Under the command of General A.A. Brusilova The Southwestern Front carried out the most successful strategic operation of the First World War in 1916

During the First World War, Russia and its Entente allies tried to coordinate the actions of their armies. In the summer of 1916, a general offensive of the Allied forces was planned. At a meeting in Chantilly (France) in February 1916, it was decided, in particular, that Russian troops would strike no later than June 2 (15). And no later than June 18 (July 1), the British and French were to launch an offensive. But in February, the Germans launched attacks near Verdun, and in May, Austro-Hungarian troops unleashed a severe blow on the Italians.

The temperamental Italians got scared and began sending panicked telegrams to the French and Russians. They demanded from the former to influence the Russians, and from the latter to immediately go on the offensive in order to distract the Austrians from Italy. Let us note that the Russians always fulfilled their allied obligations, but the allies acted as they saw fit. For example, they did not move when in 1915 the Russian army was retreating, suffering heavy losses and in need of support. But in 1916, the Russians were required to attack in order, among other things, to pull German forces away from the French Verdun. As it turned out later, the British then refused to go to the aid of the French.

And the Italian king Victor Emmanuel III sent a telegram to Nicholas II. According to his “highest” logic, for some reason only the Russians had to save Italy from defeat.

However, on May 18 (31), the king answered the Italian king as follows: “My chief of staff reported to me that on May 22 (June 4) my army will be able to launch an attack on the Austrians. This is even somewhat earlier than the date set by the Allied Military Council... I decided to undertake this isolated offensive in order to assist the brave Italian troops and in consideration of your request.”

The Italians, by the way, even thought about whether they should capitulate to the Austrians. Later it turned out that their fears were greatly exaggerated. At the same time, they diverted more than 20 Austrian divisions to themselves, and the collapse of Italy would have dealt the Entente both a military and, what was no less important for the allies, a moral blow.

The defense of the Austro-Hungarian troops was considered impregnable. The Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Infantry General M. Alekseev, reported to the Tsar on March 31 (April 13), 1916: “The totality of the actions of troops under modern conditions, as experience on the French and our fronts shows, indicates that it is hardly possible to count on execution in one a method of deep penetration into the enemy’s position, although a second line of corps would be placed behind the shock corps.” In other words, the Headquarters did not plan to defeat the enemy. She set more modest tasks for the troops: to inflict losses on the enemy. Although, it would seem, when planning a major operation, it should have clearly and clearly reflected in its directive the operational-strategic goal for which the operation was planned.

At the April meeting at Headquarters, when discussing the plan for the upcoming campaign, the generals, for the most part, were also not particularly eager to go into battle. The Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front, General A. Kuropatkin, said, for example: “It is absolutely impossible to break through the German front, because their fortified zones are so developed and strongly fortified that it is difficult to imagine success.” In turn, the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front, General A. Evert, fully agreed with Kuropatkin and said that the most acceptable way of conducting combat operations for the Western Front was defense. But the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front, General Brusilov, had a different opinion. He decisively stated that the Southwestern Front was not only ready for an offensive, but also had a good chance of operational success.

To assert this, of course, required military talent and great courage.

Unlike many generals, Brusilov adhered to Suvorov’s rule “Fight not with numbers, but with skill!” He insisted on broad offensive actions for the Southwestern Front.

“I am firmly convinced,” he said, “that we can attack... I believe that the disadvantage that we have suffered so far is that we do not attack the enemy on all fronts at once, in order to stop the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of internal action. operational lines, and therefore, being significantly weaker than us in the number of troops, he, using his developed network of railways, transfers his troops to one place or another at will. As a result, it always turns out that in the area that is being attacked, at the appointed time he is always stronger than us, both technically and quantitatively. Therefore, I urgently ask permission for my front to act offensively simultaneously with my neighbors; even if, beyond my expectations, I had not even been successful, then at least I would not only have delayed the enemy’s troops, but also attracted part of his reserves to myself and in this powerful way would have facilitated the task of Evert and Kuropatkin.”

Brusilov, later describing this meeting at Headquarters, noted that General Kuropatkin approached him during the lunch break and made the remark: “You have just been appointed commander-in-chief, and you are fortunate enough not to go on the offensive, and, therefore, not to risk your military reputation, which now stands high. Why do you want to be subjected to major troubles, perhaps being replaced from your position and losing that military aura that you have managed to earn so far? If I were you, I would do my best to disavow any offensive operations..."

The Headquarters Directive of April 11 (24), 1916 defined the following tasks: “1. The general goal of the upcoming actions of our armies is to go on the offensive and attack the German-Austrian troops... 4. The South-Western Front, disturbing the enemy throughout its entire location, makes the main attack with the troops of the 8th Army in the general direction of Lutsk.” The headquarters did not plan operations in depth, trying to limit themselves to a breakthrough and the desire to inflict as many losses on the enemy as possible. And the Southwestern Front was generally assigned a supporting role. But General Brusilov thought differently.

The troops of Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand defended against the Southwestern Front. Initially, Brusilov was opposed by four Austrian and one German army (448,000 bayonets, 38,000 sabers, 1,300 light and 545 heavy guns).

The enemy compensated for the slight numerical disadvantage with an abundance of equipment and the power of defense. In nine months, three defensive lines were built at a distance of 5 km from one another. The first was considered the most durable - with support units, pillboxes, cut-off positions that lead the enemy into a “bag” for extermination. The trenches had concrete canopies, deep dugouts were equipped with reinforced concrete vaults, and machine guns were located under concrete caps. There were also 16 rows of barbed wire, some with electric current running through them. Bombs were hung on the wire, mines and landmines were placed around, abatis, “wolf pits”, and slingshots were made. And in the Russian trenches, Austro-German flamethrowers were waiting.

Behind such a skillfully equipped first strip there were two more, albeit a little weaker. And although the enemy was sure that it was impossible to break through such a defense, he prepared a rear defensive position 10 km from the first line. When Kaiser Wilhelm II visited the front, he was delighted: he had not seen such strong positions, as it seemed to him then, even in the West, where opponents had been very successful in this matter over several years of trench warfare. At the same time, at an exhibition in Vienna, models of defensive structures from the Austro-Hungarian front were demonstrated as the highest achievement of German fortification. And the enemy believed so much in the impregnability of his defense that a few days before the Brusilov offensive, the question was even discussed about whether it would be dangerous to remove a couple of divisions from this front in order to defeat Italy as quickly as possible. It was decided that there would be no danger, since the Russians had been constantly plagued by misfortunes for the past year, and this trend was unlikely to change.

However, the Germans and Austrians relied primarily on heavy artillery. Its ratio was as follows: 174 heavy guns against 76 Russians in the 8th Army sector, 159 against 22 in the 11th Army sector, 62 against 23 in the 7th Army sector, 150 against 47 in the 9th Army sector.

With such superiority, the Germans still complained that too many heavy batteries were transferred to the Italian front. But the most important thing: the enemy did not believe that after the severe defeats of 1915, the Russians were generally capable of anything more or less serious. The chief of staff of the German army group, General Stolzmann, boastfully declared: “The possibility of Russian success is excluded!”

Apparently the Germans have forgotten who they are dealing with. The Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front was not one of those generals who are called parquet (their entire service takes place at headquarters - on parquet floors, not in the trenches - from second lieutenant to general). Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov (1853 - 1926) came from a family of hereditary military men. He lost his parents early and at the age of 4 was enrolled in the Corps of Pages, where guard officers were trained. However, he did not aspire to join the elite units, and, frankly speaking, the funds for service in the guard were not enough. After completing his studies in the Corps of Pages in the summer of 1872, the young officer chose to serve in the 15th Tver Dragoon Regiment, which was stationed in Kutaisi. (Brusilov, by the way, was born in Tiflis). There, the 19-year-old warrant officer was appointed junior platoon officer of the 1st squadron. When the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 began, Brusilov took part in hostilities literally from the first days. For the military campaign he was awarded the Order of St. Stanislaus, 3rd degree. And then there was service in various positions in the Russian Imperial Army. In the summer of 1913, cavalry general A. Brusilov took command of the 12th Army Corps in the Kiev Military District.

With the outbreak of World War I, Brusilov was appointed commander of the 8th Army. The troops of his army advanced to the border and soon entered into battle with the Austrian cavalry. The enemy was defeated, his remnants fled across the river. Zbruch. On the river The enemy Koropets tried to stop Brusilov’s troops, but was again defeated. And he retreated to the Galician city of Galich. And Brusilov moved to Lvov. Along the way we took Galich. The battle lasted three days. The Austrians lost more than five thousand people killed. For the capture of Galich, General Brusilov received the Order of St. George, 4th degree.

Soon the Austrians tried to make a detour west of Lvov. Brusilov, with the troops of the right flank and center, gave the enemy a counter battle (the most difficult type of combat operations), and with the troops of the left flank he took up a strong defense. The enemy suffered massive losses, retreated and decided to gain a foothold in the Carpathian passes in order to block the Russian troops from reaching the Hungarian plain.

In the Battle of Galicia, the first major battle of the Russian army in the Great War, the troops of General Brusilov defeated the 2nd Austro-Hungarian Army, only taking more than 20 thousand prisoners. Brusilov's army repelled all enemy attempts to relieve the city of Przemysl, besieged by the Russians.

In the most difficult year for the Russian army, 1915, the troops of General Brusilov conducted active defensive actions, inflicting serious losses on the enemy. The successes of A. Brusilov could not go unnoticed. In March 1916, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front, and in April he was awarded the rank of adjutant general. The army headquarters was then located in Zhitomir. There was a little more than a month left before the attack...

The front commander, General Brusilov, did not waste time. He paid special attention to intelligence - from regimental to army and front-line. All information obtained about the enemy was concentrated at the front headquarters. For the first time in that war, Brusilov made extensive use of aerial reconnaissance data, including photographs. Let us add that a fighter air group was also formed for the first time on the Southwestern Front. It ensured the dominance of Russian aviation in the air. Our pilots carried out bombing attacks, fired machine guns at the enemy, and supported the infantry on the battlefield.

To mislead the enemy, false radio messages were widely used on the Southwestern Front. Genuine orders, instructions, and instructions were transmitted to the troops exclusively by courier, by courier mail. False artillery positions were created. The front headquarters spread misinformation about the offensive that the Germans were allegedly preparing to the north of Polesie. Therefore, they say, the Southwestern Front must be ready to come to the rescue of General Evert. To be more convincing, the corps were ordered to prepare for an offensive in many places, using trench work to turn their positions into a springboard for an attack. Brusilov told the army commanders: it is necessary to create a complete illusion that the front will strike at 20 points.

As a result, the Austro-Hungarian command was unable to determine where the Russians would deliver the main blow. The Austrians thought in a stereotyped way: where Russian cannons would continuously fire for several days, that’s where they should wait for the main attack.

And it was a miscalculation. Brusilov gave precise instructions to the artillery for the period of breaking through the enemy defenses. Light guns were supposed to first destroy the wire fences, then destroy the machine guns. The targets of medium and heavy artillery were communication trenches and main defensive positions. As soon as the infantry rose to attack, the light artillery had to concentrate fire on the enemy's artillery batteries. Then the heavy guns immediately transferred the fire to the far lines of the enemy’s defense.

The Brusilov breakthrough gave rise to such a thing as a barrage of fire. This was a short shelling of targets, under the direct cover of which the attack began. Under dense artillery fire, the enemy could not offer decisive resistance. The attacking units broke into the first line of enemy trenches. Before this, literally in seconds, the barrage of fire was transferred to the second line of defense, then to the third, etc. And almost closely behind the rampart walked the grenadiers or, as they were called, “trench cleaners.” Grenadier teams burst into enemy trenches as soon as the barrage of fire moved further. The enemy was still sitting in the dugouts, and one grenade thrown there was enough to destroy a dozen enemy soldiers.

Based on the situation on the fronts, General Brusilov foresaw that Headquarters would order the offensive to begin on May 28-29. In order to completely mislead the enemy, he ordered all preparations to be completed by May 19. And on the 20th, the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front received an order to begin the offensive on May 22 (old style) - two weeks earlier than planned. When Brusilov asked whether other fronts would attack simultaneously, General Alekseev answered evasively that Evert would be ready by May 28, but in the meantime Brusilov would have to attack on his own.

It must be emphasized that General Brusilov largely inherited Suvorov. One very typical example: before the offensive, he created a copy of the defensive line of the Austro-German fortifications and trained soldiers on it. Suvorov did this more than once. And yet - the Suvorov-like suddenness of the blow inherent in Brusilov. Brusilov paid the main attention to this issue. The disinformation worked: the Austrians did not understand where the Russians would strike the main blow. It never occurred to them that there would be no main strike as such.

The strategic surprise of the Brusilov breakthrough was achieved by the fact that all four armies struck simultaneously. This, as they said then, was against all the rules. But Suvorov also won, breaking all the rules of war (as if there could be any rules in war!).

A day before the offensive, General Alekseev, via direct wire, conveyed to Brusilov the tsar’s order to conduct the offensive not in four sectors, but in one, and with all the forces intended for operations. Brusilov replied: report to the Emperor that I cannot regroup the corps and armies within 24 hours. Then Alekseev very diplomatically remarked: His Majesty is sleeping, I’ll report tomorrow. And tomorrow it was already too late...

And all four armies achieved success!

Brusilov relied not on artillery, as was customary in trench warfare, but on an infantry breakthrough. In the direction of the main attack, an operational density of 3-6 battalions (3000-5000 bayonets) and 15-20 guns per 1 km of front was created with a consumption of 10,000-15,000 shells. In some areas of the breakthrough, the total number of light and heavy guns was brought to 45-50 per 1 km of front. The operational density of enemy troops ranged from 4 to 10 km per infantry division, i.e. 2 battalions per 1 km of front and 10-12 guns. Thus, the Russians managed to obtain a double, and in some areas even a triple superiority of forces.

Another tactical discovery of Brusilov is an attack with rolls. He abandoned the idea of ​​covering long distances in tight formation. The infantry was divided into the so-called. waves that moved one after another at a distance of 150-200 m. The enemy positions should have been attacked in four waves and from close range. The first two waves took a trench and immediately attacked the second, where they tried to gain a foothold. The remaining waves “rolled” over the first ones and with fresh forces took the next line of defense. The cavalry was supposed to be used only in the event of a breakthrough of the enemy front. This method of attack, by the way, like other methods and methods of Brusilov, was widely used in European armies.

The battle began with a surprise artillery barrage by the troops of the Southwestern Front. On the night of June 3-4 (new style), 1916, at 3 a.m., powerful artillery fire was opened, which continued until 9 a.m. In the areas planned for the breakthrough of Russian troops, the enemy's first line of defense was destroyed. Thanks to well-organized reconnaissance, including aerial photography, Russian artillery was able to suppress many of the identified enemy guns.

The front, with the forces of four armies, broke through the Austro-Hungarian defenses simultaneously in 13 sectors and launched an offensive in depth and on the flanks. During the breakthrough, the troops of the Russian Imperial Army broke the Austro-Hungarian defenses stretching from the Pripyat marshes to the Romanian border, advanced 60-150 km in depth and occupied a significant territory of Galicia (present-day Western Ukraine).

Enemy losses amounted to 1.5 million people killed, wounded and captured. The losses of our troops were three times less. And this is in the offensive, where the ratio of losses should be the opposite!

Therefore, the talk that still exists about the low qualities of the commanders of the Russian Imperial Army is a shameless lie. It is enough to compare its losses with the losses of enemies and allies in the First World War, as well as with the losses of the Red Army in 1941–1945. The victory of the Southwestern Front naturally caused an unprecedented triumph in Russia. In his memoirs, German General Erich Ludendorff wrote: “The Russian attack in the Stryi bend, east of Lutsk, was a complete success. The Austro-Hungarian troops were broken through in several places, and the German units that went to the rescue also found themselves in a difficult situation here. It was one of the worst crises on the Eastern Front."

Both the Russian triumph and the German-Austrian crisis are associated with the name of General Alexei Brusilov. Moreover, it is also necessary to recall the names of the commanders of the armies who, under the leadership of an outstanding commander, achieved great success: the commander of the 7th Army D. G. Shcherbachev, the 8th Army - A. M. Kaledin, the 9th Army P. A. Lechitsky , 11th Army - K.V. Sakharov. As a result of this strategic operation, Italy was saved, the French held out at Verdun, the British withstood the onslaught of the Germans on the river. Somme.

It has long been known that the success of the Southwestern Front was not adequately supported by other fronts. But that's another story. As for the results of the offensive of the Southwestern Front, they were stunning and were of utmost importance for the further course of the war and the later reorganization of the world.

Then, in 1916, the Entente countries received all the conditions for a victorious end to the war. Supporting the Brusilov breakthrough with all the forces of the Entente would have led to the defeat of the enemy. This, alas, did not happen - the Allies began to attack only 26 days after the attack by Brusilov’s troops. And the war ended only in 1918. The defeat, as could have been predicted already in 1916, of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Officially, Russia was not among the winners, and justice has not yet been restored. Nevertheless, this battle became a world classic of military art. By the way, I. Stalin had great respect for General Brusilov, whose ideas formed the basis for the largest strategic offensive operations of 1944, which went down in the history of the Great Patriotic War under the name “Stalin’s ten strikes.”

The Brusilov breakthrough is the only military operation named after the commander. Military operations until 1916 did not have code names.

They were usually named after the location where the battles took place. At first, this operation was known as the Lutsk breakthrough. But already from the first days of the fighting, the success of the advancing Russian troops became so obvious that not only the domestic, but also the foreign press started talking about Brusilov. Even in military circles, especially among officers of the Southwestern Front, the offensive was named after General Brusilov. Then this name spread throughout the country. And it has survived to this day. History simply does not give laurels of encouragement to anyone. In 1916, the Southwestern Front carried out the most successful strategic operation of the Entente forces during the entire war. Adjutant General Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov rightfully deserves eternal memory in Russia.

Especially for "Century"

Almost 100 years ago, in early August, one of the most famous land operations of the First World War under the authorship of Russian General Alexei Brusilov ended. The general's troops broke through the Austro-German front thanks to an original tactical innovation: for the first time in the history of wars, the commander concentrated his forces and delivered powerful blows to the enemy in several directions at once. However, the offensive, which offered a chance to quickly end the war, was not brought to its logical conclusion.

In May 1916, hostilities in Europe became protracted. In military affairs, this is called the plausible term “positional warfare,” but in fact it is an endless sitting in the trenches with unsuccessful attempts to go on a decisive offensive, and each attempt results in huge casualties. Such, for example, are the famous battles on the Marne River in the autumn of 1914 and on the Somme in the winter and spring of 1916, which did not produce tangible results (if you do not take hundreds of thousands of dead and wounded on all sides as a “result”) neither to Russia’s allies in the Entente bloc - England and France, nor their opponents - Germany and Austria-Hungary.

General A. A. Brusilov (life: 1853-1926).

The Russian commander, Adjutant General Alexei Alekseevich Brusilov, studied the experience of these battles and came to interesting conclusions. The main mistake of both the Germans and the Allies was that they acted according to outdated tactics, known since the Napoleonic Wars. It was assumed that the enemy’s front needed to be broken through with one powerful blow in a narrow area (as an example from the biography of Napoleon Bonaparte, let us remember Borodino and the persistent attempts of the French to crush Kutuzov’s left flank - Bagration’s flushes). Brusilov believed that at the beginning of the 20th century, with the development of the fortification system, the advent of mechanized equipment and aviation, holding the attacked area and quickly delivering reinforcements to it was no longer an insurmountable task. The general developed a new offensive concept: several strong attacks in different directions.

Initially, the offensive of Russian troops in 1916 was scheduled for mid-summer, and the Southwestern Front, commanded by Brusilov (he was opposed mainly by the troops of Austria-Hungary), was assigned a secondary role. The main goal was to contain Germany in the eastern theater of operations, so that almost all reserves were at their disposal on the Northern and Western fronts. But Brusilov managed to defend his ideas before Headquarters, headed by Emperor Nicholas II. This was partly facilitated by a change in the operational situation: in early to mid-May, the troops of Italy - another ally of England, France and Russia - suffered a major defeat from the Austrians near Trentino. To prevent the transfer of additional Austrian and German divisions to the west and the final defeat of the Italians, the Allies asked Russia to launch an offensive ahead of schedule. Now Brusilov’s Southwestern Front was supposed to participate in it.

"Brusilovsky" infantry on the Southwestern Front in 1916.

The general had four Russian armies at his disposal - the 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th. The front troops at the start of the operation numbered more than 630 thousand people (of which 60 thousand were cavalry), 1,770 light guns and 168 heavy guns. In manpower and light artillery, the Russians were slightly - about 1.3 times - superior to the Austrian and German armies opposing them. But in heavy artillery the enemy had an overwhelming, more than threefold advantage. This balance of power gave the Austro-German bloc an excellent opportunity for defensive battles. Brusilov, however, even managed to take advantage of this fact: he correctly calculated that in the event of a successful Russian breakthrough, it would be extremely difficult for the “heavy” enemy troops to organize quick counterattacks.

Russian gun crew from the First World War.

The simultaneous offensive of four Russian armies, which received the name “Brusilovsky breakthrough” in history, began on May 22 (June 4 in modern style) along a front with a total length of about 500 km. Brusilov - and this was also a tactical innovation - paid great attention to artillery preparation: for almost a day, Russian artillery continuously hit the Austro-Hungarian and German positions. The southernmost of the Russian armies, the ninth, was the first to go on the offensive, inflicting a crushing blow on the Austrians in the direction of the city of Chernivtsi. The army commander, General A. Krylov, also used an original initiative: his artillery batteries constantly misled the enemy, transferring fire from one area to another. The subsequent infantry attack was a complete success: the Austrians did not understand until the very end which side to expect it from.

A day later, the Russian 8th Army went on the offensive, striking Lutsk. The deliberate delay was explained very simply: Brusilov understood that the Germans and Austrians, in accordance with the prevailing concepts of tactics and strategy, would decide that Krylov’s 9th Army was delivering the main blow, and would transfer reserves there, weakening the front line in other sectors. The general's calculations were brilliantly justified. If the pace of advance of the 9th Army slowed down slightly due to counterattacks, the 8th Army (with the support of the Seventh, which delivered an auxiliary attack from the left flank) literally swept away the weakened enemy defenses. Already on May 25, Brusilov’s troops took Lutsk, and in general, in the first days they advanced to a depth of 35 km. The 11th Army also went on the offensive in the Ternopil and Kremenets area, but here the successes of the Russian troops were somewhat more modest.

Brusilovsky breakthrough. Stages of the operation and directions of the main attacks. The dates in the title and legend of the map are given in the new style.

General Brusilov designated the city of Kovel, northwest of Lutsk, as the main goal of his breakthrough. The calculation was that a week later the troops of the Russian Western Front would begin to attack, and the southern German divisions in this sector would find themselves in a huge “pincer.” Alas, the plan never came to fruition. The commander of the Western Front, General A. Evert, delayed the offensive, citing rainy weather and the fact that his troops did not have time to complete their concentration. He was supported by the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters M. Alekseev, a long-time ill-wisher of Brusilov. Meanwhile, the Germans, as expected, transferred additional reserves to the Lutsk area, and Brusilov was forced to temporarily stop the attacks. By June 12 (25), Russian troops moved to the defense of the occupied territories. Subsequently, in his memoirs, Alexei Alekseevich wrote with bitterness about the inaction of the Western and Northern fronts and, perhaps, these accusations have grounds - after all, both fronts, unlike Brusilov, received reserves for a decisive attack!

The offensive of Brusilov's army. Modern illustration, stylized as a black and white photo.

As a result, the main actions in the summer of 1916 took place exclusively on the Southwestern Front. At the end of June and beginning of July, Brusilov's troops tried to advance again: this time the fighting took place on the northern sector of the front, in the area of ​​the Stokhod River, a tributary of the Pripyat. Apparently, the general had not yet lost hope for active support from the Western Front - the strike through Stokhod almost repeated the idea of ​​​​the failed “Kovel pincers”. Brusilov's troops again broke through the enemy's defenses, but were unable to cross the water barrier on the move. The general made his last attempt at the end of July and beginning of August 1916, but the Western Front did not help the Russians, and the Germans and Austrians, having thrown fresh units into battle, offered fierce resistance. The “Brusilov breakthrough” has fizzled out.

And this is a documentary photograph of the consequences of the breakthrough. The photo shows apparently destroyed Austro-Hungarian positions.

The results of the offensive can be assessed in different ways. From a tactical point of view, it was undoubtedly successful: the Austro-German troops lost up to one and a half million people killed, wounded and prisoners (versus 500 thousand for the Russians), the Russian Empire occupied a territory with a total area of ​​25 thousand sq. km. A by-product was that soon after Brusilov’s success, Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente, significantly complicating the situation for Germany and Austria-Hungary.

On the other hand, Russia did not take advantage of the opportunity to quickly end the hostilities in its favor. In addition, Russian troops received an additional 400 km of front line, which needed to be controlled and protected. After the Brusilov breakthrough, Russia again got involved in a war of attrition, in which it had no chance. The war was rapidly losing popularity among the people, mass protests intensified, and the morale of the army was undermined. The very next year, 1917, this led to devastating consequences within the country.

An ironic depiction of German soldiers surrendering to Brusilov. The author, oddly enough, is also a German - a contemporary of the events, the artist Hermann-Paul.

Interesting fact. German strategists learned “Brusilov’s lesson” very well. Confirmation of this is the military operations of Germany a little over 20 years later, at the beginning of the Second World War. Both the “Manstein plan” to defeat France and the infamous “Barbarossa” plan to attack the USSR were actually built on the ideas of the Russian general: concentration of forces and breakthrough of the front in several directions at the same time.

The plan of Hitler's general (future field marshal) Erich von Manstein to defeat France. Compare with the map of the Brusilov breakthrough: doesn’t it look similar?

The Brusilov breakthrough was an offensive operation by the troops of the Southwestern Front (SWF) of the Russian army on the territory of modern Western Ukraine during the First World War. Prepared and implemented, starting on June 4 (May 22, old style), 1916, under the leadership of the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front, cavalry general Alexei Brusilov. The only battle of the war, the name of which in the world military-historical literature includes the name of a specific commander.

By the end of 1915, the countries of the German bloc - the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) and the Entente alliance opposing them (England, France, Russia, etc.) found themselves in a positional impasse.

Both sides mobilized almost all available human and material resources. Their armies suffered colossal losses, but did not achieve any serious successes. A continuous front formed in both the western and eastern theaters of the war. Any offensive with decisive goals inevitably involved breaking through the enemy's defense in depth.

In March 1916, the Entente countries at a conference in Chantilly (France) set the goal of crushing the Central Powers with coordinated attacks before the end of the year.

For the sake of achieving it, the Headquarters of Emperor Nicholas II in Mogilev prepared a plan for the summer campaign, based on the possibility of attacking only north of Polesie (swamps on the border of Ukraine and Belarus). The main blow in the direction of Vilno (Vilnius) was to be delivered by the Western Front (WF) with the support of the Northern Front (SF). The Southwestern Front, weakened by the failures of 1915, was tasked with pinning down the enemy with defenses. However, at the military council in Mogilev in April, Brusilov obtained permission to also attack, but with specific tasks (from Rivne to Lutsk) and relying only on his own forces.

According to the plan, the Russian army set out on June 15 (June 2, old style), but due to increased pressure on the French near Verdun and the May defeat of the Italians in the Trentino region, the Allies asked Headquarters to start earlier.

The SWF united four armies: the 8th (cavalry general Alexei Kaledin), the 11th (cavalry general Vladimir Sakharov), the 7th (infantry general Dmitry Shcherbachev) and the 9th (infantry general Platon Lechitsky). In total - 40 infantry (573 thousand bayonets) and 15 cavalry (60 thousand sabers) divisions, 1770 light and 168 heavy guns. There were two armored trains, armored cars and two Ilya Muromets bombers. The front occupied a strip about 500 kilometers wide south of Polesie to the Romanian border, with the Dnieper serving as the rear border.

The opposing enemy group included the army groups of the German Colonel General Alexander von Linsingen, the Austrian Colonel Generals Eduard von Böhm-Ermoli and Karl von Planzer-Baltin, as well as the Austro-Hungarian Southern Army under the command of the German Lieutenant General Felix von Bothmer. In total - 39 infantry (448 thousand bayonets) and 10 cavalry (30 thousand sabers) divisions, 1300 light and 545 heavy guns. The infantry formations had more than 700 mortars and about a hundred “new products” - flamethrowers. Over the previous nine months, the enemy had equipped two (in some places three) defensive lines three to five kilometers from one another. Each strip consisted of two or three lines of trenches and resistance units with concrete dugouts and had a depth of up to two kilometers.

Brusilov's plan provided for the main attack by the forces of the right-flank 8th Army on Lutsk with simultaneous auxiliary attacks with independent targets in the zones of all other armies of the front. This ensured rapid camouflage of the main attack and prevented maneuver by enemy reserves and their concentrated use. In 11 breakthrough areas, a significant superiority in forces was ensured: in infantry - up to two and a half times, in artillery - one and a half times, and in heavy artillery - two and a half times. Compliance with camouflage measures ensured operational surprise.

Artillery preparation on different sectors of the front lasted from six to 45 hours. The infantry began the attack under cover of fire and moved in waves - three or four chains every 150-200 steps. The first wave, without stopping at the first line of enemy trenches, immediately attacked the second. The third line was attacked by the third and fourth waves, which rolled over the first two (this tactical technique was called the “roll attack” and was subsequently used by the Allies).

On the third day of the offensive, troops of the 8th Army occupied Lutsk and advanced to a depth of 75 kilometers, but later encountered stubborn enemy resistance. Units of the 11th and 7th armies broke through the front, but due to the lack of reserves they were unable to build on their success.

However, the Headquarters was unable to organize the interaction of the fronts. The offensive of the Polar Front (infantry general Alexei Evert), scheduled for early June, began a month late, was carried out hesitantly and ended in complete failure. The situation required shifting the main attack to the Southwestern Front, but the decision to do so was made only on July 9 (June 26, old style), when the enemy had already brought up large reserves from the western theater. Two attacks on Kovel in July (by the forces of the 8th and 3rd armies of the Polar Fleet and the strategic reserve of the Headquarters) resulted in protracted bloody battles on the Stokhod River. At the same time, the 11th Army occupied Brody, and the 9th Army cleared Bukovina and Southern Galicia from the enemy. By August, the front had stabilized along the Stokhod-Zolochev-Galich-Stanislav line.

Brusilov's frontal breakthrough played a big role in the overall course of the war, although operational successes did not lead to decisive strategic results. During the 70 days of the Russian offensive, the Austro-German troops lost up to one and a half million people killed, wounded and captured. The losses of the Russian armies amounted to about half a million.

The forces of Austria-Hungary were seriously undermined, Germany was forced to transfer more than 30 divisions from France, Italy and Greece, which eased the position of the French at Verdun and saved the Italian army from defeat. Romania decided to go over to the Entente side. Along with the Battle of the Somme, the SWF operation marked the beginning of a turning point in the war. From the point of view of military art, the offensive marked the emergence of a new form of breaking through the front (simultaneously in several sectors), put forward by Brusilov. The Allies used his experience, especially in the 1918 campaign in the Western theater.

For successful leadership of the troops in the summer of 1916, Brusilov was awarded the golden weapon of St. George with diamonds.

In May-June 1917, Alexey Brusilov acted as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, was a military adviser to the Provisional Government, and later voluntarily joined the Red Army and was appointed chairman of the Military Historical Commission for the study and use of the experience of the First World War, from 1922 - chief cavalry inspector of the Red Army. He died in 1926 and was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery in Moscow.

In December 2014, sculptural compositions dedicated to the First World War and the Great Patriotic War were unveiled near the building of the Russian Ministry of Defense on Frunzenskaya Embankment in Moscow. (The author is sculptor of the M. B. Grekov Studio of Military Artists Mikhail Pereyaslavets). The composition, dedicated to the First World War, depicts the largest offensive operations of the Russian army - the Brusilov breakthrough, the siege of Przemysl and the assault on the Erzurum fortress.

The material was prepared based on information from RIA Novosti and open sources

The article provides answers to the questions: what is the importance of language for building a civilization of creation; why the Russian language is the basis for building a civilization of creation in Russia; Why do the conscience and morality of a people depend on language? The division of speech into the language of truth (the language of creation) and the language of lies (the language of destruction) is described, and the meaning of such a division is explained. Attached to the article is a table distinguishing between the language of truth (the language of creation) and the language of lies (the language of destruction).

The importance of language in civilization building

It is impossible to build a creative society
using destructive concepts.

Every creator needs to improve in discernment,
expose manifestations of the language of destruction
and spread the language of truth - the language of creation.

Language is a system that enables communication and the transfer of information between people and even between generations separated by significant periods of time, for example, through writing and, nowadays, through film and other forms of technical recording. In addition, language is also the medium through which information is processed.

Languages ​​differ by place of origin: Russian, English, French and others. Also in the world, languages ​​are created for various fields of activity: the language of chemistry, physics, there is the language of programmers, medical workers, economists, bankers, there is the language of the criminal world and others. These languages ​​do not live in isolation and some concepts from narrow languages ​​gradually flow into the common speech of the majority of the population of a particular society.

Due to the system of concepts of a language, native speakers of this language have the opportunity to understand each other and unite in joint activities. There are also languages ​​that perform the function of hiding information; they are deliberately made incomprehensible to most people - they will be discussed below. In addition, the words of a particular language often, due to their emotional connotation, convey moral assessments for the phenomena denoted by these words.

For example, according to the language of affirmation and preservation of Sobriety, actively used by the sober movement in Russia, drinking alcohol is called “alcoholic self-poisoning” - words with a negative emotional connotation. The same process, in the language of the structures involved in taking away Sobriety, is called “drinking strong drinks,” “drinking beer, wine,” and other positively colored words. As you can see, you can describe the same phenomenon in a creative, truthful language, using the words “alcohol self-poisoning,” but when using the language of lies (the language of destruction), you can hide the harmful effects of alcohol by hiding it with the words “drinking.”

In turn, representatives of the civilization of creation are taking retaliatory measures to protect morality and increase the vitality of society by developing a creative terminological apparatus. An example of this is the language of affirmation and preservation of Sobriety, which became the basis for writing this work.

Thus, humanity has two comprehensive languages: the language of lies (the language of destruction) and the language of truth (the language of creation). By spreading the language of lies (language of destruction) among citizens

• the ability to understand surrounding events and predict their consequences is impaired,
• the morality of society is declining,
• Sobriety is taken away,
• natural family values ​​are being destroyed,

which facilitates appropriation and acquisitiveness for narrow circles of a destructive-appropriating civilization. The language of lies (the language of destruction) reduces the viability of broad layers of humanity.

The second language, the language of truth (the language of creation), is distinguished by its intelligibility; the words in this language truthfully reflect the usefulness or harmfulness of certain phenomena for humanity, due to which the use of the language of truth allows people to build a just world order.

Words define morality

Each concept represents the relationship between a word and an image corresponding to the word. Moreover, what the image of the phenomenon will be in people’s minds, what people’s emotional and moral assessment of the phenomenon will be, largely depends on the word used. For example, the words “love”, “tenderness” have a soft, melodic consonance and these words form a favorable attitude towards the phenomena denoted by these words, but the words “nasty”, “anger”, “abomination” subconsciously evoke a negative assessment of the phenomena denoted by these words, this occurs largely unconsciously, due to the fact that these words have a harsh, rude sound. The words themselves help to understand our world based on the wisdom of the people accumulated in the language. The emotional coloring of words is an important aspect of constructing the language of creation.

The leading layers of a destructive-appropriating civilization understand this, and the violation of society’s understanding of reality plays into their hands. The substitution of concepts can be seen most clearly in the example of the promotion of sexual perversions. For example, according to reports from the “Forward, Citizens” community in Moscow at VDNKh in 2018, the early introduction of “sex education lessons in schools” was proposed, which is essentially the corruption of children. In these lessons, it is planned to introduce the concept of “gender” into the school curriculum instead of the usual concept of “sex”. Gender ideologists deny the concept of “sex” and introduce the concept of “gender” - something like “social sex”, that is, a semblance of sex chosen by a person independently, but this word does not have a clear definition. Thus, with the help of substitution of concepts, children of European countries are now being forced to doubt their gender, and they are trying to push the same thing in Russia. Also in these lessons on sexual depravity, the concepts of “homophobia” and “transphobia” are introduced, which equate people with natural family values ​​with sick people. Instead of the concepts of “sodomy”, “pederast”, “sexual pervert”, neutral or positively colored words such as “gay”, “homosexual” and others are now imposed on us. In this way, representatives of a destructive-appropriating civilization change the morality of people. The destruction of natural family values, first of all, begins with a change in language.

When a word that truly represents a phenomenon is replaced by another neutral or attractive word, according to the rules of Western science, this is called “euphemization.” This word comes from the Greek. ἐυφήμη – “prudence”, but in reality the word “euphemization” is also a manifestation of the language of lies, because this phenomenon does not bring anything “good” to society. For example, to refer to the murder of children in the womb, the inexpressive, abstract word “abortion” is used. At the same time, an unborn person is called a “fetus,” thereby equating it with inanimate objects (vegetables, fruits) and is deprived of any legislative protection - this substitution of concepts helps justify the permissibility of intrauterine murder of children. Destroyers in Western Europe and the United States of America go even further and propose to introduce into the legal field the concepts of “postpartum abortion” and “postnatal abortion”, covering with these words their proposals to allow parents to kill already born, including healthy children, at the request of parents.

Often now the word “cohabitation” is replaced with the words “civil marriage”. Initially, the expression “civil marriage” meant a marriage formalized in the relevant government authorities without the participation of the church. Cohabitation is not actually marriage, it is already a forgery. In addition, in order to preserve the morality and family values ​​of society, it is advisable for society to condemn extramarital affairs, therefore a word with a negative, condemning connotation should be used to designate them; therefore, it is unacceptable to call cohabitation “civil marriage.” Language is the basis of human morality.

Emotionally neutral, politically correct language, which often replaces the creative concepts of different cultures and peoples, often serves to hide the destructive effects of many phenomena and helps the spread of these phenomena. Modern world-eaters have united and idealize their false language, calling it political correctness, while claiming the most benign names for themselves and their minions. For example, it is politically incorrect to call economic invaders invaders - now they are “investors.” It is not politically correct to say “sexual deviants”; supposedly one should say “persons with non-traditional sexual orientation”, “gays”. It is not politically correct to say “prostitute” or “whore” - now journalists call them “sex workers”, etc. By the way, the word “correctness” itself means tact, politeness, courtesy, but at the same time it means “accuracy, correctness, clarity." It turns out that if the use of a certain word is considered impolite in a certain circle of people, therefore, it is incorrect and “wrong”. It turns out that to determine what is politically correct, the truth is not needed - a word reflecting the truth can be declared incorrect if it does not correspond to the order accepted in a particular society. Therefore, it is better to use the concept of “correctness” instead of the concept of “correctness”. The word “correctness” is close in sound to the word “truth”, therefore what is called correct must correspond to the truth (objective reality).

By imposing a false language on society, representatives of a destructive-appropriating civilization change people’s thinking, systematically deprive people of the opportunity to understand what is good and what is evil; also, due to the imposition of “political correctness,” the intelligibility of information in general decreases. For example, we are now replacing the concept of “pressure” or “coercion” with the concept of “sanctions”. The word “sanctions” sounds soft, so it is quite calm for the means of forming public consciousness (SFOS) to talk about measures of pressure (sanctions) from the United States of America, calling them our “partners” - but this is a deception. Thus, with the help of the language of lies, they hide from us the weak, dependent position of Russia, and also retouch the true aggressive behavior of the United States of America. Politicians are specially trained to “smooth out” popular indignation by substituting concepts, as well as by introducing new concepts into speech.

If it is necessary to make a massive layoff of employees, then in destructive false language this is called the soft word “optimization,” as a result of which the vigilance of the creators is muffled.

Another example: bankers in Russia and the world are puzzled by how to force people to borrow at a significant interest rate as much and as often as possible. For this, it is very convenient to use the concept of “credit” instead of the true concepts of “usurious debt”, “interest-bearing debt” or “growing debt”. In addition, the expression “credit product” is now spreading, with the help of which citizens are given the feeling that lending money by a bank is not a service, but a type of product or product. When using the expression “credit product”, pawnbrokers and moneylenders take on the appearance of creative people engaged in the production of their “products”.

Understanding the properties of the emotional coloring of words allows everyone to understand and justify that a particular word belongs to the language of truth (the language of creation), or the language of lies (the language of destruction). How to apply this knowledge for creative purposes is described in detail in the last section of this work.

The Russian language is the basis for constructing the language of truth (the language of creation) in Russia

The Russian language is the state-forming language of Russia; it is the basis for the preservation and development of the scientific, cultural, historical heritage of Russia and the Soviet Union. The use of Russian words is important for citizens to understand the value of Russian culture and awaken love for the Motherland. The Russian language has many other advantages; in order to more accurately describe the meaning of the Russian language, let us compare it with English and with the so-called “international concepts”.

The meaning of some words in the Russian language is often more creative than the meaning of English words. For example, instead of the concept of “Motherland”, as fatherland, native country, in English the word “land” is used, that is, simply “land”.

Nowadays, the word “manager” is widely used. In the Russian Empire there was a profession called “manager”; it would seem, why invent and replace a Russian word with a foreign one? The word “management” itself contains the root “rule”, which is close to the expressions “to do right, to rule, to correct.” A similar root of “rights” is present in the words “righteous,” “truth,” “justice,” “justice.” A person called a “manager” or “manager” may subconsciously feel that he must change reality to the correct state, and his subordinates will expect the same from him. When the creative Russian word is replaced by the English-language “manager,” the concept of the high mission of a manager is blurred in the minds of people, which subsequently has a strong impact on the state of the entire society.

In addition to a more creative meaning, Russian words are advantageous for constructing the language of truth (the language of creation) due to the fact that in the Russian language word formation is easily traced by words with the same root, for example: the words “research” or “consequence” come from the word “trace” - the same Thus, any complex Russian word has a simpler, and most importantly, understandable basis. In the English language, which is actively propagated today, there is no systematic word formation, since many words in it are collected from Latin, Greek, French, Scandinavian and other languages. The continuity of word formation in the Russian language often allows us to figure out what this or that old or newly created word means, helps us to understand the relationships between the phenomena of life - this quality must be preserved.

The excessive polysemy of words that is characteristic of the English language is undesirable. There is ambiguity in the Russian language, but in English there is an order of magnitude more of it; it is characteristic of many English words, for example, the word “break”, according to the Google translator, has 85 meanings, including “to break”, “to lay”, “disperse”, “teach”, “train”, “weaken”, etc. Examples of English polysemy can be given for a very long time.

In addition, in English many words have the same sound but different spellings. The rules of reading in English are extremely vague and there are many exceptions; therefore, in addition to writing, the student has to remember the pronunciation of each word, for which it is customary to indicate the transcription in dictionaries. For example, one creator of a textbook for learning English counted five exceptions to seven rules for reading the letter “u” in various letter combinations. There is an English joke that it is only spelled "Manchester" but pronounced "Liverpool". The famous English linguist Max Muller rightly noted that English spelling is a national disaster. Partly as a result of this deficiency, dialects and dialects of the English language are proliferating in different parts of the world, which often makes mutual understanding difficult. Attempts are regularly made to change this situation, the most famous of them was undertaken by Bernard Shaw: he created a fund, with the help of which a competition was announced to create a new English alphabet with a clear correspondence between writing and pronunciation. This alphabet was created, it contains 40 letters, each of which corresponds to only one sound. Despite the advantages of B. Shaw's alphabet, they did not change the familiar, disordered English writing.

Due to the lack of clear reading rules, the quality of transmission, reception of information and thinking based on the English language decreases. Having clear rules for reading and pronunciation in the Russian language is of great value.

Russian is a figurative language - most Russian words have a clear relationship in our minds with the phenomena denoted by these words. For example, when teaching sciences presented in Russian, students rarely need dictionaries - Russian speech makes it easier to understand the meaning of what is written, the boundaries of the use of Russian words are often intuitively clear. The same cannot be said for teaching based on international concepts, which requires careful memorization of word definitions. Foreign words are often too abstract, which makes it difficult to connect a foreign word with its corresponding image. In this regard, many people who write texts use words whose meaning they do not always understand, or understand the meaning of words differently than readers understand these words, as a result of which the writer’s thought can be detached from the text he is creating. Reading such texts sometimes brings nothing but a headache. In addition, due to speech incomprehensible to the majority, a significant part of the information becomes accessible only to a narrow circle of people who have studied a set of concepts specific to a particular area for a long time. In this way, information is hidden from the uninitiated (from “non-specialists”), which helps build a society in which narrow layers of a destructive-appropriating civilization will dominate. In addition to hiding information, representatives of a destructive-appropriating civilization often deceive people with words that do not have precise definitions, for example, “gender”, “tolerance”, “democracy” and others. These words are introduced into laws and sciences, but they do not have a clear definition, which opens up great opportunities for the creation of false ideals and other types of deception.

Communication in Russia at all levels, especially in the political environment, must be conducted in the Russian literary language; replacing Russian words with foreign ones is unacceptable, because:

• Russian words are most often figurative, precise and understandable;
• the meaning of Russian words is fixed in dictionaries, therefore, communication at any level can be built on the basis of the Russian literary language;
• the approval of the rules of communication in Russian words in the political environment, in the economy and other areas significantly facilitates popular control over the activities of government officials, and also facilitates the entry into power of the indigenous peoples of Russia;
• communicating in Russian words makes it difficult for foreign interference in Russian politics;
• many foreign words from managers, scientists and others through journalists, the education system, the Internet, television, etc., pass into the common speech of the entire society. This changes the system of people’s life values ​​and fosters disrespect for the Russian language and Russian culture. As the “tops” say, many other people tend to speak the same way, therefore, at the highest state level, communication should be conducted in Russian;
• language determines the value system and thinking. Thinking based on the Russian language is more creative, in contrast to thinking based on the international concepts implanted in us.

Beware of office stuff!

Some officials, in order to avoid answering questions that are inconvenient for them, often begin to tell the people a lot of unknown, as well as overly abstract, confusing words and expressions. In this case, there may be no meaning at all in the speaker’s speeches, but due to the incomprehensibility, it will seem to many listeners that this is a “highly qualified specialist” whom they cannot understand due to their lack of education and “misunderstanding of terminology.” A clear manifestation of the language of lies (the language of destruction) is clericalism. The apt word “office worker” was created by K. Chukovsky - it sounds like the name of a disease that affects our speech.

“So what is he, a clerk? He has very precise signs that are common to both translated and domestic literature.

This is the displacement of a verb, that is, movement, action, by a participle, a gerund, a noun (especially verbal!), which means stagnation, immobility. And of all verb forms, there is a predilection for the infinitive.

This is a pile-up of nouns in oblique cases, most often long chains of nouns in the same case - the genitive, so that it is no longer possible to understand what refers to what and what is being said.

This is an abundance of foreign words where they can easily be replaced with Russian words.

This is the displacement of active revolutions by passive ones, which are almost always heavier and more cumbersome.

This is a heavy, confused structure of phrases, incomprehensibility. Countless subordinate clauses, doubly ponderous and unnatural in colloquial speech.

This is dullness, monotony, weariness, cliche. Poor, meager vocabulary: both the author and the characters speak the same dry, official language. Always, without any reason or need, they prefer a long word to a short one, an official or bookish one to a colloquial one, a complex one to a simple one, a stamp to a living image.”

Such speech was ridiculed by Ilf and Petrov:

“The task, for example, is as follows:

- Sweep the streets.

Instead of immediately carrying out this order, the strong guy makes a mad fuss about him. He throws out the slogan:

“It’s time to start the fight to sweep the streets.”

The fight is on, but the streets are not swept. The next slogan takes things even further:

– Let’s join the campaign to organize the struggle to sweep the streets.

Time passes, the strong guy does not sleep, and new commandments are posted on the unswept streets:

“Everything to carry out the plan to organize a campaign to fight for sweeping.”

And finally, at the last stage, the initial task completely disappears, and only passionate, shrill babbling remains.

– Shame on the disrupters of the campaign for the struggle to implement the plan for organizing the campaign of struggle.

All clear. It's not done. However, the appearance of desperate activity is preserved. And a strong guy leaves for Yalta to repair his broken body.”

This example is an exaggeration, but you and I are constantly being given the appearance of vigorous and well-intentioned activity with the help of “international”, “business” and “weighty” words.

Dry, confused speech often helps dishonest officials, economists, and bankers to deceive the people and trade in the Motherland, while maintaining the appearance of constructive actions. For example, the most destructive laws in Russia, as a rule, have quite plausible names, in particular, the law, according to which in 2018, for the majority of Russian residents, retirement was postponed by 5 years, has an ordinary, camouflage name: “Federal Law “On introducing amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation on the issues of assigning and paying pensions” - millions of people will go hungry and beggar because of this, but the title is just about “changes in individual legislative acts.” Another example: the 2014 law on the transfer of some Russian lands to foreign states for next to nothing for a long period of time is called “On territories of rapid socio-economic development in the Russian Federation.” Konstantin Paustovsky, in one of his articles, examines the influence of such a language and concludes: “...only our cruelest enemy could call this language Russian.” The office was and is being built through a special structure of sentences, and also largely on the basis of foreign words. Even Peter I, who zealously implanted the European in Russia, was forced to restrain the introduction of foreign words and other manifestations of clericalism, demanding that his subjects write “as intelligibly as possible.” He said to one of his ambassadors: “In your communications you use a lot of Polish and other foreign words and terms, from which it is impossible to understand the matter itself: for this reason, from now on you should write all your communications to us in Russian, without using foreign words and terms.” .

Scientists also speak in office. By using various “terms” and a confusing structure of sentences in scientific work, you can get the approval of professors, create the appearance of scientificity in its absence, but even if there is a useful innovation in scientific work, the majority of compatriots do not recognize it. Instead of scientific luminaries, thus, we often end up with “scientific obscurities.” With the help of dry, official speech with streamlined formulations it is easy to engage in fraud, but you will not be able to reach people and kindle hearts for good deeds with such language.

It is possible and necessary to speak in simple and precise Russian words, to create documents written in simple Russian, especially since the meaning of Russian words is enshrined in many dictionaries. In some cases, generalizing expressions of clericalism may be needed for bureaucratic and scientific speech, but even in business papers they should be used minimally, since clericalism in large quantities leads to various speech errors and distortions, makes the text difficult to understand, and facilitates deception. Subsequently, through journalists, films, school textbooks, etc., such stultifying, dead speech becomes common. Unfortunately, now clericalism is everywhere: it is served to us through television screens, newspapers, radio; works of art and school textbooks are created using dry, dead speech. Nowadays you can often hear how people, communicating in everyday life with their loved ones and acquaintances, instead of using the word “say” - “inform”, instead of simply “doing” - “take measures”, instead of “opportunity” they say “functional”, instead of responding to something they react, instead of condemning they express criticism, instead of observing they monitor, instead of advice they give recommendations and advise, etc. Many foreign words introduced into the Russian language are a manifestation of clericalism , since they give speech a distant, formal sound, and often make speech less understandable.

Previously, foreign words were used mainly among scientists, officials, and among representatives of individual specialties when solving their work problems, but the languages ​​of small groups do not live in isolation, so now these foreign words are being replaced by Russian in all types of communication. As a result of foreign innovations, the Russian language, with rare exceptions, is not enriched, but, on the contrary, becomes poorer. Bright, figurative, living words can now not often be heard or read, for example, the words “sarcastically, caustically, caustically”, even the word “mockery” is now rarely found - they are replaced by the same word “irony”. The abundance of foreign substitutions in the language prevents people from understanding what is happening to them and around them, for example, when a person is asked: “What’s wrong with you?” - he answers: “I’m depressed.” The word “depression” is abstract, sounds like the name of a disease and makes a person think that he needs to be treated for this “disease”; medications for this case are also produced - antidepressants, as a result, sometimes not even the person himself can understand what is happening to him, neither his interlocutor can help him. But if a person said instead of “depression” the expressions “I’m depressed...”, or “I’m depressed that...”, or the word “longing”, then this would be a reason to think about who or what he yearns for, why he depressed, come to the cause of the serious condition and eliminate it.

Many generations of our ancestors, Russian writers, did not create the rich literary Russian language so that we could use dry, inexpressive, streamlined words. Vladimir Dahl’s explanatory dictionary of the living Great Russian language contains about 200 thousand words; instead of this wealth, we are offered to switch to a set of several thousand words and expressions, many of which are dry and abstract. To clear your thoughts and speech from clericalism, we advise you to read Nora Gal’s book “The Living and Dead Word,” as well as the chapter “Clerical Law” from Korney Chukovsky’s book “Alive as Life” and, of course, the classic works of Russian writers.

In order to build society in a creative direction, it is necessary to make information as accessible and understandable to the people as possible, this is especially important for the political and economic areas. If the speech of politicians, economists, bankers is filled with a lot of abstract, incomprehensible words, if a confused structure of proposals from the office is used, then this creates opportunities for fraud, deception of the people, this deprives the majority of citizens of the opportunity to control the work of government bodies and influence it.

What to do?

We need to affirm and preserve a simple, expressive, living, creative language in all areas of public life instead of a lying and dead destructive language. To do this, you need to use predominantly Russian words in your speech and remove manifestations of clericalism from your speech. The concepts of the language of lies (the language of destruction) can also be created on the basis of the Russian language, but most often destructive concepts are introduced into our speech from foreign languages, so often, in order to express ourselves in a truthful, creative language, we only need to translate destructive concepts into Russian. If there is no suitable Russian word, then you need to create it, but if this fails, then a foreign word can be used to build a creative concept, and it is important that it carries the correct emotional, correct moral assessment of the phenomenon it denotes.

“A word can kill, a word can save,
With a word you can lead the shelves!”
V.S. Shefner

Language is the basis of people's thinking. People think in words, use words to designate and generalize the phenomena of reality in their minds, and evaluate them. Thus, language is a computational system: if you use the language of truth, which accurately reflects the essence of phenomena, then humanity, based on this language, will come to correct, creative conclusions and actions; If the language of lies is used, in which the evil is presented as useful and the good is humiliated, then people will be led to erroneous conclusions and destructive actions.

For example, now political correctness is being enforced in the world. At the heart of political correctness is the ideal of using words and expressions that supposedly will not offend any small or large associations based on race, income level, sexual perversion and other characteristics. With this approach, the truth is made unnecessary, truthful words are prohibited from being spoken by the demands of observing political correctness. In response to this, we, creators, need to use the division of speech into the language of truth (the language of creation) and the language of lies (the language of destruction) - this is a good way to defend the truth and creative ideas. The division of speech into the language of truth (the language of creation) and the language of lies (the language of destruction) is based on the ideal of truth, no matter how difficult and offensive it may be for someone. Honest people agree with the truth. Truth is a value for most. Therefore, if your interlocutor, for example, during a public discussion of something says the word of the language of lies (the language of destruction), you need to point out to him that he used the word of the language of lies, explain why this word is false and destructive, then call on the interlocutor and those around them to use the corresponding word of the language of truth (the language of creation). By acting this way, creators will no longer have to make excuses for their political incorrectness - other people will have to make excuses for using the language of lies and destruction.

Each of us needs to monitor our speech and the speech of others, we need to think about what images this or that word will form in people’s minds. It is impossible to build a creative society using the words of the language of lies (the language of destruction). It will not be possible to convey the truth to people with such words - it will be initially distorted, and therefore they will not understand it. For example, one cannot effectively assert Sobriety by calling alcohol a drink; It will not be possible to defend Russia by calling yourself a quilted jacket; You won’t be able to defend family values ​​by calling yourself a homophobe, calling homosexuals gay, etc. It’s almost impossible to add your own meaning to imposed destructive words: people will understand them in the same way as they were used to before.

Often people do not use destructive concepts on purpose, but due to the fact that destructive language is persistently implanted in the surrounding information space, many people simply do not know how to speak correctly. Therefore, we should express our wishes for using the language of truth in a polite form wherever possible: in a guest book in any institution, under an article or video material on the Internet, in personal communication, at public events, etc. Translation of destructive information influences into simple, truthful, creative language almost always deprives them of their destructive power, so every creator needs to improve in discernment, expose the manifestations of the language of destruction and spread the language of truth - the language of creation.

Table with examples of distinguishing between the language of truth (the language of creation) and the language of lies (the language of destruction)

Southwestern Front offensive 1916,

Brusilovsky breakthrough,

Breakthrough of the Southwestern Front in 1916

Breakthrough of the Austro-German front in 1916

The fighting in the Eastern European theater of the First World War in the 1916 campaign was marked by such a major event as the offensive operation of the Russian Southwestern Front under the command of General A.A. Brusilova . During its implementation, for the first time in the entire positional period of hostilities, an operational breakthrough of the enemy front was carried out, which neither the Germans, nor the Austro-Hungarians, nor the British and French had ever been able to do before. The success of the operation was achieved thanks to the new method of attack chosen by Brusilov, the essence of which was to break through enemy positions not in one sector, but in several places along the entire front. The breakthrough in the main direction was combined with auxiliary strikes in other directions, as a result of which the enemy’s entire positional front was shaken and he was unable to concentrate all his reserves to repel the main attack. (See: Brusilov A.A. My memoirs. M., 1983. pp. 183-186.) The offensive operation of the Southwestern Front was a new important stage in the development of military art. (History of military art. Textbook. In 3 books. Book 1. M., 1961. P. 141.)

The general plan of operations of the Russian army for the summer campaign of 1916 was developed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters on the basis of strategic decisions made by the Allies in March 1916 in Chantilly. He proceeded from the fact that a decisive offensive could only be undertaken north of Polesie, that is, by the troops of the Northern and Western Fronts. The Southwestern Front was given a defensive mission. But at the military council on April 14, 1916, held in Mogilev, Brusilov insisted that his front also take part in the offensive.

“According to the plan of the inter-allied conference, the Russian army was supposed to go on the offensive on June 15. However, due to the resumption of German attacks near Verdun and the offensive of the Austro-Hungarian army against the Italians in the Trentino region that began on May 15, the French and Italians persistently demanded that the Russian command take decisive action in a more early deadlines, and it (the command) once again met them halfway.

The Southwestern Front received the task of diverting the forces of the Austro-German troops to ensure the offensive of the Western Front, to which the Headquarters assigned the main role in the general offensive of all three fronts. By the beginning of the offensive, the front consisted of four armies (8th General A.M. Kaledin, 11th General V.V. Sakharov, 7th General D.G. Shcherbachev, 9th General P.A. Lechitsky) and occupied a strip 480 km wide south of Polesie and to the border with Romania.

The army group of Linsengen, the army group of E. Boehm-Ermoli, the Southern Army and the 7th Army of Planzer-Baltin acted against these troops. (Rostunov I.I. Russian Front of the First World War. M., 1976. P. 290.) The Austro-Hungarians strengthened their defense for 9 months. It was well prepared and consisted of two, and in some places three defensive positions, 3-5 km from one another, each position consisted of two or three lines of trenches and resistance nodes and had a depth of 1.5-2 km. The positions were equipped with concrete dugouts and were covered by several strips of barbed wire. In the Austrian trenches, a new product awaited the Russians - flamethrowers, and in the forefield - land mines.

The Southwestern Front's preparations for the offensive were particularly thorough. As a result of the painstaking work of the front commander, army commanders and their headquarters, a clear operation plan was drawn up. The right-flank 8th Army delivered the main blow in the Lutsk direction. The rest of the armies had to solve auxiliary tasks. The immediate goal of the fighting was to defeat the opposing Austro-Hungarian troops and capture their fortified positions.

The enemy's defenses were well scouted (including by aviation reconnaissance) and studied in detail. In order to bring the infantry as close as possible to it and shelter it from fire, 6-8 lines of trenches were prepared at a distance of 70-100 m from one another. In some places, the first line of trenches came within 100m of the Austrian positions. The troops were secretly pulled up to the breakthrough areas and only immediately on the eve of the offensive were withdrawn to the first line. Artillery was also concentrated secretly. In the rear, appropriate training of troops was organized. Soldiers were taught to overcome barriers, capture and hold enemy positions, artillery was preparing to destroy barriers and defensive structures, and accompany their infantry with fire.

The command of the Southwestern Front and its armies managed to skillfully group their troops. In general, the front forces were only slightly superior to the enemy forces. The Russians had 40.5 infantry divisions (573 thousand bayonets), 15 cavalry divisions (60 thousand sabers), 1770 light and 168 heavy guns: the Austro-Hungarians had 39 infantry divisions (437 thousand bayonets), 10 cavalry divisions (30 thousand sabers), 1300 light and 545 heavy guns. This gave a ratio of forces for infantry of 1.3:1 and for cavalry of 2:1 in favor of the Southwestern Front. In terms of the total number of guns, the forces were equal, but the enemy had 3.2 times more heavy artillery. However, in the breakthrough areas, and there were eleven of them, the Russians were able to create a significant superiority in forces: in infantry by 2-2.5 times, in artillery by 1.5-1.7 times, and in heavy artillery - by 2.5 times. (See: Verzhkhovsky D.V. The First World War 1914-1918. M., 1954. P. 71, Yakovlev N.N. The Last War of Old Russia. M., 1994. P. 175.)

The strictest adherence to camouflage measures and the secrecy of all preparations for such a powerful offensive made it unexpected for the enemy. In general terms, its leadership knew about the Russian grouping; intelligence obtained information about the impending attack. But the high military command of the Central Bloc powers, convinced of the inability of the Russian troops to take offensive action after the defeats of 1915, rejected the emerging threat.

“In the early warm morning of June 4, 1916, May 22, old style, the Austrian troops, buried in front of the Russian Southwestern Front, did not see the sun rise,” writes the historian. “Instead of the sun’s rays from the east, dazzling and blinding death - thousands of shells turned habitable , strongly fortified positions in hell... That morning something unheard of and unseen in the annals of a dull, bloody, positional war happened. Almost along the entire length of the Southwestern Front, the attack was a success." (Yakovlev N.N. The Last War of Old Russia. M., 1994. P. 169.)

This first, stunning success was achieved thanks to the close cooperation of infantry and artillery. Russian artillerymen once again demonstrated their superiority to the whole world. Artillery preparation on various sectors of the front lasted from 6 to 45 hours. The Austrians experienced all types of Russian artillery fire and even received their share of chemical shells. “The earth shook. Three-inch shells flew with a howl and whistle, and with a dull groan, heavy explosions merged into one terrible symphony.” (Semanov S.N. Makarov. Brusilov. M., 1989. P. 515.)

Under the cover of their artillery fire, the Russian infantry launched an attack. It moved in waves (3-4 chains each), following one after another every 150-200 steps. The first wave, without stopping on the first line, immediately attacked the second. The third line was attacked by the third and fourth (regimental reserves) waves, which rolled over the first two (this method was called “roll attack” and was subsequently used by the Allies in the Western European theater of war).

The most successful breakthrough was carried out on the right flank, in the offensive zone of the 8th Army of General Kaledin, which operated in the Lutsk direction. Lutsk was taken already on the third day of the offensive, and on the tenth day the army troops went 60 km deep into the enemy’s position and reached the river. Stokhod. Much less successful was the attack of the 11th Army of General Sakharov, which faced fierce resistance from the Austro-Hungarians. But on the left flank of the front, the 9th Army of General Lechitsky advanced 120 km, forced the ?. Prut and took Chernivtsi on June 18. (Rostunov I.I. Russian Front of the First World War. M„ 1976. P. 310-313.) Success had to be developed. The situation required shifting the direction of the main attack from the Western Front to the Southwestern Front, but this was not done in a timely manner. The headquarters tried to put pressure on General A.E. Evert, commander of the Western Front, in order to force him to go on the offensive, but he, showing indecisiveness, hesitated. Convinced of Evert’s reluctance to take decisive action, Brusilov himself turned over his head to the commander of the left-flank 3rd Army of the Western Front, L.P. Lesha with a request to immediately go on the offensive and support his 8th Army. However, Evert did not allow his subordinate to do this. Finally, on June 16, the Headquarters became convinced of the need to use the success of the Southwestern Front. Brusilov began to receive reserves (5th Siberian Corps from the Northern Front of General A.N. Kuropatkin and others), and Evert, although very late, was forced under pressure from the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander General M.V. Alekseev to go on the offensive in the Baranovichi direction. However, it ended unsuccessfully. Meanwhile, in Berlin and Vienna the scale of the disaster that befell the Austro-Hungarian army became clear. From near Verdun, from Germany, from the Italian and even the Thessaloniki front, troops began to be hastily transferred to the aid of the defeated armies. (Yakovlev N.N. The Last War of Old Russia. M„ 1994. P. 177.) Fearing the loss of Kovel, the most important center of communications, the Austro-Germans regrouped their forces and launched powerful counterattacks against the 8th Russian Army. By the end of June there was some calm at the front. Brusilov, having received reinforcements from the 3rd and then the Special Army (the latter was formed from guards corps, it was the 13th in a row and was called Special out of superstition), launched a new offensive with the goal of reaching the Kovel, Brody, Stanislav line. During this phase of the operation, Kovel was never captured by the Russians. The Austro-Germans managed to stabilize the front. Due to the miscalculations of the Headquarters, the lack of will and inactivity of the commanders of the Western and Northern Fronts, the brilliant operation of the Southwestern Front did not receive the conclusion that could have been expected. But she played a big role during the 1916 campaign. The Austro-Hungarian army suffered a crushing defeat. Its losses amounted to about 1.5 million killed and wounded and turned out to be irreparable. 9 thousand officers and 450 thousand soldiers were captured. The Russians lost 500 thousand people in this operation. (Verzhkhovsky D.V. The First World War 1914-1918. M., 1954. P. 74.)

The Russian army, having conquered 25 thousand square meters. km, returned part of Galicia and all of Bukovina. The Entente received invaluable benefits from her victory. To stop the Russian offensive, from June 30 to early September 1916, the Germans transferred at least 16 divisions from the Western Front, the Austro-Hungarians curtailed their offensive against the Italians and sent 7 divisions to Galicia, the Turks - 2 divisions. (See: Harbottle T. Battles of World History. Dictionary. M., 1993. P. 217.) The success of the operation of the Southwestern Front predetermined the entry of Romania into the war on the side of the Entente on August 28, 1916.

Despite its incompleteness, this operation represents an outstanding achievement of military art, which is not denied by foreign authors. They pay tribute to the talent of the Russian general. "Brusilovsky breakthrough" is the only battle of the First World War, the name of which appears in the title of the commander.

Materials used from the book: “One Hundred Great Battles”, M. “Veche”, 2002

From the encyclopedia:

Southwestern Front offensive 1916, Brusidovsky breakthrough, Southwestern Front breakthrough 1916, Austro-German Front offensive 1916, offensive. operation of the South-West troops. front (command-general of the cavalry A.A. Brusilov, chief of staff - general-l. V.N. Klembovsky), carried out from May 22 (June 4) to the end of July (beginning of August) during 1 1st World War 1914-1918. According to the decision of the military. conference of the Entente powers in Chantilly (March 1916) on the general offensive of the allied armies in the summer of 1916 Russian. the command planned to launch a major offensive in mid-June. According to the 1916 campaign plan, approved at a meeting of front commanders at Headquarters (Mogilev) April 1 (14), ch. the attack was to be carried out by the Western troops. front (1st, 2nd, 4th, 10th and 3rd armies) in the Vilna direction. South-West (8th, 11th, 7th and 9th Armies) and Northern. (12th, 5th and 6th Armies) the fronts were assigned a supporting role. According to the Headquarters directive dated April 11(24). South-West the front was supposed to assist the West. front offensive from the Rivne region to Lutsk. Application of ch. the attack on Lutsk was assigned to the 8th Army, as it was closest to the West. to the front. The command of the Southwestern Front carried out comprehensive preparations for the offensive: special attention was paid to thorough (including aerial) reconnaissance of the defense of the pr-ka, engineer. preparing bridgeheads for the offensive (each with 6-8 parallel trenches), training troops to overcome sections of positions similar to the Austro-German ones (2-3 fortified zones), practicing the interaction of infantry with artillery. The offensive was prepared in the strictest secrecy. The issue of breaking through the Austro-German positional front was resolved in a new way. defense In contrast to that adopted in the Anglo-French. troops practice breaking through defenses in one sector (direction), Brusilov prepared a breakthrough in the stripes of all armies of the front at the same time, i.e. in four directions. This achieved oper. masking ch. strike and maneuver with reserves was excluded in Ch. direction of attack. South-West the front had a slight superiority over the Austro-German armies (4th, 1st, 2nd, Southern and 7th) in manpower (573 thousand bayonets versus 448 thousand) and light artillery (1770 versus 1301 op.), but in heavy art it was more than three times inferior to pr (168 versus 545 op.). Superiority in forces and means was created in the areas where armies broke through: in infantry - by 2-2.5 times, in artillery - by 1.5 - 1.7 times. The front reserve consisted of St. 5 infantry divisions (including the 5th Siberian Corps, transferred by Headquarters before the offensive). These forces were clearly not enough to develop success. Due to the heavy defeat of Italy. army in Trentino (May 1916) and the allies’ appeal to Russia with a request to speed up the start of the offensive to divert troops from the Italian army. Front Headquarters decided to launch an offensive in the South-West. front 2 weeks earlier than planned. term. S.-W. f. n. began on May 22 (June 4) with a strong and effective art for that time. preparation. The greatest success was achieved in the zone of the 8th Army (command, General A. M. Kaledin) in the Lutsk direction. Having broken through the front in the 16-km section of Nosovichi, Koryto (the so-called Lutsk breakthrough), by May 25 (June 7) it expanded the breakthrough along the front to 70-80 km, to a depth of 25-35 km and occupied Lutsk. By June 2 (15), the 8th Army defeated the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army. the army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand from the Armenian army. gene groups A. Linsingen and advanced to a depth of 65-75 km. Having exhausted its reserves and encountered stubborn resistance in the Kiselin region from the Germans and troops transferred from France and other sectors of the front, it suspended its advance. This was also done because its offensive was not supported by the neighboring 3rd Army of the West. front. From June 3 (16) to June 22 (July 5), the 8th Army repelled counterattacks by army groups of General. G. Marwitz, E. Fankelhain and F. Bernhardi. June 11(24) South-West. The 3rd Army was transferred to the front. Troops of the 8th and 3rd (commands, General L.P. Lesh) armies tried to cross the river. Stokhod and captured Kovel, but failed, because the Germans, having brought up large forces, created a powerful defense unit here. The 11th Army (commanded by General V.V. Sakharov) broke through the front at Sapanov, but due to the lack of reserves it could not develop the breakthrough. The 7th Army (command, General D.G. Shcherbachev) broke through the defenses in the 7-km sector in the Yazlovets region, but counterattacks by large forces from the Army. gene groups Bem-Ermolli and Yuzh. army general Bothmer stopped the development of the offensive. The operation of the 9th Army (command, General Ts. A. Lechitsky) was successfully deployed. Having broken through the front in the 11-km section of Onut, Dobronouc, it defeated the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army and occupied Chernivtsi on June 5 (18). Successful breakthrough of the South-West. front was not supported in a timely manner by other fronts. The headquarters turned out to be unable to organize the interaction of the fronts. The Western offensive scheduled for May 27-28 (June 10-11). front was initially postponed, but. then it began twice - on June 2 (15) and June 20-26 (July 3-9), but was carried out hesitantly and ended in complete failure. The situation urgently required the transfer of chapter. strike from the rear to the southwest direction, but the Headquarters made a decision on this only on June 26 (July 9), when the Germans had already managed to concentrate large forces here. Two offensives launched during July against the heavily fortified fortifications. Kovel, in which the strategist also participated, the reserve of the Headquarters - Special Army General. V. M. Bezobrazov (3 corps), resulted in protracted bloody battles on the river. Stokhod, where the front stabilized. The 11th Army occupied Brody. The offensive of the 9th Army developed most successfully; during July it cleared all of Bukovina and South. Galicia. By the beginning of August, the front had stabilized along the river line. Stokhod, Kiselin, Zolochev, Berezhany, Galich, Stanislav, Delyatin. S.-W. f. n. was a major front-line operation, which was of great importance in the overall course of the war, although the operation. the successes of the front troops (breakthrough of the defense in a zone of 550 km, to a depth of 60-150 km) and did not lead to decisive strategic results. Austro-German troops lost up to 1.5 million people in May - July. killed, wounded and prisoners, 581 guns, 1,795 machine guns, 448 bombs and mortars. Russian losses armies amounted to approx. 500 thousand people The forces of Austria-Hungary were seriously undermined. To stop the advance of Russian. troops, the Germans were forced to transfer from the West. and Italy. Frontov St. 30 infantry and more than 3 kav. divisions, it eased the position of the French at Verdun and forced the Germans to stop the offensive in Trentino (see Verdun operation 1916, Trentino operation 1916). Important political as a result of S.-W. f. n. was the acceleration of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. monarchy and the performance of Romania on the side of the Entente (Romanian Front). Along with the Battle of the Somme, South-West. f. n. marked the beginning of a turning point during the 1st World War. From a military point of view. lawsuit, South-West f. n. marked the emergence of a new form of front breakthrough (simultaneously in several sectors), put forward by Brusilov, which was developed in the last years of World War I, especially in the 1918 campaign in Western Europe. military theater actions.

V. A. Yemets.

Soviet military encyclopedia: In the 8th volume / Ch. ed. commission A.A. Grechko (prev.) and others - M., 1976. -T.I. -WITH. 605-606.

Literature

Brusilov A.A. My memories. - M.-L., 1929.

Brusilov A. A. My memories. M., 1963.

Vetoshnikov L.V. Brusilovsky breakthrough. M., 1940.

Domank A. On the left flank of the Brusilov breakthrough // Border Guard. - 1994. -No. 8.-S. 67-75.

Zayonchkovsky A. M. World War 1914-1918. Ed. 3rd. T. 2. M., 1938;

History of the First World War. 1914-1918. T. 2. M., 1975;

World War 1914-1918. "Lutsk breakthrough". M., 1924;

The offensive of the Southwestern Front in May-June 1916. M., 1940;

Rostunov I.I. General Brusilov. - M., 1964.

Rostunov I.I. Russian front of the First World War. M., 1976;

Soviet military encyclopedia: In the 8th volume / Ch. ed. commission A.A. Grechko (prev.) and others - M., 1976. -T.I. -WITH. 605-606.

Strategic outline of the war of 1914-1918. Part 6. M., 1923;