits had all sorts of weapons, English Boer rifles, old, but they hit far and were powerful. You're driving in an armored personnel carrier, it's noisy, you can't hear or see what's going on around you, suddenly once - a ray of light, once - another. Bullets from the “drill” pierce the armor and the sun shines through the holes.

When I first arrived at the point, I didn’t believe that the donkey would withstand me, I’m big, and even with a combat load, but it didn’t matter!

The equipment could not get to the mountains, to the peaks where our posts were located, they left only on foot and on donkeys. The donkey is small, his legs are thin, but he drags loads. When I first arrived at the point, I didn’t believe that the donkey would withstand me, I’m big, and even with a combat load, but it didn’t matter! We left early in the morning and walked up for twelve hours, in the heat of the mountains. They fired frequently. Then a week without water or food, under mortar fire at the top and down to the point. It took about eight hours to descend.

The helicopter pilots tried not to take risks. They flew out from behind cover, dropped a skin of water and immediately went down, behind the mountain from the shelling.

R.R. - Sergey, you said “just without water and food.” Didn’t you get everything you needed, food, water, ammunition?

S.T. - They carried everything they could with them, loaded them on donkeys and went to the mountains. But it's hot in the sun there. Products heat up during the day, and are cold at night - they cool down, and so on for several days in a row, they spoil quickly. There is always a shortage of water. They brought it to us from the Union. But you can’t carry much on your own to the point in the mountains; they were delivered by helicopter. But at the top everything was shot through. We are in the trenches, dugouts, behind the stones, there are usually a little more than thirty of us, I am a commander with the rank of sergeant major. There should have been 50 people and an officer at the point, but there were always not enough people. It is difficult to provide cover for a helicopter to land and unload. Mortars, machine guns and snipers are constantly firing from the spirits. The helicopter pilots tried not to take risks. They flew out from behind cover, dropped a skin of water and immediately went down, behind the mountain from the shelling. The waterskin was bursting from the fall - as much water as they managed to collect, they pulled it. Everyone ran, some with what - basins, bottles. I was always thirsty.

R.R. - Ambushes and barriers, you also took part in them, why were they carried out, what was the point of them?

S.T. - These are preventive measures. We warned against an attack by militants. We, the border guards, had good intelligence work. It must be said that our officers made a lot of effort to explain to the local tribes the purpose of our presence in Afghanistan; some gangs, thanks to this work, went over to the side of the DRA government and helped defend the villages in the area of ​​​​responsibility of our border detachment from attacks by other gangs. There are also tribal relations, Uzbeks against Tajiks, both against Pashtuns. Intelligence received from informants about the time and place of the caravans. We took up positions along the caravan route and waited. A caravan appeared - they stopped it, inspected it, if necessary, we detain it and hand it over to the scouts; if they showed resistance, we destroy it. Correct tactics. When the policy of reconciliation began, they abandoned it, and the losses among our personnel immediately increased.

Once a gang of thirty people was detained, all with weapons.

Once a gang of thirty people was detained, all with weapons. They took it, and then looked after it all day while our officers and intelligence officers dealt with their main one. I think they released me later.

R.R. - How did the local population treat you?

S.T. - The Afghans were wary of us. This is a different culture, different traditions, religion. They interacted with whomever they could. They tried not to disturb the rest once again if they adhered to neutrality. It’s normal for locals to trade during the day, to sell you something, but at night they go to lay mines, carry weapons on raids or with caravans. They weren't afraid of us. The culture is like this: they fight from birth, children already have a machine gun, they shoot quickly and accurately.

The Afghans were wary of us. This is a different culture, different traditions, religion. They interacted with whomever they could.

R.R. - Is there something that you remember most?

S.T. - We had a combat episode. We went out to intercept the caravan. The task was completed successfully, the caravan was stopped, the militants were disarmed, a search began, and there were bags of money and women. I have never seen so much money: dollars, Afghanis, Iranian and Pakistani bills.

It's good that we left there. It’s a pity that we didn’t leave our bases there under such unfavorable conditions and abandoned people who believed us. Many lives would have been saved both by our citizens and Afghans.

Interviewed by Evgeny Belonosov

“...You have to be not just stupid, you have to be arrogant to deny what happened...”
V.V. Putin (and he Putin interprets in his own way what happened, depriving the peoples of Russia and Ukraine of the future with his madness of the wars in Ukraine and Syria, propaganda of Russian fascism throughout the world!)

This work is artistic and literary, and the author and the site on which it is published are not responsible for the content of the text and the content of other copyright materials and links presented in it, are not responsible and do not provide any guarantees in connection with the publication of facts, data, results and other information. Any coincidence with real living or living people is coincidental.

“...When our soldiers are sent to another war for the happiness of wealth and the power of a state and people foreign to us, and the crippled and disabled, perhaps your relatives, return from the next war, you will certainly understand the meaning of this message.
And now our young guys, future soldiers, have the opportunity to read and perhaps understand what awaits them in the event of a new armed conflict outside our Motherland...”
Arthur Yakovenko, machine gunner of the fifth company, 350th Airborne Regiment, 103rd Airborne Division (years of service in Afghanistan 1982-1984)

"NOBODY EXCEPT US"
The truth of Afghanistan through the eyes of an airborne soldier

Afghan War Veteran Andrei Likhoshersny said very well about this work:
“...Here is the truth that lives in each of us, and which we are afraid to admit even to ourselves...”

Let these words be the epigraph to this work.

"NOBODY EXCEPT US"

“...Here is the truth that lives in each of us, and which we are afraid to admit even to ourselves...”
Andrey Likhoshersny

CHAPTER ONE: “LANDING TOUR”

"Nobody except us". This is the motto of the Airborne Forces.
No one except us could and can carry out many military tasks.
No one but us can tell the whole truth.
The real truth about our life and service, about our battles, victories, mistakes and our crimes in the Afghan war.
The real truth, and not patriotic tales and boastful tales of tipsy or “too” forgetful “heroes”: marshals, generals, soldiers, warrant officers and officers.

I was incredibly lucky to serve in Afghanistan, in the Fifth Company of the Second Battalion, 350 Airborne Regiment, 103 Airborne Division.
A heroic company, a heroic battalion, a legendary regiment, and an equally legendary and heroic division.

And it is not just words. The 103rd Airborne Division controlled the capital of Afghanistan, Kabul, the Kabul airfield (the main airfield in Afghanistan) and all approaches to the airfield and Kabul.
The 350th Airborne Regiment was part of this division and was its most combat regiment. The headquarters of the 103rd division and the 350th regiment were separated by only a few hundred meters. The 103rd division, in fact, was the heart of the contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The 350th Airborne Regiment, in turn, was the heart of the 103rd division and, moreover, practically never got out of battle.

I took a sip of a very high honor, which, by my standards, I still have not justified and have not fully deserved.

To be at least one day in battle as a triggerman of the 350th Airborne Regiment in the Afghan War - even if not the most outstanding and heroic, but a triggerman - is an honor for any real man. There will never be anything higher than this rank for me, just as there will be no award higher than the green-painted iron emblem of the Airborne Forces from the buttonhole of my faded military HBchik.

Along with this honor and honor, I drank over the pain of bullying, and the injustice of insults, and the bitterness of indifference, and the never-quenching grief of the loss of my friends in the company, who were in many ways undeniably higher and purer than me.

In fairness, it is worth especially noting that the greatest Heroes of the Afghan War should and can be considered precisely those who spent absolutely their entire service in Afghanistan in Kurki and together with the Kurki, in combat companies, and climbed for all of one and a half, or even two-plus years in the mountains and bore all the hardships and deprivations of service between combat in the mountains, precisely in these trigger, sapper, mortar, AGS, signal and other companies, going to the mountains (namely to the mountains, and not just on combat outings) companies, platoons and separate groups .

Unfortunately, I have no right to boast of such a difficult one and a half year soldier’s service. Of course, I also fought and was a triggerman, and even was a machine gunner, and a squad leader, and a deputy platoon commander in a trigger company, and repeatedly, for more than a year, I went to combat in the mountains, but in my service there were also easier months of service than an ordinary front-line soldier trigger. Therefore, I forever feel guilty before them, for the fact that they endured much more on their shoulders and in their souls than I did.
While I spent several months relaxing at the regiment and in the rear of the medical battalion, they fought, covering my quiet life with their bodies and their lives.
It was always undeniably safer inside divisions, regiments and medical battalions. Therefore, I consider it unfair when soldiers, warrant officers, officers and generals who, at best, only reached the foot of the mountains and then waited on the armor for these combat trigger platoons, companies and groups are now beating their chests and saying that they, too, are front-line soldiers.
The triggers of combat companies and the specialists assigned to them, who spent their entire service on combat operations in the mountains and escorting columns - these are the real warriors.

Forgive me, guys, for not being as persistent as you.

I don’t ask for forgiveness from generals, officers and warrant officers, I ask forgiveness from those ordinary soldiers of the 350th Airborne Regiment, who from the beginning to the very end of heroic and difficult service, more honestly than I, courageously pulled their soldier’s burden into the regiment , and in the mountains, and in the location of the companies, performing their labors and duties themselves, without shifting them onto the shoulders of soldiers of the junior conscription, and who did not turn into scum, mocking their colleagues, and beating their colleagues.

Forgive me, Guys.

We, young soldiers, after training, came to Afghanistan, and everyone around us, from sergeant to general, from squad commander to division commander, inspired us that the rest of the soldiers, aged and demobilized, who served in Afghanistan, even for six months, more than us - clearly correct and infallible heroes.
We, who “didn’t smell gunpowder,” looked at them during the first six months of the war as heroes. We perceived them as heroes who bring the truth, and whom we must unambiguously obey in everything, and who are always and everywhere right.
This was what was confusing. These “heroes” insulted us, beat us, humiliated us, they mocked and mocked us, and we believed that it was our own fault. They are heroes, and we are stupid, idiots who have not yet experienced mountains and battles, only preventing them, the “real heroes,” from properly defending their Motherland.
At the same time, there is also the absolute impossibility of escaping anywhere from all this chaos and bestiality of the Afghan war, as in the Union. It’s there, you can run away from the unit, and sneak through, and go AWOL, and write a letter to your mother with a folder, so that they come, feed you with buns and feel sorry for you, and take you away from the unit for three or four days.
And in the Union, young soldiers immediately understand that all this bullying is due to the stupidity of those who bully, and not from the need for this bullying.
In Afghanistan, unlike the Union, the fucking war did not give us a chance to understand the bitterness (precisely the bitterness, from the word “bitch”) of such “heroes.”

In Afghanistan you were always and everywhere, precisely and only with the unit. No one came to see anyone, and no one could go anywhere.

Any absence, of any soldier, of any year of conscription, and especially of a young soldier, without the permission of a sergeant or company officer, any unauthorized disappearance from the tents or modules of the unit further than 10 - 15 meters, the commanders considered through the prism of wartime and front-line time, as desertion, with corresponding dire consequences. Dembel was definitely punished with beatings for such an unauthorized disappearance.
Not only that, if a young soldier voluntarily disappeared from the sight of his peers and “grandfathers,” it means that he is shirking their orders and instructions and they are forced to do all sorts of work for the company, which, according to the definition of hazing, is supposed to be done only by young soldiers.
A young soldier can wander beyond the unit’s location and fall into the clutches of dushmans, where he will most likely be killed.
Any check of personnel, and it was carried out in companies almost hourly, obligated the commanders, in the event of a shortage of soldiers, to sound the alarm right up to the regiment commander. Immediately, the entire personnel of the company, then the battalion, and then the regiment, rose on real combat alert to search for the missing person, no matter what year he was drafted. Everyone received scoldings, from the squad commander to the regiment commander. They could demote him, remove him from office, “hack up” an order or medal, they could even put him on trial for the disappearance or corpse of a soldier. Our “meat” has always been strictly accounted for.
So that no one wanted to “fly up” or run around with their tongue hanging out in search of the next fool who decided to even visit a fellow countryman in the neighboring company.
Therefore, the old-timers, with the tacit approval of the company officers, taught such a “freak” who left without permission with good beatings and repeatedly. Don't let yourself or your company down.
Only with the permission of the commander was it possible to retreat somewhere, even within the location of a unit (regiment), and even then, such permission was very, very rarely given, and, as a rule, not one, but several soldiers left, and, as a rule, with weapons. Even when going to the toilet across the parade ground, you were required to receive a machine gun with live ammunition. Therefore, usually, the rifle park was closed with an ordinary wooden stick.

In Afghanistan, we were baffled by the war and the tales of old-time soldiers, warrant officers and officers about their heroic deeds in previous battles. We could not verify or question these feats, supposedly accomplished before us. And the officers and demobilizers focused on these exploits, embellishing them as much as possible.
The officers said so: let the old-timers teach the young soldiers as best they can, they, these old-timers, have gone through such a battle crucible that we, the newcomers, could not even dream of.
Well, the rest was already completed and embellished by our little imagination. It was very convenient for the officers.
The old-timers and demobilizers taught us exactly their own way. Without much regard for the charter, law, human dignity and justice. They taught in such a way that young soldiers from their training hanged themselves, shot themselves, became disabled, ran away to be captured by spirits, or killed their “teachers.”

After a year of service (six months of training in the Union, six months in Afghanistan), living in the army during the Afghan war became much easier. We became old and began to drive the young ones ourselves.
Few were unable to rise from their knees and humiliations of young service, after a year of service.
And usually they couldn’t for two reasons:
1) Either he was a real child who had fallen for various reasons, a coward, a physical weakling, an informer, a thief from his fellow conscripts, colleagues in the unit (namely, a thief from his fellow conscripts in the unit, and not just a thief. To steal from the state or from other people’s units or to take away something - then the younger draft was not considered a bummer) and so on...
2) Either the soldier was very strongly hated by the company officers, who did everything by any means necessary to prevent the soldier from becoming a swollen grandfather of the Airborne Forces.

To my surprise, and as it turned out, I was absolutely unadapted to war and to life in a harsh front-line collective. This really bothered me, in the truest sense of the word.
At the same time, I was far from being one of the “nerds”; I managed to graduate from the river school before the army, which also had a kind of strict demobilization between senior and junior cadets. I managed to work in the Union, on dry cargo ships for an entire navigation, and even for the last few months of navigation, I was a boatswain on a ship with a crew of twenty adult men aged 18 years and much older.
But, if at school I was considered a human being, and was at least somehow protected by Soviet law, and in the civilian fleet I was already respected as a competent specialist and helped to adequately join the harsh naval team, then in Afghanistan, in the company, I and other young soldiers, immediately, from the very first days of front-line service, they became powerless “hello, warrior”, deprived of absolutely any protection, absolutely any possibility of justice and absolutely any justice.
My personal attempt to resist the demobilization did not lead to anything.
In their own way, the just laws of the courtyard and the streets in the army were brazenly trampled upon by the bitchy laws of demobilization. And no one even remembered about the State Laws. It was useless to complain to junior commanders, because they were the main leaders of the concepts of demobilization lawlessness, and it was impossible to complain to officers due to the concepts of boy’s honor. Young soldiers fell into the classic and irresistible for many boys of their own simple codes of honor.
On the very first evening of meeting the company and my future demobilization of the platoon commander (his name was Sopazh or Sapazh, the last name was Sulenbaev or Saulenbaev, I don’t remember exactly) I received a slap in the face from him, because, in his opinion, I was not very competent in managing the unloading beds from a vehicle (the company arrived from guarding fuel and lubricants warehouses, where it had been for almost 2 months). I also responded with a blow to the platoon commander in the face, and was immediately beaten by other demobilizers using improvised means, in the form of iron bedposts. They simply didn’t let me deal with the platoon lock one-on-one. The soldiers of my young conscription also did not stand up for me. They and I were immediately and clearly shown who was boss in the company. After that, in order to cover up the traces of the beatings, I was offered to fight until I bled with one of the young soldiers of my conscription, Lyokha Mrachkovsky (or Marachkovsky, I don’t remember exactly). All this was done under the auspices of “knock bastards.”
In addition, we were already taught from training that complaining to officers that you were beaten by demobilizers is considered a waste in the Airborne Forces.
By this time, the officers had piled into their officer module, and warrant officer “K. IN." chose not to interfere. Lyokha and I looked at each other and began to fight, for the amusement of the demobilizers. And you can't get anywhere. Law of the pack. Only a fight determines the level of respect. Then, of course, Lyokha and I discussed that all demobilizations are brutes, but such was the life of a young soldier. We then fought with him several more times, the demobilizers argued that this was the only way to become a real paratrooper. This, of course, was complete insanity and bestiality, but if you don’t fight, you will be demobilized with even greater cruelty, like “for cowardice.” In the end, beating each other or being demobilized was much better than being sent to disbat for hitting a sergeant with a platoon commander.
Then I became a platoon commander, although I didn’t hold this post for long and was personally demoted by the division commander (there is more about this later in the book).
Lyokha was discharged and also became a platoon commander; the unit even put up a poster with his portrait as the best sergeant of the regiment, of whom the Motherland is proud. He and I remained on good friendly terms until we were sent home, and often recalled our youth and fights for the amusement of the demobilized soldiers.

Why didn’t young soldiers resist demobilization? All the hazing came from our platoon sergeants (deputy platoon commander), who were senior to us in rank and who enjoyed unquestioned officer patronage. ZamKomVzvod often created for themselves a backbone and groups of the same unpunished sadists, freaks of age, demobilization, and sometimes even young soldiers (although young soldiers and only notorious ghouls were extremely rarely involved), who did whatever they wanted in the company, with the tacit consent of the officers and warrant officers of the company .
This was beneficial for the officers and warrant officers of the company, since with the help of these sadists they could be absent from the company for a long time (resting in their officer module from the worries of service) and could direct the company through them.
Officers and warrant officers could thus much more easily maintain discipline in the company, based on fear, hunger, humiliation, bullying and beatings. It was more convenient for the commanders. Considering that all the platoon commanders were senior to us in rank, we could not give them a physical or moral rebuff; they immediately remembered that this rebuff would definitely end for us with a tribunal and a prison sentence.
It was useless to complain to officers and ensigns; they did not wash dirty linen in public and covered the demobilization to the fullest.
If cases of beatings, bullying, famine or hazing had surfaced in the company, then the officers and ensigns would have had their titles and awards cut off. Moreover, the further the information about hazing, theft, beatings and bullying went, the wider the circle of those punished would become, right up to the commander of the 103rd Division.
So, there was no way for the young soldier of my call to expect justice and intercession. It was not in anyone's interest to admit that the regiment and division were completely destroyed.
Moreover, they were so decomposed that even the elite, intelligence, were forced to disband and rebuild from scratch, so even this unit became uncontrollable and criminalized. What can we say about simple battalion companies?
Betrayal, trade in vodka, weapons and drug trafficking (drugs were sent to the USSR in soldiers' coffins) flourished even at the headquarters of our 103rd division.
Where can we expect justice for the soldier? Any justice immediately entailed inspections and commissions from Moscow, but traitors and thieves did not need them.

So the young soldiers shot, hanged themselves, poisoned themselves, either endured it, or outwitted their tormentors and went to the zone, or ran away to the dushmans.

In our company, for example, the platoon commander, Lieutenant “Sh. IN." I considered such complaints only as snitching.
The company commander, Captain Telepenin, simply didn’t give a damn; he himself could have ordered a soldier to be tied to another soldier with a rope to make counting them easier. Platoon Lieutenant "S." I was just afraid of demobilization and the platoon “Sh. IN.". “Sh. IN." beat platoon commander "S." and spread rot, so much so that he, the poor fellow, preferred to sleep in the soldier’s platoon tent, and not in the officer’s module.
Platoon Lieutenant "H." He was always on his own and never got involved in company problems.
Ensign "K. IN." He was completely dependent on the officers, and it made no sense for him to take the side of the soldiers, although he was more familiar to the soldiers than the company officers and was in the company more often than the officers. In addition, he depended for his awards directly on the company commander and the company political officer.
The political officer of the company "O. P." I didn’t want to spoil the relationship with “Sh.” V.”, because if he began to stand up for the young soldiers, “Sh. IN." He would have rotted him too, just like he rotted the platoon “S”.
“Sh. IN." was physically very strong. "ABOUT. P." I was rather weak physically and was unloaded in combat equipment to a minimum, since I was traveling in the mountains in full equipment. Even his officer’s peacoat “O. P." forced young soldiers to wear it. Mines and AGS tapes and bags with “O. P." I didn’t carry it either. He covered up his weakness with “concern” for young soldiers. Like, if he, the political officer, forces one of the young soldiers to drag his personal political property in the mountains, during combat, then demobilization will put less of a burden on this young soldier.
This was all a complete lie. Demobilizers carried their property themselves or secretly left some of their combat equipment on their armor (mostly they left extra bags of ammunition). But the majority of demobilized soldiers honestly and persistently dragged everything to the mountains themselves. Young soldiers, even the most cunning ones, could not leave their equipment on their armor; for this they were beaten and scorned mercilessly. Fortunately, the bulk of the young soldiers still carried everything loaded on them into the mountains, and those who were weak became more resilient in six months. This was the mutual responsibility of the officers and warrant officers; each of them depended on the others for their weaknesses.
There was also no point in complaining above the company commanders, jumping over their heads; the officers themselves immediately declared such a soldier an informer, with all the ensuing consequences of serving such a soldier as a potential suicide bomber and a corpse. Such a “jumping” soldier, an informer, simply had no chance of surviving until demobilization. When I was young in my service, I once tried to open the eyes of the commander of the 103rd division, General Slyusar, to the mess in his division, so what? He was immediately demoted, declared an informer, and no one bothered to sort out the mess. But he didn’t whisper in my ear, didn’t name names, didn’t run to headquarters for a personal audience. After all, I spoke openly about everything, in the presence of my colleagues and officers. He called things by their proper names, but did not say a single last name or first name. I didn’t complain about anyone personally. He just said that in our 103rd Airborne Division, looting, crime, theft, drug addiction and terrible abuse of young soldiers are flourishing. What kind of informer am I? I fought for my native army. I wanted, like in the movies, to see mentorship and friendship between front-line soldiers. I wanted decent officers. It's war. The homeland is in danger.
Never mind this general, commander of the 103rd Airborne Division “A. WITH." I wanted to go both to my homeland and to my subordinates. And he knew everything as well as I did, or even a hundred times better. Only this whole disgusting thing suited him very much. He felt like a pike in troubled water and didn’t want to change anything.
And I, naive, then believed in the Hero of the Soviet Union, “combat general”, commander of the 103rd Airborne Division “A. WITH.".
However, below, in this book and in the comments to it, this episode is written in great detail, read carefully."